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Abstract
Theory and Applications of Outsider Anonymity
in Broadcast Encryption
by
Irippuge Deshan Milinda Perera
Adviser: Dr. Nelly Fazio
Broadcast encryption (BE) allows efficient one-to-many secret communication of
data over a broadcast channel. In the standard setting of BE, information about
receivers is transmitted in the clear together with ciphertexts. This could be a serious
violation of recipient privacy since the identities of the users authorized to access
the secret content in certain broadcast scenarios are as sensitive as the content itself.
Anonymous broadcast encryption (AnoBE) prevents this leakage of recipient identities
from ciphertexts but at a cost of a linear lower bound (in the number of receivers) on
the length of ciphertexts. A linear ciphertext length is a highly undesirable bottleneck
in any large-scale broadcast application. In this thesis, we propose a less stringent
yet very meaningful notion of anonymity for broadcast encryption called outsider-
anonymous broadcast encryption (oABE) that allows the creation of ciphertexts that
are sublinear in the number of receivers. We construct several oABE schemes with
varying security guarantees and levels of efficiency. We also present two very interesting
cryptographic applications afforded by the efficiency of our oABE schemes. The first
is broadcast steganography (BS), the extension of the state of the art setting of point-
to-point steganography to the multi-recipient setting. The second is oblivious group
storage (OGS), the introduction of fine-grained data access control policies to the
setting of multi-client oblivious cloud storage protocols.
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The origins of cryptography are rooted almost exclusively in diplomatic, military, and
government contexts, but in the last couple of decades, cryptography has rapidly moved
into consumer applications. One does not have to look far to notice the widespread
use of cryptography in our everyday lives. Whenever we unlock a garage door or a car
using a remote-control device, connect to a WiFi network, pay for meals at a restaurant
or order takeout on the Internet using a credit or debit card, make a video call via
voice-over-IP, install a software update, or pay for public transportation using a transit
pass we witness the omnipresence of cryptography. These ubiquitous applications of
cryptography are fueled by our increasing reliance on digital technologies and our
general necessity to prevent these technologies from being abused.
Historically, cryptography was considered the art of writing and solving codes.
Therefore, proving the advertised security guarantees of the early cryptosystems such
as Caesar cipher, Vigenère cipher, and Enigma machine was never an integral part of
their design [73]. Consequently, all these early cryptosystems have been badly broken.1
The first step in treating cryptography as a science was taken by Claude Shannon in
his seminal paper published in 1949 under the title “Communication Theory of Secrecy
1Here we mean that a cryptosystems is broken when it is possible for an adversary to recover the
message embedded in a ciphertext without knowing the secret key with overwhelming advantage.
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
Systems” [101]. It was in this paper that the first rigorous mathematical analysis
of private-key encryption was presented. A couple of decades later, Whitfield Diffie
and Martin Hellman published a paper titled “New Directions in Cryptography” [39]
marking a pivotal point in the scientific study of cryptography. The novelty of Diffie-
Hellman result was that it demonstrated how two people can securely communicate
over an insecure channel without having a previously-agreed common shared key.
This paper combined with the introduction of RSA cryptosystem [96] in 1978 by
Ronald L. Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman opened doors to the realm of
public-key cryptography. Since then, the field of cryptography has observed a multitude
of advances in terms of more specialized protocols, refined mathematical foundations,
stronger security guarantees, etc. from the research community. Today, cryptography
is a major research discipline with thousands of researchers and dozens of conferences.
Public-key encryption, which is about the secure point-to-point communication
of messages, is undoubtedly the most popular application domain of public-key
cryptography. The basic security property provided by a public-key encryption scheme
is data secrecy, the guarantee that no ciphertxt reveals any non-trivial information
regarding its encrypted message. This notion of data secrecy has been formalized under
the terms semantic security [57] and non-malleability [44]. It has also been extended
to more specialized settings such as identity-based encryption (IBE) [16], hierarchical
identity-based encryption (HIBE) [53,68], broadcast encryption (BE) [12,49], attribute-
based encryption (ABE) [63,97], etc.
With the increased concerns over the privacy of the users in the recent years,
another security property for public-key encryption came into existence under the
term anonymity [11]. This security property guarantees that a ciphertext does not leak
the identity of the user for whom it was encrypted. As of now, most of the existing
settings of encryption have been extended to provide both data secrecy and anonymity
properties. Examples of such extensions include key-private public-key encryption
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[11], anonymous (hierarchical) identity-based encryption (A(H)IBE) [2, 16, 24], and
anonymous broadcast encryption (AnoBE) [10].
In addition to preserving the user privacy, anonymous encryption schemes also allow
additional cryptographic applications. One such application is public-key encryption
with keyword search (PEKS) as Abdalla et al. noticed in [2]. In a PEKS scheme,
each ciphertext is associated with a keyword with the requirement that the ciphertext
does not leak any information regarding the keyword. A user is given along with his
decryption key a trapdoor for each keyword he is authorized to use. Later, given
a batch of ciphertexts stored in a remote database, a user can delegate the task of
finding the ciphertexts associated to one of his keywords to an honest-but-curious
database administrator by providing the corresponding trapdoor. Then, the database
administrator can find all the ciphertexts associated with the keyword corresponding
to the given trapdoor without knowing what the keyword is or which messages are
encrypted in the ciphertexts. In [2], Abdalla et al. presented a generic framework
that can construct a PEKS scheme by using an AIBE scheme as an underlying
primitive. Clearly, the efficiency of the underlying anonymous encryption scheme
plays an important role in these cryptographic applications of anonymity.
A major drawback for the efficiency of the state of the art anonymous broadcast
encryption schemes is that their ciphertext lengths are linear in the number of receivers.
As Kiayias and Samari showed in [76], this linear ciphertext length is a lower bound that
is unfortunately unavoidable. A close examination of the result in [76] indicates that
this highly inefficient overhead on the ciphertext length is a direct consequence of the
very restrictive notion of anonymity that the existing anonymous broadcast encryption
schemes are required to provide. Since any overhead on the ciphertext length directly
translates to a communication overhead, the existing definition of anonytmity for
broadcast encryption also narrows the range of its applications, especially when it
comes to large-scale broadcast systems.
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In this dissertation, we propose a less stringent yet very meaningful notion of
anonymity for broadcast encryption called outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption
(oABE). Since our notion of oursider anonymity is not subject to the lower bound
presented in [76], our oABE schemes enjoy much more efficient, sublinear ciphertext
lengths in the number of receivers. We also present two very interesting cryptographic
applications allowed by the efficiency of our oABE schemes. The first extends the
state of the art setting of point-to-point steganography to the multi-recipient setting.
The second introduces fine-grained data access control policies to the existing setting
of multi-client oblivious cloud storage protocols.
1.1 Organization of the Dissertation
The rest of this dissertation is organized into four chapters, namely Preliminaries
(Chapter 2), Outsider-Anonymous Broadcast Encryption (Chapter 3), Broadcast
Steganography (Chapter 4), and Oblivious Group Storage (Chapter 5). A brief
summary of each of these chapters is given below.
In Chapter 2, we present the background information prerequisite for the rest
of this dissertation. The material presented in this chapter include mathematical
notations, Diffie-Hellman assumptions, hash functions, cryptographic primitives, and
a summary of the subset cover framework [89].
In Chapter 3, we formally define the notion of outsider-anonymous broadcast
encryption and construct several oABE schemes with varying security guarantees and
levels of efficiency. Each of our oABE constructions is also accompanied by a rigorous
mathematical proof of security.
Chapter 4 contains our first application of the notion of outsider anonymity: the
extension of point-to-point model of steganography to the broadcast setting. After
formally defining the setting and the security model of this new type of steganography
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that we call broadcast steganography (BS), we also present two provably secure con-
structions of BS along with their proofs of security. En route to our BS constructions,
we also construct and prove the security of a new kind of an oABE scheme that
produces pseudorandom ciphertexts.
The last chapter (Chapter 5) presents our second application of the notion of
outsider anonymity. In this application, we extend the state of the art multi-client
oblivious cloud storage model to provide shared data access with fine-grained data
access control policies. In the first part of this chapter, we formally define the setting
and the security model of our new type of an oblivious cloud storage protocol that
we term oblivious group storage (OGS). The second part consists of our new OGS




Given below are some notations that we are using throughout this dissertation.
• := denotes a definition or a deterministic assignment where the right hand side
(RHS) is the definiens and the left hand side (LHS) is the definiendum.
• ← denotes a random assignment where the RHS is a probabilistic polynomial
time (PPT) algorithm. The random tape of this execution of the PPT algorithm
is chosen uniformly at random.
• ←$ denotes a random assignment where the RHS is a finite set. The element
assigned to the LHS from this set is picked uniformly at random.
• {0, 1}n denotes the set of all bit-strings of length n.
• ⊥ denotes a special output of an algorithm indicating a failure.
• G denotes a finite group, Z denotes the set of integers.
• For n ∈ Z, Zn denotes the additive group of integers modulo n and Z∗n denotes
the multiplicative group of integers modulo n.
6
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• ‖ denotes the string concatenation operation. Specifically, if s1 and s2 are two
bit-strings, then s1‖s2 denotes the concatenation of s1 and s2.
• For a given vector ~a and an element b, we denote by ~a : b the vector obtained by
appending b at the end of the vector ~a.
• Prfx(~a) denotes the set of all prefix vectors of ~a with non-zero length.
2.2 Diffie-Hellman Assumptions
Let G = 〈g〉 be a group with a generator g and order q. Define the function dh as
dh : G2 → G
dh(X, Y ) := Z, (2.1)
where X = gx, Y = gy, and Z = gxy for x, y ∈ Zq.
2.2.1 Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption
The computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is to compute dh(X, Y ) given
two random group elements X, Y ∈ G. Formally, we say that the CDH problem is
(t, )-hard relative to the group G if for all t-time adversaries A, we have
∣∣∣Pr[A(G, q, g, gx, gy) = dh(gx, gy)]∣∣∣ ≤ ,
where x, y ←$ Zq and the probability is computed over the random coins used to
generate the exponents x, y and by A. The CDH assumption was first introduced by
Diffie and Hellman in [39].
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2.2.2 Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption
The decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is to distinguish the two distributions
(X, Y, dh(X, Y )) and (X, Y, Z) for three random group elements X, Y, Z ∈ G. Formally,
we say that the DDH problem is (t, )-hard relative to the group G if for all t-time
adversaries A, we have
∣∣∣Pr[A(G, q, g, gx, gy, gxy) = 1]− Pr[A(G, q, g, gx, gy, gz) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ ,
where x, y, z ←$ Zq and the probability is computed over the random coins used to
generate the exponents x, y, z and by A. The DDH assumption was also introduced
by Diffie and Hellman in [39].
2.2.3 Strong Twin Computational Diffie-Hellman
Assumption
Let G = 〈g〉 be a group with a generator g and order q. Also, let the function dh be
defined as in Equation (2.1). Define the function 2dh as
2dh : G3 → G2
2dh(X1, X2, Y ) := (dh(X1, Y ), dh(X2, Y )).
For two fixed group elements X1, X2 ∈ G, also define the predicate 2dhp as follows.
2dhp : G3 → {True,False}
2dhp(X1, X2, Yˆ , Zˆ1, Zˆ2) := 2dh(X1, X2, Yˆ ) .=? (Zˆ1, Zˆ2)
The strong twin computational Diffie-Hellman problem (s2CDH) problem is to
compute 2dh(X1, X2, Y ) given random group elementsX1, X2, Y ∈ G along with access
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to an oracle that provides answers to the predicate 2dhp(X1, X2, ·, ·, ·). Formally, We
say that the s2CDH problem is (t, )-hard relative to G if for all t-time adversaries A,
it is the case that
∣∣∣Pr[A2dhp(gx1 ,gx2 ,·,·,·)(gx1 , gx2 , gy) = 2dh(gx1 , gx2 , gy)]∣∣∣ ≤ ,
where x1, x2, y ←$ Zq and the probability is computed over the randomness used to
sample the exponents x1, x2, y and by A. The s2CDH problem was introduced by
Cach et al. in [29]. The authors also showed in [29] that the s2CDH assumption is
equivalent to the CDH assumption.
2.3 Hashing Functions
2.3.1 Entropy-Smoothing Hashing
A family of hash functions Hes = {H : X → Y } is “entropy-smoothing” [69] if it is
hard to distinguish (H,H(x)) from (H, y), where H is a random element of Hes, x is
a random element of X, and y is a random element of Y . More formally, Hes is called
(t, )-entropy-smoothing if for every t-time adversary A,
∣∣∣Pr[A(H,H(x)) = 1 | H ←$ Hes, x ←$ X]
− Pr[A(H, y) = 1 | H ←$ Hes, y ←$ Y ]
∣∣∣ ≤ ,
where the probability is over the choice of H, x, y and over the random coins used by
A. Entropy smoothing is related to strong randomness extraction [120], but it is a
much less stringent (and hence easier to realize) notion, as it seeks only computational
(rather than information-theoretic) guarantees, and it is specific to one entropy source
(the uniform distribution over the domain X), whereas strong extractors are applicable
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to any source of a given min-entropy.
2.3.2 Strong 2-Universal Hashing
A family of hash functions Hs2u = {H : X → Y } is strong 2-universal [113] if for all
distinct x1, x2 ∈ X and all (not necessarily distinct) y1, y2 ∈ Y , exactly |Hs2u||Y |2 functions
of Hs2u map x1 to y1 and x2 to y2. More formally,
Pr
[
H(x1) = y1 ∧H(x2) = y2 | H ←$ Hes;
x1, x2 ←$ X;x1 6= x2; y1, y2 ←$ Y
]
= 1|Y |2 .
2.4 Cryptographic Primitives
2.4.1 Encapsulation Mechanism
An encapsulation mechanism can be thought of as a “relaxed” commitment scheme.
While a commitment scheme allows the sender to commit to any message of his
choosing, an encapsulation mechanism forces the sender to commit to a random
bit-string. This notion was originally proposed by Boneh and Katz [20].
Definition 2.4.1 (Encapsulation Mechanism Setting): The formal setting of
an encapsulation mechanisms consists a tuple of algorithms Π = (SetupCom,Commit,
Open) defined as follows.
PK← SetupCom(1λ): SetupCom algorithm takes the security parameter λ as an
input and produces a commitment public key PK.
(rˆ, com, decom)← Commit(PK): Commit algorithm takes as input the public key
PK. After sampling a random bit-string rˆ ∈ {0, 1}λ together with associated
commitment and decommitment values com and decom, Commit algorithm
outputs the tuple (rˆ, com, decom).
CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES 11
rˆ/⊥ := Open(PK, com, decom): Given a public key PK, a commitment value com,
and a decommitment value decom, the Open algorithm either outputs rˆ ∈ {0, 1}λ
or the failure symbol ⊥. We assume that Decrypt is deterministic.
Correctness. If PK is a commitment public key output by SetupCom(1λ) and
(rˆ, com, decom)← Commit(PK), then it must be the case that
Open(PK, com, decom) = rˆ,
except with negligible probability in the security parameter λ. ♦
A secure encapsulation mechanism provides two aspects of security: hiding and
relaxed binding. The hiding aspect of security guarantees that the triples of the form
(PK, com, rˆ) are statistically indistinguishable from those of the form (PK, com, r) for
random r ∈ {0, 1}λ. The relaxed binding property assures that given an output
(rˆ, com, decom) of Commit(PK), it is hard to produce a decommitment value decom′
such that Open(PK, com, decom′) 6∈ {rˆ,⊥}.
2.4.2 Strong Existentially Unforgeable One-Time Signature
A one-time signature scheme is a digital signature scheme that allows at most one
message to be signed per key pair. Signing more than one message per key pair breaks
the security of the scheme. One-time signatures are an old notion, originally proposed
in 1979 by Lamport [79].
Definition 2.4.2 (One-time Signature Setting): The formal setting of one-time
signatures consists of a message spaceMSP , a signature space SSP , and a tuple of
algorithms Σ = (Gen, Sign,Vrfy) defined as follows.
(VK, SK)← Gen(1λ): The key-generation algorithm Gen takes as input the security
parameter λ and outputs a key pair (VK, SK), where SK is used to sign a message
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and VK is used to later verify that message/signature pair.
σ ← Sign(SK,m): The signing algorithm Sign takes as input a signing key SK and
a message m ∈MSP and outputs a signature σ ∈ SSP .
{0, 1} := Vrfy(VK, σ,m): Given a verification key VK, a signature σ ∈ SSP, and
a message m ∈MSP , the verification algorithm Vrfy either outputs 0 or 1. We
assume that Vrfy is deterministic.
Correctness. For every m ∈MSP, if (VK, SK) is a signature/verification key pair
output by Gen(1λ), then it must be the case that
Vrfy(VK, Sign(SK,m),m) = 1,
except with negligible probability in the security parameter λ. ♦
The definition of security for one-time signature schemes we present here is termed
strong existential unforgeability against a chosen-message attack or SIG-SEU for short.
An existentially unforgeable signature scheme ensures that a PPT adversary who is
given the signatures for a few messages of his choosing is not be able to produce a
signature for a new message. Strong existential unforgeability guarantees that such an
adversary cannot even produce a new signature for a previously signed message. The
notion of strong existential unforgeability can be formalized as the following game
between a PPT adversary A and a challenger C.
Definition 2.4.3 (SIG-SEU Game): For a given one-time signature scheme Σ =
(Gen, Sign,Vrfy), the strong existential unforgeability game, which is played between a
PPT challenger C and an adversary A, is defined as follows.
Setup: C executes the Gen algorithm QS times and returns the generated verification
keys VK1, . . . ,VKQS to A. C also initializes the set of returned queries RQ := ∅.
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Query: A adaptively requests QS signatures, at most one per verification key, from
C. For each such request, A sends a verification key index i and a message mi
of his choosing. C computes the signature σi ← Sign(SKi,mi), adds (mi, σi, i) to
RQ, and returns σi to A.
Response: A returns a tuple (m∗, σ∗, i∗) to C. We say that A wins the SIG-SEU
game if Vrfy(VKi∗ , σ∗,m∗) = 1 and (m∗, σ∗, i∗) 6∈ RQ.
We refer to such an adversary A as a SIG-SEU adversary. The advantage of A winning
the above game is defined as,
AdvSIG-SEUA,Σ := Pr[Vrfy(VKi∗ , σ∗,m∗) = 1 ∧ (m∗, σ∗, i∗) 6∈ RQ],
where the probability is over the random bits used by A and C. ♦
Definition 2.4.4 (SIG-SEU Security): A signature scheme Σ is (t, QS, )-SIG-
SEU-secure if for any t-time SIG-SEU adversary making at most QS adaptive signature
queries, we have that AdvSIG-SEUA,Σ ≤ . ♦
2.4.3 Anonymous (Hierarchical) Identity-Based Encryption
Identity-Based Encryption. Identity-based encryption is a public-key encryption
scheme where the public key of a user can be an arbitrary bit-string such as an
email address. A system initialization authority (SIA) possessing a master secret
key produces a secret key corresponding to a given identity. IBE greatly simplifies
the problem of key distribution and management in public-key encryption since now
the users don’t have to worry about exchanging long and unintelligible public keys.
Although this concept was suggested by Shamir in 1984 [100], an efficient and provably
secure construction was not proposed until the work of Boneh and Franklin in 2001 [16].
Since then, there have been several IBE constructions (e.g., [13, 17,112]).
CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES 14
Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption. Since having a single key generation
authority is undesirable due to the computational overhead in a large network of users,
the notion of hierarchical identity-based encryption was proposed in [53,68]. HIBE is
a generalized version of IBE that allows delegation of keys in a hierarchical structure.
At the top of this hierarchy is the system initialization authority. At the following
level are several sub-authorities. Each of these sub-authorities holds a delegation key
that allows it to decrypt the ciphertexts destined to it as well as to the users below it
in the hierarchy. Each user belonging to a sub-authority is also allowed to extend the
hierarchy by becoming a sub-sub-authority, and these levels of delegation can extend
further. Since the introduction, there have been several HIBE constructions in the
literature (e.g., [14, 52,82,85,112]).
Anonymous (Hierarchical) Identity-Based Encryption. The notion of anony-
mous (hierarchical) identity-based encryption is a direct extension of the notion of key
privacy in public-key encryption [11] to the setting of (hierarchical) identity-based
encryption. Specifically, an A(H)IBE scheme is anonymous if its ciphertexts do
not leak the identities of the recipients. This concept was originally proposed by
Abdalla et al. in [2] where they investigated public-key encryption with keyword
search (PEKS) [15]. PEKS is a system where each ciphertext is associated with a
keyword with the requirement that the ciphertext does not leak any information
regarding the keyword. A user is given along with his decryption key a trapdoor
for each keyword he is authorized to use. Now, given a batch of ciphertexts (e.g.,
stored in a remote database), a user can delegate the task of finding the ciphertexts
associated to one of his keywords to an honest-but-curious third party (e.g., database
administrator) by giving that third party the corresponding trapdoor. Then, the third
party can find all the ciphertexts associated with the keyword corresponding to the
given trapdoor without knowing what the keyword is or which messages are encrypted
in the ciphertexts. In [2], Abdalla et al. presented a framework that constructed a
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PEKS scheme by using an AIBE scheme as an underlying primitive.
Although the authors in [2] introduced the notion of A(H)IBE, they didn’t provide
any concrete constructions. They did, however, notice that the very first IBE scheme
by Boneh and Franklin [16] was indeed anonymous in the random oracle model. The
first AIBE scheme secure in the standard model was proposed by Gentry in [51] and
the first AHIBE scheme also secure in the standard model was proposed by Boyen and
Waters in [24]. Since then, there have been several other constructions with various
useful properties and improvements [4, 8, 28, 37, 46, 81, 94, 98, 99, 103]. Given below are
the definitions of the AIBE and AHIBE schemes.
Definition 2.4.5 (AIBE Setting): An anonymous identity-based encryption sche-
me, associated with an identity space ISP , a message spaceMSP , and a ciphertext
space CSP , is a tuple of algorithms (Setup,Extract,Encrypt,Decrypt) defined as follows.
(MPK,MSK)← Setup(1λ): Setup takes the security parameter 1λ as input and
outputs the master public key MPK and the master secret key MSK.
skI ← Extract(MPK,MSK, I): Extract takes the master public key MPK, the mas-
ter secret key MSK, and an identity I ∈ ISP as inputs and outputs a secret key
skI for the identity I.
c← Encrypt(MPK, I,m): Encrypt takes the master public key MPK, an identity
I ∈ ISP , and a messagem ∈MSP as inputs and outputs a ciphertext c ∈ CSP .
m/⊥ := Decrypt(MPK, skI, c): Given the master public key MPK, a secret key
skI , and a ciphertext c ∈ CSP , Decrypt either outputs a message m ∈MSP or
the failure symbol ⊥. Decrypt is assumed to be deterministic.
Correctness. For every I ∈ ISP, and every m ∈ MSP, if skI is the secret key
output by Extract(MPK,MSK, I), then
Decrypt(MPK, skI ,Encrypt(MPK, I,m)) = m,
CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES 16
except with negligible probability in the security parameter λ. ♦
Definition 2.4.6 (AHIBE Setting): An anonymous hierarchical identity-based en-
cryption scheme, associated with an identity space ISP, a message space MSP,
and a ciphertext space CSP , is a tuple of algorithms (Setup,Extract,Delegate,Encrypt,
Decrypt) defined as follows.
(MPK,MSK)← Setup(1λ, `): Setup takes the security parameter 1λ and the max-
imum depth of the hierarchy ` and outputs the master public key MPK and the
master secret key MSK.
sk~I ← Extract(MPK,MSK, ~I ): Extract takes the master public key MPK, the mas-
ter secret key MSK, and an identity vector ~I ∈ ISPd such that 1 ≤ d ≤ ` as
inputs and outputs a secret key sk~I for the identity vector ~I.
sk~I:I′ ← Delegate(MPK, sk~I, I ′): Delegate takes the master public key MPK, a
secret key sk~I for the identity vector ~I ∈ ISPd such that 1 ≤ d < `, and an
identity I ′ ∈ ISP as inputs and outputs a secret key sk~I:I′ for the identity
vector ~I : I ′ ∈ ISPd+1.
c← Encrypt(MPK, ~I,m): Encrypt takes the master public key MPK, an identity
vector ~I ∈ ISPd such that 1 ≤ d ≤ `, and a message m ∈MSP as inputs and
outputs a ciphertext c ∈ CSP .
m/⊥ := Decrypt(MPK, sk~I, c): Given the master public key MPK, a secret key
sk~I , and a ciphertext c ∈ CSP , Decrypt either outputs a message m ∈MSP or
the failure symbol ⊥. Decrypt is assumed to be deterministic.
Correctness. For every ~I ∈ ISPd such that 1 ≤ d ≤ `, and every m ∈MSP , if sk~I
is the secret key properly generated for the identity ~I (i.e., either executing Extract or
Delegate), then
Decrypt(MPK, sk~I ,Encrypt(MPK, ~I,m)) = m,
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except with negligible probability in the security parameter λ. ♦
We now review the formal security models related to A(H)IBE schemes. Following
the work in the literature [4, 46, 81, 98], we present these security models as games
played between a PPT challenger and an adversary. In a nutshell, the goal of the
adversary in these games is to tell apart two ciphertexts generated under two different
identities of which he does not own the corresponding secret keys. Depending on the
game in question, the adversary is also granted some privileges.
We follow a unified approach in the presentation of these games. As such, we
first present the games related to the X-IND-CCA notions of security where X ∈
{AIBE,AHIBE}. In the material that follows, we show how to tweak these games to
obtain the X-IND-CPA variations.
Definition 2.4.7 (X-IND-CCA Game for X ∈ {AIBE,AHIBE}): For a given
A(H)IBE scheme, the X-IND-CCA game for X ∈ {AIBE,AHIBE} played between a




Setup(1λ) if X = AIBE
Setup(1λ, `) otherwise
and gives A the resulting master public key MPK, keeping the master secret key
MSK to itself. C also initializes the set of revoked identities RI := ∅.
Phase 1: A adaptively issues queries of the following types.
Secret-key query ~I: A requests the secret key of the identity ~I ∈ ISPd
where d = 1 if X = AIBE, 1 ≤ d ≤ ` otherwise. C runs sk~I ←
Extract(MPK,MSK, ~I ), adds ~I to R, and sends sk~I to A.
Decryption query (~I, c): A issues a decryption query on an identity ~I ∈
ISPd, where d = 1 if X = AIBE, 1 ≤ d ≤ ` otherwise, and a ci-
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phertext c ∈ CSP. C computes sk~I ← Extract(MPK,MSK, ~I ), runs
Decrypt(MPK, sk~I , c), and gives the result to A.
Challenge: A gives C two equal length messages m∗0,m∗1 ∈MSP and two identities
~I∗0 , ~I
∗
1 ∈ ISPd with the following restrictions:
1. (Prfx(~I∗0 ) ∪ Prfx(~I∗1 )) ∩R = ∅.
2. d = 1 if X = AIBE, 1 ≤ d ≤ ` otherwise.
C picks b∗ ←$ {0, 1}, computes c∗ ← Encrypt(MPK, ~I∗b∗ ,m∗b∗), and sends c∗ to A.
Phase 2: The interaction between A and C in this phase is similar to Phase 1 with
two restrictions as given below.
Secret-key query ~I: ~I 6∈ (Prfx(~I∗0 ) ∪ Prfx(~I∗1 )).
Decryption query (~I, c): If ~I ∈ (Prfx(~I∗0 ) ∪ Prfx(~I∗1 )), then c 6= c∗.
Guess: A outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1} and wins if b = b∗.
The adversary A in this game is called an X-IND-CCA adversary and A’s advantage
is defined as
AdvX-IND-CCAA,Π :=
∣∣∣Pr[b = b∗]− 12 ∣∣∣,
where the probability is over the random coins used by C and A. ♦
Remark 2.4.8. In [27], Canetti et al. proposed a weaker notion of security called
selective-ID security. In contrast to the full security game that we presented in
Definition 2.4.7 above, the adversary in the selective-ID security game is required to
output the challenge identities ~I∗0 , ~I∗1 before the public parameters are generated by
the challenger. This weakened notion of security has allowed the realization of early
AHIBE constructions [4, 8, 24,46,81,99,103].
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Definition 2.4.9: An A(H)IBE scheme Π is (t, QI , QD, )-X-IND-CCA-secure for X ∈
{AIBE,AHIBE} if for any t-time X-IND-CCA adversary making at most QI adaptive
secret-key queries and QD adaptive decryption queries, we have AdvX-IND-CCAA,Π ≤ . ♦
By not allowing the adversary to submit any decryption queries in Phase 1 and
Phase 2 of the X-IND-CCA game, one obtains the X-IND-CPA game.
Definition 2.4.10: An A(H)IBE scheme Π is (t, QI , )-X-IND-CPA-secure for X ∈
{AIBE,AHIBE} if Π is (t, QI , 0, )-X-IND-CCA-secure. ♦
Weakly Robust Anonymous Identity-Based Encryption. The robust encryp-
tion, formalized by Abdalla et al. [3], requires that it is hard to produce a ciphertext
that is valid for two different users. In [3], the authors define two types of robustness,
strong and weak. Informally, an AIBE scheme is called weakly robust, if any adversary
has negligible advantage in producing two identities I0, I1 and a message m such that
the encryption of m under I0 can be decrypted with the private key associated with I1
leading to a non-⊥ result. The authors also provide a transformation algorithm which
makes possible to obtain a weakly robust AIBE scheme from a regular AIBE one.
2.4.4 Broadcast Encryption
Conventional encryption schemes provide the means for secret transmission of data in
point-to-point communication. The setting of broadcast encryption [12,49], instead,
consists of a sender, an insecure unidirectional broadcast channel, and a universe of
receivers. When the sender wants to transmit some confidential data, it specifies the
set of authorized receivers and creates an encrypted version of the content. A secure
BE scheme enables legitimate receivers to recover the original content, while ensuring
that excluded users just obtain meaningless data, even in the face of collusions. The
formal setting of broadcast encryption is given below.
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Definition 2.4.11 (BE Setting): A broadcast encryption scheme, associated with
a universe of users U = [1, N ], a message spaceMSP, and a ciphertext space CSP ,
is a tuple of algorithms (Setup,KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) defined as follows.
(MPK,MSK)← Setup(1λ, N): The Setup algorithm takes as input the security
parameter 1λ and the number of users in the system N . It outputs the master
public key MPK and the master secret key MSK of the system.
ski ← KeyGen(MPK,MSK, i): The key generation algorithm KeyGen takes as input
the master public key MPK, the master secret key MSK, and a user i ∈ U . It
outputs the secret key ski of the user i.
c← Encrypt(MPK, S,m): The Encrypt algorithm takes as input the master public
key MPK, the set of receivers S ⊆ U , and a message m ∈MSP . It then outputs
a ciphertext c ∈ CSP .
m/⊥ := Decrypt(MPK, S, ski, c): Given the master public key MPK, a secret key
ski, the set of receivers S ⊆ U , and a ciphertext c ∈ CSP , the Decrypt algorithm
either outputs a message m ∈MSP or the failure symbol ⊥. We assume that
Decrypt is deterministic.
Correctness. For every S ⊆ U , every i ∈ S, and every m ∈ MSP, if ski is the
secret key output by KeyGen(MPK,MSK, i), then it must be the case that
Decrypt(MPK, S, ski,Encrypt(MPK, S,m)) = m,
except with negligible probability in the security parameter λ. ♦
There are two main models of security for BE schemes: security against chosen
plaintext attack (BE-IND-CPA) and security against chosen ciphertext attack (BE-
IND-CCA). These security models are defined as games between a PPT adversary
and a challenger. For completeness, we present these definitions below.
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Definition 2.4.12 (BE-IND-CCA Game): For a given BE scheme Π = (Setup,
KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt), the BE-IND-CCA game is defined between a PPT adversary
A, and a challenger C as follows.
Setup: C runs (MPK,MSK)← Setup(1λ, N) and gives A the resulting master public
key MPK, keeping the master secret key MSK to itself. C also initializes the set
of revoked users RU to be empty.
Phase 1: A adaptively issues queries of the following types.
Secret-key query i: A requests the secret key of the user i ∈ U . C runs
ski ← KeyGen(MPK,MSK, i) to generate the secret key ski of the user i,
adds i to RU , and sends ski to A.
Decryption query (S, i, c): A issues a decryption query where S ⊆ U , i ∈ U ,
and c ∈ CSP. First, C runs ski ← KeyGen(MPK,MSK, i) to generate the
secret key ski of user i. Then, it runs Decrypt(MPK, S, ski, c) and returns
the output to A.
Challenge: A provides C with two equal length messages m∗0,m∗1 ∈ MSP. C sets
S∗ := U \RU , picks a random bit b∗ ∈ {0, 1}, runs c∗ ← Encrypt(MPK, S∗,m∗b∗),
and returns c∗ to A.
Phase 2: A adaptively issues queries of the following type.
Decryption query (S, i, c): This type of query is handled by C as in Phase 1
with one exception: if i ∈ S∗ and c = c∗, C rejects the query.
Guess: A outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1} and wins if b = b∗.
We refer to such an adversary A as a BE-IND-CCA adversary. The advantage of A
winning the above game is defined as,
AdvBE-IND-CCAA,Π :=
∣∣∣Pr[b = b∗]− 12 ∣∣∣,
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where the probability is over the random bits used by A and C. ♦
Definition 2.4.13 (BE-IND-CCA Security): A BE scheme Π is (t, QU , QD, )-
BE-IND-CCA-secure if for any t-time BE-IND-CCA adversary making at most QU
adaptive secret-key queries and at most QD chosen decryption queries, we have that
AdvBE-IND-CCAA,Π ≤ . ♦
Definition 2.4.14 (BE-IND-CPA Security): A BE scheme Π is (t, QU , )-BE-
IND-CPA-secure if Π is (t, QU , 0, )-BE-IND-CCA-secure. ♦
2.4.5 Steganography
The point-to-point encryption schemes are effective at concealing the meaning of
the communication between two parties. If the parties additionally require that the
very existence of their communication over a public communication medium remains
concealed, then the required tool is steganography [104]. Conventional steganography
allows two parties to communicate covertly, even in the presence of an adversary, by
hiding the intended content within seemingly harmless messages, also known as the
communication channel.
In the following, we present the formal definition of a steganography scheme,
including the existing formal models of security defined for such a scheme. A crucial
aspect of any steganographic protocol is the underlying communication channel in
which the secret messages are sent. We also present the formal definitions of related
to this stegotext-transmission medium below.
Definition 2.4.15 (Documents & Covertexts): Let Σ = {0, 1}σ be a finite set of
bit-strings with length σ. Denote by Σ∗ the set of sequences of finite length over Σ.
We call the strings u ∈ Σ documents and the strings s ∈ Σ∗ covertexts. ♦
Definition 2.4.16 (Channels): A channel Ch is a function that takes as input a
channel history h ∈ Σ∗ and produces a probability distribution on Σ. A channel history
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h = s1‖ . . . ‖sl ∈ Σ∗ is called legal if for all i ∈ [1, l], PrCs1‖...‖si−1 [si] > 0. A sampling
of l documents in succession from a channel is denoted by s = s1‖ . . . ‖sl ← Clh
(shorthand notation for s1 ← Ch, s2 ← Ch‖s1 , . . . , sl ← Ch‖s1‖...‖sl−1). A channel is
called always informative if for every legal history h ∈ Σ∗, H∞(Clh) = W(l), where H∞
is the min-entropy function. ♦
A channel can be modeled either as an oracle or as an efficiently computable
randomized function Channel(h; r) (where r denotes the random coins). While the
latter is a stronger assumption on the channel, [66] shows it to be necessary for secure
steganography. Efficiently computable channels also enable broadcast steganographic
constructions with stronger security guarantees as we show in Section 4.5.
Definition 2.4.17 (Steganography Setting): A steganography scheme, associat-
ed with a message spaceMSP , and a channel Ch on a set of documents Σ, is a tuple
of algorithms (Setup,KeyGen,Encode,Decode) defined as follows.
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ): KeyGen takes the security parameter 1λ as input and
outputs a public/secret key pair (pk, sk).
s← Encode(pk, h,m): Encode takes a public key pk, a channel history h ∈ Σ∗,
and a message m ∈ MSP as inputs and outputs a stegotext s ∈ Σ∗ from the
support of Clh for some l = poly(|m|).
m/⊥ := Decode(sk, h, s): Given a secret key sk, a channel history h ∈ Σ∗, and
a stegotext s ∈ Σ∗, Decode either outputs a message m ∈MSP or the failure
symbol ⊥. We assume that Decode is deterministic.
Correctness. For every m ∈ MSP and legal channel history h ∈ Σ∗, if (pk, sk) is
output by KeyGen(1λ), then it must be the case that
Decode(sk, h,Encode(pk, h,m)) = m,
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except with negligible probability in the security parameter λ. ♦
There are three models of security defined for steganography schemes. They are,
in the strongest to weakest order, steganographic secrecy against adaptive chosen-
covertext attacks (SS-IND-CCA), steganographic secrecy against publicly-detectable,
replayable adaptive chosen-covertext attacks (SS-IND-PDR-CCA), and steganographic
secrecy against adaptive chosen-hiddentext attacks (SS-IND-CHA). These models of
security are defined as games played between a PPT challenger and an adversary. Below
we define the SS-IND-CCA game. Next, we show how to modify the SS-IND-CCA
game to obtain the SS-IND-PDR-CCA and SS-IND-CHA games.
Definition 2.4.18 (SS-IND-CCA Game): For a given steganography scheme Π =
(Setup,KeyGen,Encode,Decode), the SS-IND-CCA game, which is played between a
PPT adversary A and a challenger C, is defined as follows.
Setup: C runs (pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ) and gives A the resulting public key pk, keeping
the secret key sk to itself.
Phase 1: A adaptively issues queries of the following type.
Decoding query (h, s): A issues a decoding query on a channel history h ∈ Σ∗
and a covertext s ∈ Σ∗. C sends the result of Decode(sk, h, s) to A.
Challenge: A gives C a message m∗ ∈MSP and a legal history h ∈ Σ∗. C picks a
random bit b∗ ∈ {0, 1} and generates the challenge s∗ depending on it as follows.
If b∗ = 0, then C encodes m∗ into a stegotext s∗, i.e., s∗ ← Encode(pk, h,m∗).
Otherwise, C sample s∗ as a covertext of equal length, i.e., s∗ ←$ Cl∗h for l∗ =
|Encode(pk, h,m∗)|/σ. At the end, C gives s∗ to A.
Phase 2: The interaction between A and C in this phase is similar to Phase 1 with
one restriction as given below.
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Decoding query (h, s): s 6= s∗.
Guess: A outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1} and wins if b = b∗.
The adversary A is called a SS-IND-CCA adversary and A’s advantage is defined as
AdvSS-IND-CCAA,Π :=
∣∣∣Pr[b = b∗]− 12 ∣∣∣,
where the probability is over the random coins used by A and C. ♦
Definition 2.4.19 (SS-IND-CCA Security): A steganography scheme Π is (t,
QD, )-SS-IND-CCA-secure if for any t-time SS-IND-CCA adversary making at most
QD adaptive decoding queries, it must be the case that AdvSS-IND-CCAA,Π ≤ . ♦
We obtain the SS-IND-PDR-CCA game by restricting the kind of decoding queries
allowed in Phase 2 of the SS-IND-CCA game. Specifically, the adversary now cannot
issue any decoding query (h, s) such that s ≡pk s∗ for some SS compatible relation
≡pk, which is defined in Definition 2.4.20 below. The adversary A’s advantage in the
SS-IND-PDR-CCA game is defined as,
AdvSS-IND-PDR-CCAA,Π :=
∣∣∣Pr[b = b∗]− 12 ∣∣∣,
where the probability is over the random coins used by A and C.
Definition 2.4.20 (ß Compatible Relation): Let Π = (Setup,KeyGen,Encode,
Decode) be a steganography scheme. Let (pk, sk) be a valid public/secret key pair
generated by the KeyGen algorithm. A binary relation on stegotexts of Π induced by
the public key pk is called a SS compatible relation (denoted by ≡pk) if for any two
channel history/stegotext pairs (h1, s1), (h2, s2) where s1 and s2 are encoded under
the public key pk, the following requirements are satisfied.
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1. If s1 ≡pk s2, then it must be the case that Decode(sk, h1, s1) = Decode(sk, h2, s2)
except with negligible probability in the security parameter λ.
2. There exists a PPT algorithm that only takes pk, (h1, s1), and (h2, s2) and
determines whether s1 ≡pk s2.
Definition 2.4.21 (SS-IND-PDR-CCA Security): A steganography scheme Π
is (t, QD, )-SS-IND-PDR-CCA-secure with respect to some SS compatible relation
≡pk if for any t-time SS-IND-PDR-CCA adversary making at most QD adaptive
decoding queries, it holds that AdvSS-IND-PDR-CCAA,Π ≤ . ♦
The SS-IND-CHA game is defined similar to the SS-IND-CCA game, with the
restriction that the adversary is not allowed to issue any decoding queries during
Phase 1 and Phase 2.
Definition 2.4.22 (SS-IND-CHA Security): A steganography scheme Π is (t, )-
SS-IND-CHA-secure if Π is (t, 0, )-SS-IND-CCA-secure. ♦
2.4.6 Multi-User Oblivious Random Access Machine
Multi-user oblivious random access machine (M-ORAM), which was originally proposed
by Jinsheng et al. [72], is a protocol that allows a set of clients to obliviously share the
storage at a cloud storage provider. A M-ORAM protocol is executed between four
types of parties: a system initialization authority, a set of clients, a set of anonymizers,
and a cloud storage provider S. The SIA’s job is to initialize the system by generating
the required keys, and authorize the addition of new clients to the system. The set
of anonymizers facilitate the communication between the clients and S while also
preserving the oblivious data access and data secrecy guarantees. The formal definition
of the setting of M-ORAM protocols is given below.
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Definition 2.4.23 (M-ORAM Setting): A M-ORAM scheme, associated with
an SIA, a set of clients C = [1, N ], a set of anonymizers A = [1,M ], a server
S, a position space PSP, and a message space MSP, is a tuple of algorithms
(Setup,KeyGen,Write,Read) defined as follows.
(MPK,MSK, ak1, . . . , akM , st0)← Setup(1λ,M): Setup is a non-interactive al-
gorithm executed by the SIA. This algorithm takes the security parameter 1λ
and the number of anonymizers in the system M as inputs and outputs the
master public key MPK, the master secret key MSK, the anonymizers’ secret keys
ak1, . . . , akM , and the initial state of the server storage st0. At the end of this
algorithm, the SIA places MPK in a publicly accessible location, keeps MSK to
herself, provides the anonymizers’ secret keys to the corresponding anonymizers,
and places st0 in the storage provided by S.
cki ← KeyGen(MPK,MSK, i): KeyGen is also a non-interactive algorithm executed
by the SIA. This algorithm takes the master public key MPK, the master secret
key MSK, and a client i ∈ C as inputs and outputs a secret key cki for client i.
At the end of this algorithm, the SIA gives cki to client i.
(ak′1, . . . , ak′M , stt+1)← Write(MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , cki, p,m, stt): Write is an
interactive algorithm executed between a client i ∈ C, the M anonymizers, and
S. The anonymizers supply their secret keys ak1, . . . , akM . The client i supplies
his secret key cki, a position p ∈ PSP, and a message m ∈MSP. S provides
the current server state stt. At the end of this algorithm, the server state
transforms from stt to stt+1 and the old anonymizers’ secret keys get replaced
by the new secret keys ak′1, . . . , ak′M .
(m/⊥, ak′1, . . . , ak′M , stt+1)← Read(MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , cki, p, stt): Read is
also an interactive algorithm executed between a client i ∈ C, theM anonymizers,
and S. The anonymizers supply their secret keys ak1, . . . , akM . The client i
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provides the secret key cki and a position p. S provides the current server state
stt. At the end of this algorithm, the client i learns a message m or the failure
symbol ⊥, the server state transforms from stt to stt+1, and the old anonymizers’
secret keys get replaced by the new secret keys ak′1, . . . , ak′M .
Correctness. LetMPK, ak1, . . . , akM , and stt be a valid master public key, a sequence
of M anonymizers’ valid secret keys, and a valid server state, respectively. For every
h, i ∈ C, p ∈ PSP, and m ∈ MSP, if ckh, cki are the secret keys of the clients
h, i, respectively, Write(MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , ckh, p,m, stt) = (ak′1, . . . , ak′M , stt+1), and
ak′1, . . . , ak
′
M and stt+1 transform into ak
′
1, . . . , ak
′
M and stt+1 after zero or more
executions of Read and Write algorithms that do not modify the message at position
p, then Read(ak′1, . . . , ak
′
M , cki, p, stt+1) yields m, except with negligible probability in
the security parameter λ. ♦
The formal definition of security of a M-ORAM protocol is defined in an honest-
but-curious (OBC) adversarial model, where the adversary is allowed to gain as much
information as he can with the requirement that he follow the M-ORAM protocol as
specified in Definition 2.4.23. Similar to the security models presented earlier in this
section, this M-ORAM security model is also defined as a game, termed M-ORAM-
IND-OBC. In this game, the challenger simulates the entire M-ORAM protocol while
giving the adversary read access to the private states of the cloud storage provider,
the revoked clients, and the compromised anonymizers.
Definition 2.4.24 (M-ORAM-IND-OBC Game): For a given multi-user oblivi-
ous RAM scheme Π = (Setup,KeyGen,Write,Read), the M-ORAM-IND-OBC game,
played between a PPT adversary A and a challenger C, is defined as follows.
Setup: C runs (MPK,MSK, ak1, . . . , akM , st0)← Setup(1λ, N), gives A the resulting
master public key MPK and the initial server state st0, and keeps the master
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secret keyMSK and the anonymizer keys ak1, . . . , akM to herself. C also initializes
the sets of revoked clients RC and compromised anonymizers RA as empty sets.
Phase 1: A adaptively issues queries of the following types.
Client secret-key query i: A requests the secret key of a client i ∈ C. C
runs cki ← KeyGen(MPK,MSK, i), adds i to RC , and gives cki to A.
Anonymizer secret-key query j: A requests the secret key of an anonymizer
j ∈ A. C adds j to RA and gives akj, the most recent secret key of the
anonymizer j, to A. It is required that at least one anonymizer remain
uncompromised for the duration of the M-ORAM-IND-OBC game.
Revoked client write query (i, p,m): A inquires C to execute the Write
algorithm on behalf of a revoked client i ∈ RC with a position p ∈ PSP,
and a message m ∈MSP as inputs. Then, using the secret key of client
i, the most recent anonymizer keys, and the server state, C simulates the
interactive algorithm Write(MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , cki, p,m, stt) and gives the
adversarial view1 of this execution of Write algorithm to A.
Revoked client read query (i, p): A asks C to run the Read algorithm on
a position p ∈ PSP on behalf of a revoked client i ∈ RC . C simulates
Read(MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , cki, p, stt) using the client i’s secret key, the most
recent anonymier keys, and the server state; and gives the adversarial view
of this execution of Read to A.
Honest client write query (i,m): A asks C to run the Write algorithm for
an honest client i ∈ C \ RC with a message m ∈ MSP. C, however,
does not allow A to provide a position for this query. Instead, C picks
1The adversarial view includes the list of all the publicly visible requests exchanged among the
client i, the anonymizers, and S, changes made to the server state, as well as the private states and
the secret keys of the entities controlled by A (such as the client i and the compromised anonymizers)
during an episode of an interactive execution of Write or Read in the chronological order.
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p ←$ PSP uniformly at random and assigns to it a sequential identifier
id. After running Write(MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , cki, p,m, stt) using the client
i’s secret key, the most recent anonymizer keys, and the server state, C
gives the adversarial view of this execution of Write and id to A.
Honest client read query (i, id): A inquires C to run the Read algorithm for
an honest client i ∈ C \RC on the position associated with the identifier id.
C looks up the position p that she associated with id during a previous honest
client write query, simulates Read(MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , cki, p, stt) using the
client i’s secret key, the most recent anonymier keys, and the server state;
and provides the adversarial view of this execution of Read to A.
Pre-Challenge: A gives C two messages m∗0,m∗1 ∈MSP, and a client i∗ ∈ C \RC .
C picks two positions p∗0, p∗1 ←$ PSP and assigns sequential identifiers id∗0, id∗1
to them, respectively. Next, it runs Write(MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , cki∗ , p∗0,m∗0, stt)
and Write(MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , cki∗ , , p∗1,m∗1, stt+1) using the client i∗’s secret key,
the most recent anonymizer keys, and the server state; and gives the adversarial
views of these executions of Write and the position identifiers id∗0, id∗1 to A.
Phase 2: This phase is similar to Phase 1 with the exception that A is not allowed
to corrupt the client i∗. Note that A may submit honest client read queries on
the position identifiers id∗0, id∗1.
Challenge: C picks a random bit b∗ ∈ {0, 1} and simulates the execution of Read(
MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , cki∗ , p∗b∗ , stt) using the client i∗’s secret key, the most recent
anonymier keys, and the server state. C also assigns two new sequential position
identifiers id∗2, id∗3 to p∗b , p∗1−b, respectively. Finally, C gives the adversarial view of
this execution of Read and the two position identifiers id∗2, id∗3 to the adversary.
Phase 3: This phase is similar to Phase 2 with the exception that A is not allowed to
submit any honest client read queries on the position identifiers id∗0, id∗1. However,
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A is allowed to submit such queries on the position identifiers id∗2, id∗3
Guess: A outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1} and wins if b = b∗.
A is called an M-ORAM-IND-OBC adversary and A’s advantage in winning the
above game is defined as
AdvM-ORAM-IND-OBCA,Π :=
∣∣∣Pr[b = b∗]− 12 ∣∣∣,
where the probability is over the random coins used by A and C. ♦
Definition 2.4.25 (M-ORAM-IND-OBC Security): An M-ORAM scheme Π is
(t, QC , QA, QD, )-M-ORAM-IND-OBC-secure if for any t-time M-ORAM-IND-OBC
adversary making at most QC , QA, and QD adaptive client secret-key, anonymizer
secret-key, and data access queries, respectively, we have AdvM-ORAM-IND-OBCA,Π ≤ . ♦
2.5 Subset Cover Framework
The subset cover (SC) framework proposed by Naor et al. [89] is a system that abstracts
a variety of broadcast encryption schemes in the private-key setting where only the
Center can transmit encrypted messages. A broadcast encryption scheme belonging to
the SC framework defines a family of subsets Fam of the universe of users U = [1, N ]
in the system. The Center assigns to each subset Fj ∈ Fam a long-lived private key kj .
When generating the private key of a user i ∈ U , the Center runs the following steps.
1. Find the set of all the subsets Usr ⊆ Fam that user i is a member of.
2. Give to user i the long-lived private keys associated with each subset in Usr.
When the Center wants to broadcast a message m to a subset of users S ⊆ U , it
executes the following steps.
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1. Generate a short-lived session key k̂.
2. Encrypt m under k̂ using a semantically secure private-key encryption protocol.
3. Find a set of disjoint subsets Cov ⊆ Fam that contains or “covers” all the users
belonging to S.
4. Encrypt k̂ using each long-lived private key corresponding to the subsets in Cov.
5. Broadcast the encryption of m under k̂ and the encryptions of k̂ to all the users
in the system.
Upon receiving a broadcast ciphertext, a user can successfully decrypt and obtain m if
and only if that user is part of the authorized set (i.e., the user possesses a long-lived
private key corresponding to some subset in Cov).
The authors in [89] also presented two concrete revocation schemes, namely the
complete subtree (CS) method and the subset difference (SD) method. In the CS








the private key length at a receiver is O(logN), where r is the number of revoked
users in a broadcast ciphertext. In the SD method, the one with more involved





. Another crucial difference between the two schemes is that
the assignment of the long-lived private keys in the former is information-theoretic,
whereas in the latter it is computational. Below we provide a short description of the
CS method, and we refer the reader to [89] for further details on the SD method.
2.5.1 Complete Subtree Method
In this scheme, the N users are represented as the leaves of a perfect binary tree T
and the collection of subsets Fam contains all possible subtrees of T . In case N is not
a power of 2, some dummy users are added to the system. During the key generation
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phase, every subtree in Fam is assigned a long-lived private key which is also made
available to all the users belonging to that subtree. Since every user is a member of
all the subtrees rooted at each node in the path from the root of T down to the leaf








due to the fact that it requires on average a logarithmic
number of subtrees to revoke r users (see [89] for a formal analysis).
2.5.2 Extension of the Subset Cover Framework
to the Public-Key Setting
The original subset cover framework was defined only for the private-key setting.
In [40], Dodis and Fazio extended the SC framework to the public-key setting by
combining a novel assignment of hierarchical identifiers (HIDs) to the nodes in T with
(hierarchical) identity-based encryption. For completeness, we only explain below the
extension of the CS method. We refer the reader to [40] for the details regarding the
extension of the SD method.
The assignment of HIDs to the nodes in T goes as follows. First, the root of T
is assigned a special identifier denoted by Root. Next, each edge e of T is assigned
the identifier IDe ∈ {0, 1} depending on whether the edge connects to the left child
or to the right child. Then, the hierarchical identifier HIDv of any node v can be
computed by concatenating all the identifiers starting from the root of T down to v
(i.e., HIDv := Root‖IDe1‖ . . . ‖IDelogN ). It is important to note that any prefix of HIDv
represents a valid HID of a parent node of v.
Once the HIDs of the nodes are assigned, the Dodis and Fazio extends the CS
method to the public-key setting by utilizing an IBE scheme as follows. First, each of
the long-lived private keys corresponding to the subtrees in Fam of the original CS
method now gets replaced by a public/private key pair. For a given subtree t in Fam
the public key becomes the hierarchical identifier HIDtroot , where troot denotes the root
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of t; and the private key becomes the IBE secret key corresponding to HIDtroot when
viewed as a bit-string. The key generation algorithm of the public-key CS method,
when executed on behalf of a user i, goes as follows.
1. Find the set of all the subtrees Usr ⊆ Fam that user i (when viewed as a leaf of
T ) is a member of.
2. Extract the IBE secret keys corresponding to the HIDs of the root nodes of each
subtree belonging to Usr.
3. Give those IBE secret keys to user i.
Since the structure of the T and the assignment of HIDs to the nodes of T are publicly
known to all the users, any user in the system can be a sender as well as a receiver.
When a user want to broadcast a message to a subset of users S ⊆ U , it executes the
following steps.
1. Generate a short-lived session key k̂.
2. Encrypt m under k̂ using a semantically secure private-key encryption protocol.
3. Find a set of disjoint subtrees Cov ⊆ Fam covering all the users in S.
4. Using the IBE scheme, encrypt the session key k̂ under each of the HIDs
associated with the root nodes of the subtrees in Cov.
5. Broadcast the encryption of the message m under k̂ and the IBE encryptions of
k̂ to all the users in the system.
Upon receiving a broadcast ciphertext, a user can decrypt if and only if that user
possesses an IBE secret key corresponding any of the valid root node HIDs associated
with the cover set of that ciphertext. In the public-key setting, the Center becomes
the system initialization authority that establishes the broadcast encryption system





The intrinsic access control capabilities of BE schemes make them a useful tool for
many natural applications, spanning from protecting copyrighted content distributed
as stored media [1], to managing digital subscriptions to satellite TV, to controlling
access in encrypted file systems [19]. Thanks to its wide variety of applications, BE
has received a lot of attention from the crypto research community in recent years
(e.g., [18, 22, 23, 40–42, 50, 54, 64, 89, 118]). The quest in these works, however, has
been for ever more efficient solutions in terms of sender-oriented properties such as
less encryption/decryption running time and more compact broadcast ciphertexts
and key storage. And, in these respects, the constructions proposed in [18,54] can be
considered as being nearly optimal. Little attention, instead, has been devoted to the
exploration of refined BE security models that accurately account for the requirements
inherent in multi-recipient communication. More specifically, the focus has been on
providing attractive solutions for senders, while overlooking the security and privacy
35
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concerns of the receivers.
For instance, the formal definition of broadcast encryption explicitly requires that
whenever some digital content is encrypted and sent in broadcast, information about
the set of authorized receivers is necessary to decrypt it correctly. Therefore, the set of
authorized receivers is transmitted as part of the ciphertext. This in particular implies
that an eavesdropper, even if unable to recover the message, can still easily discover
the identities of the actual receivers of the content. One way to address the privacy
implications that result from explicitly specifying the set of authorized receivers in the
broadcast is to use ephemeral IDs and to keep secret the table that associates such
IDs with the actual receivers. This simple solution, however, would at best result in a
pseudonym system, in which it is still possible to link pseudonyms across transmissions
and determine whether the same entity is an authorized receiver for two different
broadcasts. Consequently, the state of the art BE schemes are inherently incapable of
preserving any notion of receiver anonymity.
In certain broadcast applications, protecting the privacy of the receivers is just as
important as preserving the confidentiality of the broadcast messages. For example,
suppose a satellite TV provider employs a BE scheme to securely broadcast sensitive
information over a channel to its subscribers. Now, if the BE scheme does not provide
any privacy guarantees of the users, a subscriber decrypting the channel using his
secret key might also learn who else has subscribed for that channel. This is a serious
violation of the privacy of the subscribers.
Anonymous Broadcast Encryption. The first work in the cryptographic literature
to consider recipient privacy in broadcast encryption was put forth by Barth et al. [10].
Motivated by the privacy requirements in encrypted file systems, the authors therein
introduced the notion of private broadcast encryption, which later came to be known
as anonymous broadcast encryption, that aims to prevent the leakage of the identities
of the receivers. As a proof-of-concept, they also suggested two generic public-key
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constructions, one with linear decryption time in the number of legitimate recipients
and another with constant decryption time, that do not leak any information about
the set of authorized receivers of a broadcast ciphertext and are secure in the standard
model and in the random oracle model, respectively. In [83], Libert et al. suggested a
technique to prove the security of a variant of the second construction of [10] without
reliance on random oracles, thus attaining an AnoBE construction with efficient
decryption in the standard model.
Krzywiecki et al. presented a private public-key broadcast encryption scheme with
communication complexity proportional to the number of revoked users [77]. The
security analysis of the proposed solution is rather informal, however, so the security
guarantees are at best heuristic.
In [93], Yu et al. presented the first secret-key multicast scheme with membership
anonymity and communication complexity independent of the number of receivers.
The proposed scheme not only hides the identities of the receives, but also the number
of users allowed to receive the content. A shortcoming is that only a single user can
be revoked for each broadcast.
A promising research line toward practical anonymous broadcast encryption was
initiated by Jarecki and Liu [71]. The authors propose the first construction of an
efficient unlinkable secret handshake scheme, which is an authenticated key exchange
protocol providing affiliation/policy hiding (i.e., the transmission hides the affiliation
and the identities of all parties) and unlinkability (i.e., it is impossible to link any two
instances of the secret handshake protocol). The proposed construction can be seen
as a stateful version of a public-key broadcast encryption scheme, with the additional
property of protecting the receivers’ identities. Statefulness, however, implies that the
key used to encrypt the broadcasts changes for each transmission, and receivers need
to keep track of the changes to be able to recover the content. An interesting trait
of the of construction of [71] is that it trades some degree of anonymity for better
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efficiency: while the receiver’s identities are hidden from outsiders, the scheme still
allows authorized users to learn information about other members of the receiver set.
A major drawback of the state of the art AnoBE constructions mentioned above
is that their ciphertexts have linear length in the number of authorized receivers. A
linear ciphertext length is a highly undesirable property in any large-scale broadcast
application. Furthermore, as Kiayias and Samari recently showed in [76], this drawback
is unfortunately unavoidable. In [76], the authors presented the lower bounds on the
ciphertext length of AnoBE schemes and showed that fully anonymous broadcast
encryption schemes with atomic ciphertexts (e.g., the schemes of [10,83]) must have
W(s λ) ciphertext length, where s is the number of authorized receivers and λ is the
security parameter. This lower bound highlights the cost of achieving full anonymity
of the receivers in the setting of broadcast encryption.
3.2 Contributions
There are yet other broadcast applications where the anonymity of the authorized
receivers must be protected only from the outsiders (or the unauthorized users). As a
simple example, imagine that a group of scientists working for a top secret government
project wants to broadcast documents among themselves. Since their identities and
the documents they share are equally sensitive, they decide to employ an AnoBE
scheme for the transmissions. Now, since the scientists already know one another, the
full anonymity provided by AnoBE is not really necessary. What they really need is a
secure broadcast encryption scheme that prevents the leakage of their identities to the
outsiders. Also, as shown in [76], full anonymity comes at a cost of ciphertext length
being linear in the number of authorized receivers.
Outsider-Anonymous Broadcast Encryption. We formalize the above notion of
anonymity in this chapter under the term outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption
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(oABE).1 We identify that the notion of outsider anonymity lies in between the complete
lack of anonymity that characterizes traditional broadcast encryption schemes, and the
full anonymity provided by AnoBE schemes. Taking advantage of this relaxation of
anonymity, we also present modular oABE constructions whose ciphertext lengths are
sublinear in the number of legitimate receivers. It should be noted that oABE is the
first broadcast encryption scheme to achieve sublinear ciphertext lengths while also
guaranteeing a useful degree of anonymity for the authorized receivers. In summary,
our contributions are as follows.
1. First, we formally present the definition of Outsider-Anonymous Broadcast
Encryption. Compared to the definition of regular broadcast encryption, our
definition does not require the set of receivers to be an input to the decryption
algorithm. As we noticed, this modification to the decryption algorithm is a
necessary step toward any notion of anonymity for broadcast encryption.
2. Second, we put forth two security models of oABE: security with respect to
chosen plaintext attack and security with respect to chosen ciphertext attack.
These security models are presented as games played between a probabilistic
polynomial time adversary A and a challenger C. We say that a particular oABE
construction is secure with respect to one of these games if for all probabilistic
polynomial time adversaries, the advantage of winning the game is negligible in
the security parameter of the construction.
3. Then, we present several secure oABE constructions with different optimization
criterion. Table 3.1 summarizes the parameters of these constructions. This
table also compares our constructions to the state of the art broadcast encryption
schemes with anonymity guarantees. Notice that all of our oABE constructions
attain sublinear ciphertext length in the number of receivers by trading some
1This result has also been published at the 15th International Conference on Practice and Theory
in Public Key Cryptography—PKC 2012 [48].
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degree of anonymity. As we mentioned earlier, in certain applications of broadcast
communication, this level of anonymity provided by our oABE constructions do
suffice. In addition to sublinear ciphertext length, some of our constructions also
enjoy enhanced decryption, where for a given oABE ciphertext, the decryption
algorithm executes a single decryption operation of the underlying cryptosystem.
4. Finally, we prove that our constructions are secure with respect to their cor-
responding security models. At the heart of our proofs is a set of reduction
arguments comprising multiple intermediate hybrid games. Specifically, we
show how to use any adversary that can distinguish between any pair of two
consecutive games to break the security of one of the underlying cryptosystems
of our oABE constructions or falsify one of the Diffie-Hellman assumptions that
we presented earlier in Section 2.2.
Organization. The setting and the security models of outsider-anonymous broadcast
encryption is introduced in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we first present a generic
oABE construction in the standard model that achieve outsider anonymity under
adaptive corruptions in the chosen-plaintext (Section 3.4.1) and chosen-ciphertext
(Section 3.4.2) settings. Next, we describe a CCA-secure oABE construction with
enhanced decryption that is secure under the gap Diffie-Hellman assumption in the
random oracle model (Section 3.4.3), and also extend it to the standard model
(Section 3.4.4), using the twin Diffie-Hellman-based techniques of [29]. In Section 3.4.5
we also present a variant of the scheme in Section 3.4.4 with even shorter ciphertexts, at
a price on the other parameters, most notably user storage and decryption complexity.
Finally, we outline an optimization for the private-key setting to accommodate storage-
constrained systems and attain constant key storage at the Center, while maintaining
efficient decryption and logarithmic storage at the receivers (Section 3.4.6).
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3.3 Formal Model
3.3.1 Setting of oABE
The setting of outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption is analogous to that of
broadcast encryption with one important distinction: the oABE decryption algorithm
does not require the set of recipients as an input. We stress that is the starting point
for providing any level of anonymity in a broadcast encryption scheme.
Definition 3.3.1 (oABE Setting): An outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption
scheme, associated with a universe of users U = [1, N ], a message spaceMSP, and
a ciphertext space CSP, is a tuple of algorithms (Setup,KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt)
defined as follows.
(MPK,MSK)← Setup(1λ, N): The Setup algorithm takes as input the security
parameter 1λ and the number of users in the system N . It outputs the master
public key MPK and the master secret key MSK of the system.
ski ← KeyGen(MPK,MSK, i): The key generation algorithm KeyGen takes as input
the master public key MPK, the master secret key MSK, and a user i ∈ U . It
outputs the secret key ski of the user i.
c← Encrypt(MPK, S,m): The Encrypt algorithm takes as input the master public
key MPK, the set of receivers S ⊆ U , and a message m ∈MSP . It then outputs
a ciphertext c ∈ CSP .
m/⊥ := Decrypt(MPK, ski, c): Given the master public key MPK, a secret key
ski, and a ciphertext c ∈ CSP , the Decrypt algorithm either outputs a message
m ∈MSP or the failure symbol ⊥. We assume that Decrypt is deterministic.
Correctness. For every S ⊆ U , every i ∈ S, and every m ∈ MSP, if ski is the
CHAPTER 3. OUTSIDER-ANONYMOUS BROADCAST ENCRYPTION 43
secret key output by KeyGen(MPK,MSK, i), then it must be the case that
Decrypt(MPK, ski,Encrypt(MPK, S,m)) = m,
except with negligible probability in the security parameter λ. ♦
3.3.2 Security of oABE
The degree of recipient-set anonymity captured in the security models of oABE,
which we call outsider anonymity, lies between the complete lack of protection that
characterizes traditional broadcast encryption schemes as introduced in [12,49], and
the full anonymity provided in schemes such as [10,83]. In an oABE scheme, when
the adversary receives a ciphertext of which she is not a legal recipient, she will
be unable to learn anything about the identities of the legal recipients (let alone
the contents of the ciphertext). Still, for those ciphertexts for which the adversary
is in the authorized set of recipients, she might also learn the identities of some
the other legal recipients. This seems a natural relaxation, since often the contents
of the communication already reveals something about the recipient set. At the
same time, our new intermediate definitions of security allow the constructions of
more efficient anonymous broadcast encryption schemes; for example, in Section 3.4
we describe the first broadcast encryption schemes with sublinear ciphertexts that
attain some meaningful recipient-set anonymity guarantees. Specifically, we define
two models of security for oABE schemes, namely, chosen-ciphertext attack security
(oABE-IND-CCA) and chosen-plaintext attack security (oABE-IND-CPA).
oABE-IND-CCA Security. This is the strongest notion of security of an oABE
scheme, and it is related to the BE-IND-CCA model of security of BE schemes.
Formally, we define the oABE-IND-CCA security model as a game played between
a PPT adversary A and a challenger C. For a given oABE scheme to be secure in
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this model of security, any A’s advantage in winning the oABE-IND-CCA game must
be negligible. The high-level idea of this game is that for any two sets of recipients
S0, S1 ∈ U , any A should not be able to distinguish between a ciphertext intended for
the recipient set S0 and a ciphertext intended for the recipient set S1 given the fact
that the A does not possess the secret key of any user in S0 ∪ S1. We require the two
sets S0, S1 be the same size in order to avoid trivial ciphertext length-based attacks.
The formal definition of the oABE-IND-CCA model of security is given below.
Definition 3.3.2 (oABE-IND-CCA Game): The oABE-IND-CCA game defined
for an oABE scheme Π = (Setup,KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt), a PPT adversary A, and
a challenger C is as follows.
Setup: C runs (MPK,MSK)← Setup(1λ, N) and gives A the resulting master public
key MPK, keeping the master secret key MSK to itself. C also initializes the set
of revoked users RU to be empty.
Phase 1: A adaptively issues queries of the following types.
Secret-key query i: A requests the secret key of the user i ∈ U . C runs
ski ← KeyGen(MPK,MSK, i) to generate the secret key ski of the user i,
adds i to RU , and sends ski to A.
Decryption query (i, c): A issues a decryption query where i ∈ U and c ∈
CSP . First, C runs ski ← KeyGen(MPK,MSK, i) to generate the secret key
ski of user i. Then, it runs Decrypt(MPK, ski, c) and gives the output to A.
Challenge: A gives C two equal length messages m∗0,m∗1 ∈ MSP and two equal
length sets of user identities S∗0 , S∗1 ⊆ U with the restriction that RU∩(S∗0∪S∗1) =
∅. C picks a random bit b∗ ∈ {0, 1}, runs c∗ ← Encrypt(MPK, S∗b∗ ,m∗b∗), and
returns c∗ to A.
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Phase 2: The interaction between A and C in this phase is similar to Phase 1 with
two restrictions as given below.
Secret-key query i: i 6∈ S∗0 ∪ S∗1 .
Decryption query (i, c): If i ∈ S∗0 ∪ S∗1 , then c 6= c∗.
Guess: A outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1} and wins if b = b∗.
We refer to such an adversary A as an oABE-IND-CCA adversary. The advantage of
A winning the above game is defined as,
AdvoABE-IND-CCAA,Π :=
∣∣∣Pr[b = b∗]− 12 ∣∣∣,
where the probability is over the random bits used by A and C. ♦
Definition 3.3.3 (oABE-IND-CCA Security): An oABE scheme Π is (t, QU ,
QD, )-oABE-IND-CCA-secure if for any t-time oABE-IND-CCA adversary mak-
ing at most QU adaptive secret-key queries and at most QD chosen decryption queries,
we have that AdvoABE-IND-CCAA,Π ≤ . ♦
oABE-IND-CPA Security. This model of security is defined similar to the oABE-
IND-CCA game with the restriction that the adversary is not allowed to issue any
decryption queries during Phase 1 and Phase 2. The adversary is still allowed to issue
secret-key queries. Also note that oABE-IND-CPA security model is analogous to the
BE-IND-CPA security model of BE schemes.
Definition 3.3.4 (oABE-IND-CPA Security): An oABE scheme Π is (t, QU , )-
oABE-IND-CPA-secure if Π is (t, QU , 0, )-oABE-IND-CCA-secure. ♦
Remark 3.3.5. Any of our definitions of security of outsider-anonymous broadcast en-
cryption schemes given above can be easily transformed to a corresponding definition of
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security of a fully anonymous broadcast encryption scheme by changing the restriction
in the Challenge step, which is currently RU ∩ (S∗0 ∪ S∗1) = ∅, to RU ∩ (S∗0 4 S∗1) = ∅.2
3.4 Constructions
We now present our constructions of outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption schemes.
In a nutshell, the key point of our constructions is to combine an anonymized version
of the public-key extension by Dodis and Fazio [40] of the complete subtree method of
the subset cover framework by Naor et al. [89] with a fully secure weakly robust AIBE
scheme such as [51]. Reviews of the SC framework and the CS method are given in
Section 2.5. Notice that our approach can be seen as a framework for achieving an
oABE scheme by using any weakly robust AIBE scheme as an underlying primitive.








length of the underlying AIBE scheme, and the user secret key length is O(logN)
times the user secret key length of the underlying AIBE scheme, where r is the number
of revoked users and N is the total number of users in the system.
We start with two generic oABE constructions: an oABE-IND-CPA-secure con-
struction in Section 3.4.1 and an oABE-IND-CCA-secure construction in Section 3.4.2.










/2 decryption operations of the un-
derlying AIBE scheme for each decrypted oABE ciphertext. In Section 3.4.3, we
present an enhanced oABE-IND-CCA-secure construction in which for a given oABE
ciphertext, the Decrypt algorithm executes a single AIBE decryption operation. A
drawback of this construction is that its security can only be proven in the random
oracle model. In Section 3.4.4, we present another enhanced oABE-IND-CCA-secure
construction whose security can be proven in the standard model. In Section 3.4.5 we
present a variant of the scheme in Section 3.4.4 attaining even shorter ciphertexts, at
2For any two sets S0, S1, their symmetric difference is denoted by S0 4 S1.
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a price on the other parameters, most notably, user storage and decryption complexity.
Finally, in Section 3.4.6, we outline an optimization for the private-key setting to
attain constant key storage at the Center, while maintaining efficient decryption and
logarithmic storage at the receivers.
For the simplicity of exposition, our constructions encrypt the actual message m.
The ciphertext length could be further reduced by using a hybrid encryption where m
is encrypted using a private-key encryption algorithm with a secret key k, and then k
is encrypted using the oABE scheme.
In all constructions, T denotes the binary tree of N users in the system with
respect to the CS method. For simplicity, we assume that N = 2n.
3.4.1 A Generic oABE-IND-CPA-Secure
Public-Key Construction
Given a weakly robust AIBE-IND-CPA-secure anonymous identity-based encryption
scheme Π′ = (Setup′,Extract′,Encrypt′,Decrypt′), we construct an oABE-IND-CPA-
secure outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption scheme Π = (Setup,KeyGen,Encrypt,
Decrypt) as shown below.
Setup(1λ, N): Obtain (MPK′,MSK′)← Setup′(1λ). Output MPK and MSK as
MPK := (MPK′, N) MSK := MSK′.
KeyGen(MPK,MSK, i): Let HIDi := (Root, ID1, . . . , IDn) be the hierarchical identi-
fier associated with user i in the binary tree T . For k := 1 to n+ 1, compute
ski,k ← Extract′(MPK′,MSK′,HIDi|k). Output the secret key ski of user i as
ski := (ski,1, . . . , ski,n+1) .
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Encrypt(MPK, S,m): Let Cover be the family of subtrees covering the set of receivers
S according to the CS method. For each subtree Tj in Cover, let HIDj be the








. For 1 ≤ j ≤ l, compute cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′,HIDj,m).
Set m˜ ←$ {0, 1}|m|. For l+ 1 ≤ j ≤ L, compute cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′, dummy, m˜),
where dummy is a special identifier used to obtain padding ciphertext components.
Output the ciphertext c as
c :=
(
cpi(1), . . . , cpi(L)
)
,
where pi : {1, . . . , L} → {1, . . . , L} is a random permutation.
Decrypt(MPK, ski, c): Parse the secret key ski as the tuple (ski,1, . . . , ski,n+1) and
the ciphertext c as the tuple (c1, . . . , cL).
1. For k := 1 to n+ 1,
a. For j := 1 to L,
i. Compute m := Decrypt′(MPK′, ski,k, cj).
ii. If m 6= ⊥, return m. Otherwise, continue to next j.
b. If k = n+ 1, return ⊥. Otherwise, continue to next k.
Parameters. When the above construction is instantiated with Gentry’s fully secure
AIBE scheme in the CPA setting [51], we obtain the following parameter lengths. Let
G and GT be the two groups with prime order q in Gentry’s construction. MSK is
just one element in Zq and the integer N . MPK is only 3 group elements in G. The
user secret key consists of (logN + 1) elements in Zq and (logN + 1) elements in G.















Also notice that the Encrypt algorithm in Gentry’s AIBE-IND-CPA-secure scheme
does not require any pairing computations since they can be precomputed.
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The correctness of the above generic public-key construction in the CPA setting
follows from the correctness of the underlying AIBE scheme. In Theorem 3.4.1 given
below, we establish the security of this construction based on the security of the
underlying AIBE scheme.
Theorem 3.4.1: If the AIBE scheme Π′ = (Setup′,Extract′,Encrypt′,Decrypt′) is
(t, QU , )-AIBE-IND-CPA-secure, then the above construction is
(













, and let pi : {1, . . . , L} → {1, . . . , L} be a random permutation. For
b ∈ {0, 1}, let S∗b be the set of authorized receivers chosen by the adversary in the
Challenge step, and let Coverb denote the family of subtrees covering the set S∗b
according to the complete subtree method of the public-key extension of the subset
cover framework. Let lb := |Coverb|. For each 1 ≤ j ≤ lb and for each subtree T bj in
Coverb, let HIDbj be the hierarchical identifier associated with the root of T bj .
We organize our proof as a sequence of games, Game00, . . . ,Game0l0 ≡ Game1l1 , . . . ,
Game10, between the adversary A and the challenger C. During the Challenge step of
the first game (Game00), A receives an encryption of m∗0 for S∗0 and in the last game
(Game10), A receives an encryption of m∗1 for S∗1 .
Game00: This game corresponds to the game given in Definition 3.3.4 when the
challenge bit b∗ is fixed to 0. The interaction between A and C during Setup,
Phase 1, and Phase 2 steps follow exactly as specified in Definition 3.3.4. During
Challenge step, A gives C two equal length messages m∗0,m∗1 ∈ MSP and
two equal length sets of user identities S∗0 , S∗1 ⊆ U with the restriction that
RU ∩ (S∗0 ∪ S∗1) = ∅, where RU is the set of users that A has corrupted during
Phase 1. C computes the challenge ciphertext c∗, which will subsequently be
sent to A, as follows.
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1. For j := 1 to l0, compute cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′,HID0j ,m∗0).
2. Set m˜ ←$ {0, 1}|m∗0|.
3. For j := l0 + 1 to L, compute cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′, dummy, m˜).
4. Set c∗ :=
(
cpi(1), . . . , cpi(L)
)
.
Eventually, A outputs a bit b and wins if b = 0.
Game0h(1 ≤ h ≤ l0): This games is similar to Game0h−1, but C computes the chal-
lenge ciphertext c∗ as follows.
1. For j := 1 to l0 − h, compute cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′,HID0j ,m∗0).
2. Set m˜ ←$ {0, 1}|m∗0|.
3. For j := l0 − h+ 1 to L, compute cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′, dummy, m˜).
4. Set c∗ :=
(
cpi(1), . . . , cpi(L)
)
.
At the end, A outputs a bit b and wins if b = 0.
Game1l1: This game is identical to Game
0
l0 .
Game1k(0 ≤ k < l1): This game is similar to Game1k+1, but the challenge ciphertext
c∗ is now computed by C as follows.
1. For j := 1 to l1 − k, compute cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′,HID1j ,m∗1).
2. Set m˜ ←$ {0, 1}|m∗1|.
3. For j := l1 − k + 1 to L, compute cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′, dummy, m˜).
4. Set c∗ :=
(
cpi(1), . . . , cpi(L)
)
.
Finally, A outputs a bit b and wins if b = 0.
For 0 ≤ i ≤ l0 and 0 ≤ j ≤ l1, let Adv0,iA,Π and Adv1,jA,Π denote A’s advantage
in winning Game0i and Game1j , respectively. In Lemma 3.4.2, we show that if the
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underlying AIBE scheme is (t, QU , )-AIBE-IND-CPA secure, then A’s advantage in
distinguishing Game0h−1 from Game0h is at most . Similarly, Lemma 3.4.3 states that
under similar conditions A’s advantage in distinguishing Game1k+1 from Game1k is at
most . Therefore,
∣∣∣Adv0,0A,Π − Adv1,0A,Π∣∣∣ ≤  (l0 + l1)
≤ 2  L






Lemma 3.4.2: For 1 ≤ h ≤ l0, if the underlying anonymous identity-based encryption
scheme Π′ is (t, QU , )-AIBE-IND-CPA-secure, then A’s advantage in distinguishing
Game0h−1 from Game0h is at most . In other words,
∣∣∣Adv0,h−1A,Π − Adv0,hA,Π∣∣∣ ≤ . 
Proof. We build a PPT adversary B that runs the AIBE-IND-CPA game with its
challenger C ′ as follows. First, B receives the master public key MPK′ of the AIBE
scheme from C ′. Next, B internally executes the oABE-IND-CPA game with A in
order to gain advantage in the AIBE-IND-CPA game. The details of the interaction
between C ′, B, and A are given below.
Setup: B forwards MPK′ to A. B also initializes the set of revoked users RU := ∅.
Phase 1: When A invokes a secret-key query for user i, first, B computes HIDi, which
is the hierarchical identifier associated with the user i in the binary tree T . Next,
for k := 1 to n+ 1, B obtains the secret key ski,k of the identity HIDi|k from its
challenger C ′. After adding i to RU , B sends to A the secret key of the user i as
ski := (ski,1, . . . , ski,n+1).
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Challenge: B receives from A two equal length messages m∗0,m∗1 ∈ MSP and
two equal length sets of user identities S∗0 , S∗1 ⊆ U with the restriction that
RU ∩ (S∗0 ∪ S∗1) = ∅. B draws m˜ ←$ {0, 1}|m∗0| and computes the components of
its challenge query as follows.
id′0 = HID0l0−h+1, id
′
1 = dummy, m′0 = m∗0, m′1 = m˜
Observe that the condition RU ∩ (S∗0 ∪S∗1) = ∅, together with the key assignment
strategy of the CS method guarantees that the identity id′0 hadn’t been queried
to B’s key generation oracle, and thus this is a valid challenge query to C ′.
Next, B sends the two identities id′0, id′1 and the two messages m′0,m′1 as the
challenge query to C ′. C ′ picks a random bit b′ ∈ {0, 1} and sends c′ ←
Encrypt′(MPK′, id′b′ ,m′b′) to B. Finally, B computes the challenge ciphertext c∗,
which is eventually sent to A, as follows.
1. For j := 1 to l0 − h, compute cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′,HID0j ,m∗0).
2. Set cl0−h+1 := c′.
3. For j := l0 − h+ 2 to L, compute cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′, dummy, m˜).
4. Set c∗ :=
(
cpi(1), . . . , cpi(L)
)
.
Phase 2: This phase is handled similarly to Phase 1 with the usual restriction that
A does not invoke a secret-key query i such that i ∈ S∗0 ∪ S∗1 .
Guess: A outputs a guess b and B passes this bit as its guess for b′ to C ′.
Observe that, by construction, it holds that if C ′ chooses b′ = 0, then B is playing
Game0h−1, whereas if b′ = 1, then B is playing Game0h. Therefore, B’s AIBE-IND-CPA
advantage is equivalent to A’s advantage in distinguishing Game0h−1 from Game0h.
More formally, ∣∣∣Adv0,h−1A,Π − Adv0,hA,Π∣∣∣ = AdvAIBE-IND-CPAB,Π′ ≤ . 
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Lemma 3.4.3: For 0 ≤ k < l1, if the underlying anonymous identity-based encryption
scheme Π′ is (t, QU , )-AIBE-IND-CPA-secure, then A’s advantage in distinguishing
Game1k+1 from Game1k is at most . More precisely,
∣∣∣Adv1,k+1A,Π − Adv1,kA,Π∣∣∣ ≤ . 
Proof. The argument is analogous to the proof of Lemma 3.4.2. 
3.4.2 A Generic oABE-IND-CCA-Secure
Public-Key Construction
Given a weakly robust AIBE-IND-CCA-secure anonymous identity-based encryption
scheme Π′ = (Setup′,Extract′,Encrypt′,Decrypt′) and a strong existentially unforgeable
one-time signature scheme Σ = (Gen, Sign,Vrfy), we construct an oABE-IND-CCA-
secure outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption scheme Π = (Setup,KeyGen,Encrypt,
Decrypt) as given below. The definition of strong existential unforgeability for one-time
signature schemes is given in Section 2.4.2.
Setup(1λ, N): Obtain (MPK′,MSK′)← Setup′(1λ). Output MPK and MSK as
MPK := (MPK′, N) MSK := MSK′.
KeyGen(MPK,MSK, i): Let HIDi := (Root, ID1, . . . , IDn) be the hierarchical identi-
fier associated with user i in the binary tree T . For k := 1 to n+ 1, compute
ski,k ← Extract′(MPK′,MSK′,HIDi|k). Output the secret key ski of user i as
ski := (ski,1, . . . , ski,n+1).
Encrypt(MPK, S,m): Generate (VK, SK) ← Gen(1λ). Let Cover be the family of
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subtrees covering the set of receivers S according to the CS method. For each
subtree Tj in Cover, let HIDj be the hierarchical identifier associated with the root







. For 1 ≤ j ≤ l, compute
cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′,HIDj,VK‖m). Set m˜ ←$ {0, 1}|VK‖m|. For l + 1 ≤ j ≤ L,
compute cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′, dummy, m˜), where dummy is a special identifier used
to obtain padding ciphertext components. Compute ĉ as
ĉ :=
(
cpi(1), . . . , cpi(L)
)
,
where pi : {1, . . . , L} → {1, . . . , L} is a random permutation.
Generate σ ← Sign(SK,VK‖ĉ ), and output c := (σ,VK, ĉ ).
Decrypt(MPK, ski, c): Parse the secret key ski as the tuple (ski,1, . . . , ski,n+1) and
the ciphertext c as (σ,VK, ĉ = (c1, . . . , cL)).
1. For k := 1 to n+ 1,
a. For j := 1 to L,
i. Compute m′ := Decrypt′(MPK′, ski,k, cj).
ii. If m′ 6= ⊥, parse m′ as VK‖m and return m if
Vrfy(VK, σ,VK‖ĉ ) = 1. Otherwise, continue to next j.
b. If k = n+ 1, return ⊥. Otherwise, continue to next k.
Parameters. The parameter lengths of the above construction when instantiated
with Gentry’s Fully Secure AIBE scheme in the CCA setting [51] are as follows. Let
G and GT be the two groups with prime order q in Gentry’s construction. MSK is
one element in Zq and the integer N . MPK consists of 5 group elements in G and the
definition of a hash function H from a family of universal one-way hash functions. The
user secret key consists of 3(logN + 1) elements in Zq and 3(logN + 1) elements in G.
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Similar to Gentry’s AIBE-IND-CPA-secure construction, the Encrypt algorithm in his
AIBE-IND-CCA-secure construction does not require any pairing computations since
they can be precomputed.
The correctness of the above generic public-key construction in the CCA setting
follows from the correctness of the underlying signature and AIBE schemes. The
security of this construction is established in Theorem 3.4.4 below.
Theorem 3.4.4: If the one-time signature scheme Σ = (Gen, Sign,Vrfy) is (t, QD, 1)-
SIG-SEU-secure and the AIBE scheme Π′ = (Setup′,Extract′,Encrypt′,Decrypt′) is
(t, QU , QD, 2)-AIBE-IND-CCA-secure, then the construction given above is
(
t, QU ,






Proof. Let r, L, pi, S∗b , Coverb, lb, T bj , and HIDbj be as defined in the proof of The-
orem 3.4.1. We organize our proof as a sequence of games, Game00, . . . ,Game0l0 ≡
Game1l1 , . . . , Game
1
0, between the adversary A and the challenger C. During the
Challenge step of the first game (Game00), A receives an encryption of m∗0 for S∗0 and
in the last game (Game10), A receives an encryption of m∗1 for S∗1 .
Game00: This game corresponds to the game given in Definition 3.3.3 when the
challenge bit b∗ is fixed to 0. The interaction between A and C during Setup,
Phase 1, and Phase 2 steps follow exactly as specified in Definition 3.3.3. During
Challenge step, A gives C two equal length messages m∗0,m∗1 ∈ MSP and
two equal length sets of user identities S∗0 , S∗1 ⊆ U with the restriction that
RU ∩ (S∗0 ∪ S∗1) = ∅, where RU is the set of users that A corrupted during Phase
1. C computes the challenge ciphertext c∗, which will subsequently be sent to A,
as follows.
1. Generate (VK, SK)← Gen(1λ).
2. For j := 1 to l0, compute cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′,HID0j ,VK‖m∗0).
3. Set m˜ ←$ {0, 1}|VK‖m∗0|.
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4. For j := l0 + 1 to L, compute cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′, dummy, m˜).
5. Set ĉ :=
(
cpi(1), . . . , cpi(L)
)
.
6. Generate σ ← Sign(SK,VK‖ĉ ), and set c∗ := (σ,VK, ĉ ).
Eventually, A outputs a bit b and wins if b = 0.
Game0h(1 ≤ h ≤ l0): This game is similar to Game0h−1, but C computes the challenge
ciphertext c∗ as follows.
1. Generate (VK, SK)← Gen(1λ).
2. For j := 1 to l0 − h, compute cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′,HID0j ,VK‖m∗0).
3. Set m˜ ←$ {0, 1}|VK‖m∗0|.
4. For j := l0 − h+ 1 to L, compute cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′, dummy, m˜).
5. Set ĉ :=
(
cpi(1), . . . , cpi(L)
)
.
6. Generate σ ← Sign(SK,VK‖ĉ ), and set c∗ := (σ,VK, ĉ ).
At the end, A outputs a bit b and wins if b = 0.
Game1l1: This game is identical to Game
0
l0 .
Game1k(0 ≤ k < l1): This game is similar to Game1k+1, but c∗ is now computed by
C as follows.
1. Generate (VK, SK)← Gen(1λ).
2. For j := 1 to l1 − k, compute cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′,HID1j ,VK‖m∗1).
3. Set m˜ ←$ {0, 1}|VK‖m∗1|.
4. For j := l1 − k + 1 to L, compute cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′, dummy, m˜).
5. Set ĉ :=
(
cpi(1), . . . , cpi(L)
)
.
6. Generate σ ← Sign(SK,VK‖ĉ ), and set c∗ := (σ,VK, ĉ ).
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Finally, A outputs a bit b and wins if b = 0.
For 0 ≤ i ≤ l0 and 0 ≤ j ≤ l1, let Adv0,iA,Π and Adv1,jA,Π denote A’s advantage
of winning Game0i and Game1j , respectively. In Lemma 3.4.5, we show that if the
underlying one-time signature scheme and AIBE scheme are, respectively, (t, QD, 1)-
SIG-SEU-secure and (t, QU , QD, 2)-AIBE-IND-CCA-secure, then A’s advantage of
distinguishing Game0h−1 from Game0h is at most 1 + 2. Similarly, Lemma 3.4.6 states
that under analogous conditions A’s advantage of distinguishing Game1k+1 from Game1k
is again at most 1 + 2. Therefore,
∣∣∣Adv0,0A,Π − Adv1,0A,Π∣∣∣ ≤ (1 + 2) (l0 + l1)
≤ 2 (1 + 2)L






Lemma 3.4.5: For 1 ≤ h ≤ l0, if the underlying one-time signature scheme Σ is
(t, QD, 1)-SIG-SEU-secure and the anonymous identity-based encryption scheme Π′ is
(t, QU , QD, 2)-AIBE-IND-CCA-secure, then A’s advantage of distinguishing Game0h−1
from Game0h is at most 1 + 2. In other words,
∣∣∣Adv0,h−1A,Π − Adv0,hA,Π∣∣∣ ≤ (1 + 2). 
Proof. We build a PPT adversary B that runs the AIBE-IND-CCA game with its
challenger C ′ as follows. First, B receives the master public key MPK′ of the AIBE
scheme from C ′. Next, B internally executes the oABE-IND-CCA game with A in
order to gain advantage in the AIBE-IND-CCA game. The details of the interaction
between C ′, B, and A are given below.
Setup: B forwards MPK′ to A. B also initializes the set of revoked users RU := ∅.
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Phase 1: B replies to A’s queries as follows.
Secret-key query i: First, B computes HIDi, which is the hierarchical identifier
associated with the user i in the binary tree T . Next, for k := 1 to n+ 1,
B obtains the secret key ski,k of the identity HIDi|k from its challenger
C ′. After adding i to RU , B sends to A the secret key of the user i as
ski := (ski,1, . . . , ski,n+1).
Decryption query (i, c): First, B parses c as (σ,VK, ĉ = (c1, . . . , cL)). Then,
B computes HIDi, and for each k := 1 to n+ 1, proceeds as follows.
• If B obtained the secret key ski,k corresponding to the identity HIDi|k
in the process of responding to a previous secret-key query, then B
attempts to decrypt in turn all ciphertext components c1, . . . , cL in ĉ
using the secret key ski,k. If any of these decryption attempts yield a
non-⊥ value VK‖m, then B returns m to A if Vrfy(VK, σ,VK‖ĉ ) = 1.
Otherwise, B continues to next k.
• If B did not obtain the secret key ski,k of the identity HIDi|k from
an earlier secret-key query, then B makes L decryption queries to its
challenger C ′, one for each ciphertext component c1, . . . , cL, all under
identity HIDi|k. If any of these decryption queries return a non-⊥ value
VK‖m, then B returns m to A if Vrfy(VK, σ,VK‖ĉ ) = 1. Otherwise, B
continues to next j.
If all the above decryption attempts return ⊥, then B returns ⊥ to A.
Challenge: B receives from A two equal length messages m∗0,m∗1 ∈ MSP and
two equal length sets of user identities S∗0 , S∗1 ⊆ U with the restriction that
RU ∩ (S∗0 ∪ S∗1) = ∅. B generates (VK, SK)← Gen(1λ), selects a random string
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m˜ ←$ {0, 1}|VK‖m∗0|, and sets
id′0 = HID0l0−h+1, id
′
1 = dummy, m′0 = VK‖m∗0, m′1 = m˜.
Next, B sends the two identities id′0, id′1 and the two messages m′0,m′1 as the
challenge query to C ′. C ′ picks a random bit b′ ∈ {0, 1} and responds to B with
c′ ← Encrypt′(MPK′, id′b′ ,m′b′). Finally, B computes the challenge ciphertext c∗,
which is eventually sent to A, as follows,
1. For j := 1 to l0 − h, compute cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′,HID0j ,VK‖m∗0).
2. Set cl0−h+1 := c′.
3. For j := l0 − h+ 2 to L, compute cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′, dummy, m˜).
4. Set ĉ := (cpi(1), . . . , cpi(L)).
5. Generate σ ← Sign(SK,VK‖ĉ ), and set c∗ := (σ,VK, ĉ ).
Phase 2: B replies to A’s queries as follows.
Secret-key query i: These queries are handled similarly to Phase 1, with the
usual restriction that A does not invoke a secret-key query i such that
i ∈ S∗0 ∪ S∗1 .
Decryption query (i, c): B parses c as (σ,VK, ĉ = (c1, . . . , cL)) and replies
according to one of the following cases.
• If c = c∗ and i 6∈ S∗0 ∪ S∗1 , then B proceeds as in Phase 1. (Note that
in this case B’s output will be ⊥, as it should be.)
• If c = c∗, and i ∈ S∗0 ∪ S∗1 , B just rejects, since A is submitting an
invalid query.
• If c 6= c∗ and i 6∈ S∗0 , then B proceeds as in Phase 1.
• If c 6= c∗ and i ∈ S∗0 , then B computes HIDi, and proceeds as follows:
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 If for all k := 1 to n + 1, it is the case that HIDi|k 6= HID0l0−h+1,
then B proceeds as in Phase 1. Observe that the condition ∀k ∈
[1, n+1] : HIDi|k 6= HID0l0−h+1 ensures that all the decryption queries
that B will make to its challenger C ′ in the process of responding
to A’s queries are allowed.
 If ∃ k ∈ [1, n + 1] such that HIDi|k = HID0l0−h+1, and c′ does
not appear among the ciphertext components of ĉ, then again B
proceeds as in Phase 1. Observe that the condition that ĉ does not
contain c′ ensures that also in this case all the decryption queries
that B will make to its challenger C ′ in the process of responding
to A’s queries are allowed.
 If ∃ k ∈ [1, n + 1] such that HIDi|k = HID0l0−h+1, but c′ appears
among the ciphertext components of ĉ, then B outputs ⊥. To see
that ⊥ is the correct reply, observe that in the real oABE-IND-CCA
game, a decryption query (i, c) of this type will trigger decryption
of the c′ component. Since by construction c′ is the encryption of
VK‖m∗0, and c 6= c∗, by the strong existential unforgeability of the
underlying one-time signature scheme, the verification test of the
decryption algorithm would fail, thus yielding ⊥ as output.
Guess: A outputs a guess b and B passes this bit as its guess for b′ to C ′.
Observe that, by construction, it holds that if C ′ chooses b′ = 0, then B is playing
Game0h−1, whereas if b′ = 1, then B is playing Game0h. Therefore, up to forgeries of the
underlying one-time signature scheme, B’s AIBE-IND-CCA advantage is essentially
A’s advantage in distinguishing Game0h−1 from Game0h. Therefore,
∣∣∣Adv0,h−1A,Π − Adv0,hA,Π∣∣∣ ≤ (1 + 2). 
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Lemma 3.4.6: For 0 ≤ k < l1, if the underlying one-time signature scheme Σ is
(t, QD, 1)-SIG-SEU-secure and the underlying anonymous identity-based encryption
scheme Π′ is (t, QU , QD, 2)-AIBE-IND-CCA-secure, then A’s advantage of distin-
guishing Game1k+1 from Game1k is at most . More precisely,
∣∣∣Adv1,k+1A,Π − Adv1,kA,Π∣∣∣ ≤ (1 + 2). 
Proof. The argument is analogous to the proof of Lemma 3.4.5. 
3.4.3 An Enhanced oABE-IND-CCA-Secure Public-Key
Construction in the Random Oracle Model
The main limitation of our generic public-key constructions is the running time of
the decryption algorithm. As described in the opening paragraphs of Section 3.4,









/2 AIBE decryption attempts on
average. The root cause behind this limitation is the decryption process’s inability to
identify the correct AIBE ciphertext component efficiently. In this section, we describe
an enhancement of our generic public-key construction under the computational Diffie-
Hellman assumption, in the random oracle model. The definition of the CDH problem
is given in Section 2.2.1.
The main idea of this enhancement is to adapt the techniques of [10] to the structure
of our ciphertexts and attach a unique tag to each AIBE ciphertext component of
a given oABE ciphertext. With this optimization, the Decrypt algorithm is able to
identify the correct AIBE ciphertext component via a linear search through the whole
oABE ciphertext components, at which point a single AIBE decryption operation










, but in fact this is in a sense an overestimate, since the cost of
searching for the correct ciphertext component is much less than carrying out multiple
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decryption attempts.
Given a weakly robust AIBE-IND-CCA-secure anonymous identity-based encryp-
tion scheme Π′ = (Setup′,Extract′,Encrypt′,Decrypt′) and a strong existentially un-
forgeable one-time signature scheme Σ = (Gen, Sign,Vrfy), we construct an oABE-IND-
CCA-secure outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption scheme Π = (Setup,KeyGen,
Encrypt,Decrypt) with enhanced decryption as follows. In this construction, G = 〈g〉
denotes a group with prime order q > 2λ in which computational Diffie-Hellman
problem is hard, the decisional Diffie-Hellamn problem is easy, and g is a group
generator. H : G→ {0, 1}λ is a cryptographic hash function that will be modeled as
a random oracle in the security analysis of this construction.
Setup(1λ, N): Obtain (MPK′,MSK′)← Setup′(1λ). For each node (with the hierar-
chical identifier HID) in T , draw aHID ←$ Zq, and compute AHID := gaHID . Output
MPK and MSK as
MPK :=
(







KeyGen(MPK,MSK, i): Let HIDi := (Root, ID1, . . . , IDn) be the hierarchical iden-
tifier associated with user i in the binary tree T . For k := 1 to n + 1, set
ski,k := aHIDi|k , and compute ski,k ← Extract′(MPK′,MSK′,HIDi|k). Output the










Encrypt(MPK, S,m): Generate (VK, SK) ← Gen(1λ). Let Cover be the family of
subtrees covering the set of receivers S according to the CS method. For
each subtree Tj in Cover, let HIDj be the hierarchical identifier associated with
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s ←$ Zq, and compute c0 := gs. For 1 ≤ j ≤ l, compute cj := H(AsHIDj),
cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′,HIDj,VK‖AsHIDj‖m). Set m˜ ←$ {0, 1}|VK‖c0‖m|. For l + 1 ≤
j ≤ L, set sj ←$ Zq, and compute cj := H(gsj ), cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′, dummy, m˜),













where pi : {1, . . . , L} → {1, . . . , L} is a random permutation.
Generate σ ← Sign(SK,VK‖ĉ ), and output c := (σ,VK, ĉ ).




, . . . ,(
ski,n+1, ski,n+1
))
and the ciphertext c as (σ,VK, ĉ = (c0, (c1, c1), . . . , (cL, cL))).
1. For k := 1 to n+ 1,
a. Compute tagk := H(c
ski,k
0 )
2. Check whether ∃k ∈ [1, n+ 1] ∃j ∈ [1, L] such that tagk = cj
a. If suitable k, j exist, compute m′ := Dec(MPK′, ski,k, cj).
b. If m′ can be parsed as VK‖c ski,k0 ‖m and
Vrfy(VK, σ,VK‖ĉ ) = 1, return m.
c. Otherwise, return ⊥.
Remark 3.4.7. Notice that the check in Step 2 of the Decrypt algorithm can be
performed in expected time O(n+ L) = O(L), e.g., using a hash table H to compute
the intersection between {tagk}k∈[1,n+1] and {cj}j∈[1,L] as follows.
1. Initialize H to be empty.
2. For k := 1 to n+ 1
a. Insert (tagk, k) in H.
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3. For j := 1 to L
a. Look up an entry of the form (cj, k) in H. If found, return k.
The correctness of the above enhanced public-key construction in the CCA setting
follows from the algebraic properties of the group G and the correctness of the
underlying signature and AIBE schemes. The security of this construction is established
in Theorem 3.4.8 below.
Theorem 3.4.8: If the one-time signature scheme Σ = (Gen, Sign,Vrfy) is (t, QD, 1)-
SIG-SEU-secure, the AIBE scheme Π′ = (Setup′,Extract′,Encrypt′,Decrypt′) is (t, QU ,
QD, 2)-AIBE-IND-CCA-secure, and CDH problem is (t, 3)-hard in G and DDH
problem is efficiently computable in G, then the above construction is
(
t, QU , QD, 2 (1 +





-oABE-IND-CCA-secure, in the random oracle model. 
Proof. Let r, L, pi, S∗b , Coverb, lb, T bj , and HIDbj be as defined in the proof of Theo-
rem 3.4.1. We organize our proof as a sequence of games between the adversary A
and the challenger C as follows.
Game00, Game
0












During the Challenge step of the first game (Game00), A receives an encryption of
m∗0 for S∗0 and in the last game (Game10), A receives an encryption of m∗1 for S∗1 .
Game00: This game corresponds to the game given in Definition 3.3.3 when the
challenge bit b∗ is fixed to 0. The interaction between A and C during Setup,
Phase 1, and Phase 2 steps follow exactly as specified in Definition 3.3.3. During
Challenge step, A gives C two equal length messages m∗0,m∗1 ∈ MSP and
two equal length sets of user identities S∗0 , S∗1 ⊆ U with the restriction that
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RU ∩ (S∗0 ∪ S∗1) = ∅, where RU is the set of users that A corrupted during Phase
1. C computes the challenge ciphertext c∗, which will subsequently be sent to A,
as follows.
1. Generate (VK, SK)← Gen(1λ).
2. Draw s ←$ Zq, and compute c0 := gs.





cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′,HID0j ,VK‖AsHID0j‖m
∗
0).
4. Set m˜ ←$ {0, 1}|VK‖c0‖m∗0|.
5. For j := l0 + 1 to L, set sj ←$ Zq, and compute cj := H(gsj),
cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′, dummy, m˜).











7. Generate σ ← Sign(SK,VK‖ĉ ), and set c∗ := (σ,VK, ĉ ).
Eventually, A outputs a bit b and wins if b = 0.
Game0h(1 ≤ h ≤ l0): This game is similar to Game0h−1, but C computes the challenge
ciphertext c∗ as follows.
1. Generate (VK, SK)← Gen(1λ).
2. Draw s ←$ Zq, and compute c0 := gs.





cj ← Enc(MPK′,HID0j ,VK‖AsHID0j‖m
∗
0).
4. Set m˜ ←$ {0, 1}|VK‖c0‖m∗0|.




, cl0−h+1 ← Encrypt′(MPK′, dummy, m˜).
6. For j := l0 − h+ 2 to L, set sj ←$ Zq, and compute cj := H(gsj),
cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′, dummy, m˜).
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8. Generate σ ← Sign(SK,VK‖ĉ ), and set c∗ := (σ,VK, ĉ ).
At the end, A outputs a bit b and wins if b = 0.
Game0h(1 ≤ h ≤ l0): This game is similar to Game
0
h, but C computes the challenge
ciphertext c∗ as follows.
1. Generate (VK, SK)← Gen(1λ).
2. Draw s ←$ Zq, and compute c0 := gs.





cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′,HID0j ,VK‖AsHID0j‖m
∗
0).
4. Set m˜ ←$ {0, 1}|VK‖c0‖m∗0|.
5. For j := l0 − h+ 1 to L, set sj ←$ Zq, and compute cj := H(gsj),
cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′, dummy, m˜).











7. Generate σ ← Sign(SK,VK‖ĉ ), and set c∗ := (σ,VK, ĉ ).
Finally, A outputs a bit b and wins if b = 0.
Game1l1: This game is identical to Game
0
l0
Game1k(1 ≤ k ≤ l1): This game is similar to Game1k, with the challenge ciphertext
c∗ computed by C as follows.
1. Generate (VK, SK)← Gen(1λ).
2. Draw s ←$ Zq, and compute c0 := gs.





cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′,HID1j ,VK‖AsHID1j‖m
∗
1).
4. Set m˜ ←$ {0, 1}|VK‖c0‖m∗1|.
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, cl1−k+1 ← Enc(MPK′, dummy, m˜).
6. For j := l1 − k + 2 to L, set sj ←$ Zq, and compute cj := H(gsj),
cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′, dummy, m˜).











8. Generate σ ← Sign(SK,VK‖ĉ ), and set c∗ := (σ,VK, ĉ ).
At last, A outputs a bit b and wins if b = 0.
Game1k(0 ≤ k < l1): This game is similar to Game
1
k+1, but C computes the challenge
ciphertext c∗ as follows.
1. Generate (VK, SK)← Gen(1λ).
2. Draw s ←$ Zq, and compute c0 := gs.





cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′,HID1j ,VK‖AsHID1j‖m
∗
1).
4. Set m˜ ←$ {0, 1}|VK‖c0‖m∗1|.
5. For j := l1 − k + 1 to L, set sj ←$ Zq, and compute cj := H(gsj),
cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′, dummy, m˜).











7. Generate σ ← Sign(SK,VK‖ĉ ), and set c∗ := (σ,VK, ĉ ).
Finally, A outputs a bit b and wins if b = 0.
For 0 ≤ i1 ≤ l0, 1 ≤ i2 ≤ l0, 0 ≤ j1 ≤ l1 and 1 ≤ j2 ≤ l1, let Adv0,i1A,Π, Adv0,i2A,Π,
Adv1,j1A,Π and Adv
1,j2
A,Π denote A’s advantage of winning Game0i1 , Game
0
i2 , Game1j1 and
Game0j2 , respectively. In Lemma 3.4.9, we show that if the underlying one-time
signature scheme and AIBE scheme are, respectively, (t, QD, 1)-SIG-SEU-secure and
(t, QU , QD, 2)-AIBE-IND-CCA-secure, then A’s advantage of distinguishing Game0h−1
from Game0h is at most 1 + 2. And, in Lemma 3.4.10, we show that if CDH problem
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is (t, 3)-hard in G and DDH problem is efficiently computable in G, then A has at
most 3 advantage in distinguishing Game
0
h from Game0h. Similarly, Lemma 3.4.11 and
Lemma 3.4.12 states that under analogous conditions, A’s advantages of distinguishing
Game1k+1 from Game1k, and Game1k from Game
1
k is at most 1 + 2 and 3, respectively.
Therefore,
∣∣∣Adv0,0A,Π − Adv1,0A,Π∣∣∣ ≤ (1 + 2 + 3) (l0 + l1)
≤ 2 (1 + 2 + 3)L






Lemma 3.4.9: For 1 ≤ h ≤ l0, if the underlying one-time signature scheme Σ is
(t, QD, 1)-SIG-SEU-secure and the anonymous identity-based encryption scheme Π′ is
(t, QU , QD, 2)-AIBE-IND-CCA-secure, then A’s advantage of distinguishing Game0h−1
from Game0h is at most 1 + 2. In other words,
∣∣∣Adv0,h−1A,Π − Adv0,hA,Π∣∣∣ ≤ (1 + 2). 
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Lemma 3.4.5 and is therefore omitted.
The only difference which we should be careful about is the new tag system of the
ciphertext components. The challenger can trivially compute these tags as specified
in the construction of Section 3.4.3 and attach them to the corresponding ciphertext
components during the simulation. 
Lemma 3.4.10: For 1 ≤ h ≤ l0, if the computational Diffie-Hellman problem is
(t, 3)-hard in G and the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is efficiently computable in
G, then A’s advantage of distinguishing Game0h from Game0h is at most 3, i.e.,
∣∣∣Adv0,hA,Π − Adv0,hA,Π∣∣∣ ≤ 3. 
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Proof. Let F be the event that A queries the random oracle H at the point AsHID0l0−h+1 .
By construction, it is clear that
∣∣∣Adv0,hA,Π − Adv0,hA,Π∣∣∣ ≤ Pr[F ].
We want to show Pr[F ] ≤ Pr[CDH] ≤ 3. Assuming A can distinguish Game0h
from Game0h, we build a PPT CDH adversary B which uses A as a subroutine. First,
B gets a CDH problem instance (G, q, g,X = gx, Y = gy) as input from the CDH
challenger. Then, B simulates the challenger’s behavior in Game0h to A as follows.
Setup: B runs the Setup step as in Definition 3.3.3 except that it reuses the group G
that it received from the CDH challenger and sets AHID0l0−h+1 = Y .
Phase 1: B replies to A’s queries as follows.
Secret-key query i: These queries are handle as specified in Definition 3.3.3.
Decryption query (i, c): B distinguishes two cases. If the node (which is
denoted by u for simplicity) with hierarchical identifier HID0l0−h+1 is not
among the ancestors of the leaf node corresponding to the user i in the tree
T , then B just runs the Decrypt algorithm in Section 3.4.3. Otherwise, B still
runs the Decrypt algorithm as in Section 3.4.3, but with one modification.
That is, during Step 1, he skips the computation of the tag corresponding
to node u. If this modified computation of the Decrypt algorithm yielded a
valid message m, B simply returns that m. If not, B proceeds as follows.
1. Denote by sku the AIBE secret key of the node u.
2. Parse c as (σ,VK, ĉ = (c0, (c1, c1), . . . , (cL, cL))).
3. For j := 1 to L,
a. Compute m′ := Dec(MPK′, sku, cj).
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b. If m′ = VK‖Z‖m, Vrfy(VK, σ,VK‖ĉ ) = 1, the DDH algorithm
accepts (g, c0, Y, Z), and cj = H(Z), return m.
4. If Step 3 did not result in a valid m, return ⊥ (as the original Decrypt
algorithm would have returned).
Challenge: Given two equal length messages m∗0,m∗1 ∈MSP and two equal length
sets of user identities S∗0 , S∗1 ⊆ U with the restriction that RU ∩ (S∗0 ∪ S∗1) = ∅,
B computes the challenge ciphertext c∗ as follows.
1. Generate (VK, SK)← Gen(1λ).
2. Set c0 := X.







cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′,HID0j ,VK‖X
aHID0
j ‖m∗0).
4. Set m˜ ←$ {0, 1}|VK‖c0‖m∗0|.
5. Compute cl0−h+1 ←$ {0, 1}λ, cl0−h+1 ← Enc(MPK′, dummy, m˜).
6. For j := l0 − h+ 2 to L, set sj ←$ Zq, and compute cj := H(gsj),
cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′, dummy, m˜).











8. Generate σ ← Sign(SK,VK‖ĉ ), and set c∗ := (σ,VK, ĉ ).
Phase 2: B handles Phase 2 as in Phase 1 with the same restrictions given in
Definition 3.3.3. A slight complication is that, post-challenge, the adversary
could try to reuse the c0, cpi(1), . . . , cpi(L) components from c∗, but combine them
with fresh c˜1, . . . , c˜L components for some message m̂ of her choice. If a ciphertext
so crafted were submitted to the decryption oracle for user u, then B would
invoke the special decryption process described in Phase 1, and would be unable
to test whether cj = H(Z). However, in order for all the other checks in Step
3b to go through, m′ should be equal to VˆK‖Z‖m̂, for a Z such that (g,X, Y, Z)
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is a DDH tuple. Clearly, at that point B could simply halt its computation, and
output Z as its answer to its CDH challenge.
Guess: A outputs a guess b and B saves it.
When simulating the random oracle H to A, B picks R ←$ {0, 1}λ as the result
and responds consistently. If A ever makes a random oracle query Z such that the
DDH algorithm accepts (g,X, Y, Z), B halts the computation and outputs Z as its
solution to the CDH problem.
By construction, A can distinguish Game0h from Game0h only if it queries the
random oracle on gxy or sends a decryption oracle query with a ciphertext component
containing gxy. In both cases, B suspends the computation and wins the CDH game.
Therefore, A’s advantage in distinguishing Game0h from Game0h is at most 3. 
Lemma 3.4.11: For 0 ≤ k < l1, if the underlying one-time signature scheme Σ is
(t, QD, 1)-SIG-SEU-secure and the anonymous identity-based encryption scheme Π′ is
(t, QU , QD, 2)-AIBE-IND-CCA-secure, then A’s advantage of distinguishing Game1k+1
from Game1k is at most 1 + 2. More precisely,
∣∣∣Adv1,k+1A,Π − Adv1,kA,Π∣∣∣ ≤ (1 + 2). 
Proof. The argument is analogous to the proof of Lemma 3.4.9. 
Lemma 3.4.12: For 1 ≤ k ≤ l1, if the computational Diffie-Hellman problem is
(t, 3)-hard in G and the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is efficiently computable in
G, then A’s advantage of distinguishing Game1k from Game1k is at most 3, i.e.,
∣∣∣Adv1,kA,Π − Adv1,kA,Π∣∣∣ ≤ 3. 
Proof. The argument is analogous to the proof of Lemma 3.4.10. 
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3.4.4 An Enhanced oABE-CCA-Secure Public-Key
Construction in the Standard Model
In this section, we augment the construction in Section 3.4.3 so that its security can
be proven in the standard model under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption using
techniques from [83]. The key ingredient of this modification is the “trapdoor test”
of the strong twin computational Diffie-Hellman problem [29]. The definitions of the
DDH and s2CDH problems are given in Section 2.2.2 and Section 2.2.3, respectively.
Let Π′ = (Setup′,Extract′,Encrypt′,Decrypt′) be a weakly robust AIBE-IND-CCA-
secure anonymous identity-based encryption scheme and Σ = (Gen, Sign,Vrfy) a strong
existentially unforgeable one-time signature scheme. We construct an oABE-IND-CCA-
secure outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption scheme Π = (Setup,KeyGen,Encrypt,
Decrypt) with enhanced decryption in the standard model as follows. In this con-
struction, G = 〈g〉 denotes a group with prime order q > 2λ in which the decisional
Diffie-Hellman problem is hard and g denotes a group generator.
Setup(1λ, N): Obtain (MPK′,MSK′)← Setup′(1λ). For each node (with the hierar-
chical identifier HID) in T , draw aHID, bHID, cHID, dHID ←$ Zq, and compute
AHID := gaHID , BHID := gbHID , CHID := gcHID , DHID := gdHID .
Output MPK and MSK as
MPK :=
(




MSK′, {aHID, bHID, cHID, dHID}HID∈T
)
.
KeyGen(MPK,MSK, i): Let HIDi := (Root, ID1, . . . , IDn) be the hierarchical identi-
fier associated with user i in the binary tree T . For k := 1 to n+ 1, set ski,k :=
(aHIDi|k , bHIDi|k , cHIDi|k , dHIDi|k), and compute ski,k ← Extract′(MPK′,MSK′,HIDi|k).
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Encrypt(MPK, S,m): Generate (VK, SK) ← Gen(1λ). Let Cover be the family of
subtrees covering the set of receivers S according to the CS method. For each
subtree Tj in Cover, let HIDj be the hierarchical identifier associated with the root







. Draw s ←$ Zq, and
compute c0 := gs. For 1 ≤ j ≤ l, compute cj := ((AVKHIDjBHIDj)s, (CVKHIDjDHIDj)s),
cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′,HIDj,VK‖m). Set m˜ ←$ {0, 1}|VK‖m|. For l+1 ≤ j ≤ L, set
sj,1, sj,2 ←$ Zq, and compute cj := (gsj,1 , gsj,2), cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′, dummy, m˜),













where pi : {1, . . . , L} → {1, . . . , L} is a random permutation.
Generate σ ← Sign(SK,VK‖ĉ ), and output c := (σ,VK, ĉ ).




, . . . ,(
ski,n+1, ski,n+1
))
and the ciphertext c as (σ,VK, ĉ = (c0, (c1, c1), . . . , (cL, cL))).
1. For k := 1 to n+ 1,
a. Parse ski,k as (ak, bk, ck, dk)
b. Compute tagk := (c akVK0 c bk0 , c ckVK0 c dk0 )
2. Check whether ∃k ∈ [1, n+ 1] ∃j ∈ [1, L] such that tagk = cj
a. If suitable k, j exist, compute m′ := Decrypt′(MPK′, ski,k, cj).
b. If m′ can be parsed as VK‖m and Vrfy(VK, σ, ĉ ) = 1, return m.
c. Otherwise, return ⊥.
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Remark 3.4.13. Notice that using a technique similar to the one given in Remark 3.4.7,
we can reduce the tag-searching time in Step 2 of the Decrypt algorithm from O(nL)
to O(n+ L) = O(L).
The correctness of the above enhanced public-key construction in the CCA setting
follows from the algebraic properties of the group G and the correctness of the
underlying signature and AIBE schemes. The security of this construction is established
in Theorem 3.4.14 below.
Theorem 3.4.14: If the one-time signature scheme Σ = (Gen, Sign,Vrfy) is (t, QD,
1)-SIG-SEU-secure, the AIBE scheme Π′ = (Setup′,Extract′,Encrypt′,Decrypt′) is
(t, QU , QD, 2)-AIBE-IND-CCA-secure, and DDH problem is (t, 3)-hard in G, then
the above construction is
(
t, QU , QD, 2
(











Proof. The proof of this theorem follows almost the same structure as that of Theo-
rem 3.4.8, with the exception that the tags are now created as described in Section 3.4.4.
More specifically, as in the proof of Theorem 3.4.8, we again consider the following
sequence of games between the adversary A and the challenger C.
Game00, Game
0












During the Challenge step of the first game (Game00), A receives an encryption of
m∗0 for S∗0 and in the last game (Game10), A receives an encryption of m∗1 for S∗1 .
Game00 corresponds to the original game as described in Definition 3.3.3, when the
challenge bit b∗ is fixed to 0.
Game0h(1 ≤ h ≤ l0) is similar to Game0h−1, except that at position j = l0 − h+ 1,
C pairs the correct tag cj = ((AVKHIDjBHIDj)s, (CVKHIDjDHIDj)s) with an encryption cj of a
random string m˜ of the same length of VK‖m∗0.
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Game0h(1 ≤ h ≤ l0) is similar to Game0h, but C computes the challenge ciphertext
components for position j = l0 − h + 1 as follows: to create tag cl0−h+1, C uses a
random value sj ←$ Zq.
The description of Game1k(1 ≤ k ≤ l1), and Game1k(0 ≤ k < l1) is as above, where
we replace m∗0 with m∗1.
For 0 ≤ i1 ≤ l0, 1 ≤ i2 ≤ l0, 0 ≤ j1 ≤ l1 and 1 ≤ j2 ≤ l1, let Adv0,i1A,Π, Adv0,i2A,Π,
Adv1,j1A,Π and Adv
1,j2
A,Π denote A’s advantage of winning Game0i1 , Game
0
i2 , Game1j1 and
Game0j2 , respectively.
The proof that A’s advantage of distinguishing Game0h−1 from Game0h is at most
1 + 2 is essentially identical to that of Lemma 3.4.9.





(where 3 is the advantage of breaking the DDH assumption in G) is
essentially identical to that of Lemma 1 of [83].
Similarly, A’s advantages of distinguishing Game1k+1 from Game1k, and Game1k from































3.4.5 An Enhanced oABE-IND-CCA-Secure Public-Key
Construction with Shorter Ciphertexts
Below we sketch a variation of our techniques from Section 3.4.4 that results in
an outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption scheme with ciphertext length O(r).
Unfortunately, this very compact ciphertext length comes at a price on the other
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parameters.
The idea is to combine the Dodis-Fazio [40] public-key extension of the subset
difference method of Naor et al. [89] with a fully secure weakly robust anonymous
hierarchical identity-based encryption scheme with constant ciphertext length such
as [33,34]. Following this approach, we would get the following system parameters.
Ciphertext Length: O(r) AHIBE ciphertexts.
Public Key Length: O(N logN) public tags.
Secret Key Length: O(log2N) AHIBE secret keys and O(N) secret tags.
Decryption Time: O(N) tag computation/searching time and one AHIBE decryp-
tion attempt.
3.4.6 An Enhanced oABE-IND-CCA-Secure
Private-Key Construction
The enhanced oABE-IND-CCA-secure public key constructions achieve a major perfor-
mance gain in the Decrypt algorithm compared to the generic oABE-IND-CCA-secure
construction, but it also changes the length of the master public key from O(1) to
O(N). This increase in master public key length may not be a concern for many
practical constructions, since the master public key can be stored as a static data file
on a server on the Internet and also in users’ computers. Still, for the private-key
setting it is possible to accommodate storage-sensitive systems and attain constant key
storage at the Center, while maintaining efficient decryption and logarithmic storage
at the receivers.
In particular, recall from Section 2.5 that in the private-key setting, only the
Center can broadcast messages to the receivers. Thus, the O(N) information from
which the tags for efficient decryption are created does not need to be published.
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Therefore, this information can be compressed into O(1) key storage using a standard
trick based on any length-tripling pseudo-random number generator G (cf. e.g., the
SD method of Naor et al. [89]). In other words, the random exponents associated
with the subtrees of T (cf. Section 3.4.3) are now pseudorandomly generated from
a single seed, by repeated invocations of G on the left or right third of the result of
the previous iteration, based on the path to the root of the subtree at hand. Finally,
upon reaching the subtree root, the middle third of the pseudorandom output is used




Simmons [104] introduced the cryptographic community to the problem of hidden
communication with his famous prisoners’ dilemma: Alice and Bob are in jail and can
only talk in the presence of the jail warden Ward. Ward will not allow any encrypted
communication, so Alice and Bob must hide their messages about an escape plan (the
hiddentext) into innocent-looking communication (the stegotext) that Ward cannot
distinguish from casual chatter (the covertext).
Modern cryptographic treatment of steganography began with Cachin’s formal-
ization in the information-security setting [26] and Hopper et al.’s in the complexity-
theoretic one [67]. Since then, steganography has received regular attention by the
cryptographic community. To a first approximation, existing solutions differ mostly
in the degree of adversarial control that they can tolerate, and in the specific trade-
off that they achieve among the main efficiency measures of transmission overhead,
public/secret key storage, and encryption/decryption complexity.
Kiayias et al. [74] improved the efficiency of the steganographic protocol of [67]
by replacing the use of a pseudorandom function family with the combination of a
78
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pseudorandom generator and a t-wise independent hash function. This approach was
further refined in [75] to obtain a key-efficient steganographic system, where the gain
stems from employing a novel rejection sampling method based on extractors.
Public-Key Steganography. The notion of steganography was extended to the
public-key setting by von Ahn and Hopper [110], but they mostly focused on secu-
rity against passive adversaries. A stronger security model (steganographic secrecy
against adaptive chosen-covertext attacks or SS-IND-CCA) was defined by Backes
and Cachin [9], but their constructions attained only an intermediate security notion,
termed steganographic secrecy against publicly-detectable, replayable adaptive chosen-
covertext attacks (SS-IND-PDR-CCA). Building upon the work of [9], Hopper [66]
attained full SS-IND-CCA security under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption in
the standard model. In addition, Le and Kurosawa [80] suggested a weaker generaliza-
tion of the model of [9], but with better efficiency than [66].
All steganographic constructions mentioned above assume that the communication
channel can be modeled by an efficient covertext sampler that can be queried adaptively,
in a black-box manner. Dedic et al. [38, 95] looked into communication bounds for
stegosystems of this kind, while Lysyanskaya and Meyerovich [86] dealt with the case
of imperfect channel oracle samplers.
From an operational standpoint, public-key steganography resembles the setting
of public-key encryption: a participant with a public/secret key pair is able to receive
covert messages (the hiddentexts) from another party, who only knows the public
key. Unlike the case of public-key cryptography, however, it is assumed that the
communication medium, called the channel, has a pre-determined distribution of
possible “neutral content” (the covertexts). Furthermore, the encoded hiddentexts
(the stegotexts), are required to be indistinguishable from the covertexts of the
communication channel.
A common approach to realize public-key stegosystems is the encrypt-then-embed







Figure 4.1: The encrypt-then-embed paradigm underlying steganography.
paradigm [9,66,67,110], depicted in Figure 4.1. At a high level, encoding is accom-
plished by first encrypting the hiddentext using a public-key cryptosystem, and then
implanting the resulting ciphertext in the stegotext using an embedding function. The
decoding process develops similarly, but in the reverse direction. Based on the secu-
rity properties of the underlying cryptosystem and embedding function, one obtains
stegosystems with a variety of security guarantees.
4.2 Contributions
The state of the art steganographic protocols only allow covert communication between
two parties. In certain applications, however, one-to-many covert communication
is desired. As a simple example, assume that there is a country where freedom of
speech is curtailed. Also assume that in this country, there is an activist who does
not agree with the events occurring in his neighborhood. Consequently, he decides to
use social media channels to broadcast messages about the events to his followers. If
he broadcast the messages in the clear, he would run into trouble with the authorities.
If he used broadcast encryption, he would raise suspicion due to its gibberish-looking
distribution and again run into trouble with the authorities. What he needs is a
mechanism to covertly send messages to his followers. Although steganography does
allow covert communication, using a point-to-point steganographic protocol with its
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key shared among the followers does not help the activist much because it does not
allow him to revoke compromised followers. What he really needs is a mechanism
to covertly broadcast messages that also allows him to dynamically select the set of
recipients for each broadcast message.
Broadcast Steganography. We formalize the above notion of steganography in
this chapter under the title broadcast steganography (BS).1 Intuitively, broadcast
steganography enables a sender to communicate covertly with a dynamically designated
set of receivers, so that authorized recipients correctly recover the original content,
while unauthorized users and outsiders remain unaware of the covert communication.
To construct broadcast steganography, we employ the encrypt-then-embed paradigm
that underpins most steganographic constructions [9, 66, 67, 110]. Realizing this
approach, however, requires solving several technical problems.
The first issue is that, in broadcast encryption, the receiver set is included explicitly
in the ciphertext as part of its header (e.g., [12, 18, 22, 40–42, 49, 50, 54, 64, 89, 118]).
This is a non-starter for steganography, which intrinsically requires that the existence
of any data in the channel be concealed. To address this issue, we turn to anonymous
broadcast encryption, a notion introduced by Barth et al. [10] with the goal of keeping
the identities of the authorized receivers anonymous.
The second hurdle is that the encrypt-then-embed paradigm requires the underlying
encryption functionality to have pseudorandom ciphertexts. This property so far had
not been considered in the broadcast encryption literature, and none of the existing
constructions support it natively. Interestingly, attaining pseudorandom ciphertexts
requires implicitly that the identities of the recipients be unintelligible in the view of
outsiders (pseudorandomness of the ciphertext clearly cannot hold in the view of the
recipients). This condition ties back directly to the previous issue, but in a weaker
form, as recipient anonymity is only required to hold against outsiders. As it turns
1This result has also been published at the Cryptographer’s Track at the RSA Conference—CT-
RSA 2014 [47]





Figure 4.2: Relations between broadcast encryption (BE), (outsider) anonymous
broadcast encryption (AnoBE/oABE), and broadcast steganography (BS). A straight
arrow means that one notion implies the other, while the curly arrow denotes our
black-box constructions from oABE$ to BS (cf. Section 4.5). (To avoid cluttering the
figure, relations implied by transitivity are omitted.)
out, the notion of outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption that we presented in
Chapter 3 provides a relaxation of full anonymity of exactly this sort. As mentioned in
Section 3.2, oABE trades some degree of anonymity for better efficiency: whereas all
known fully-anonymous broadcast encryption schemes [10, 83] have ciphertexts linear
in the number of receivers, our constructions given in Section 3.4 obtain sublinear
ciphertext length, though they do not necessarily guarantee that authorized users
will learn no information about other members of the receiver set. Unfortunately,
none of our oABE contructions attain pseudorandom ciphertexts required for the
encrypt-then-embed paradigm given in Figure 4.1.
In light of the above observations, we put forth and realize a new broadcast
encryption variant that we term outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption with pseu-
dorandom ciphertexts (oABE$). oABE$ enables a black-box construction of broadcast
steganography via the encrypt-then-embed paradigm. Realizing an efficient oABE$
scheme requires non-trivial enhancements to the oABE construction of Section 3.4.4,
for it entails resolving the apparent tension between the ciphertext pseudorandom
property and the ciphertext redundancy introduced by common approaches to CCA
security [20,43]. Our solution harmonizes these requirements using a novel Pedersen-
like encapsulation mechanism. The definition of an encapsulation mechanism is
presented in Section 2.4.1. Figure 4.2 shows how oABE$ relates to other broadcast
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communication protocols.
Table 4.1 shows the parameters of our oABE$-based BS schemes. In this table,
Type-1 channels are the most general, and are modeled as stateful probabilistic oracles
whose output distribution may depend on past samples. Type-2 channels are slightly
more restrictive as they assume history independence, and can then be modeled as
efficiently sampleable document distributions, in other words, efficiently computable
randomized functions.
Applications of Broadcast Steganography. The combination of stealth and
revocation capabilities offered by broadcast steganography enables defenses against
insider threats in anti-censorship systems, intelligence scenarios, and other domains
that rely on covert communication [87,109].
For a military example, consider a camp where each soldier has an army smartphone,
on which they receive weather forecast, unclassified news and other information in the
clear. Suppose that headquarters suspect that a group of officials are conspiring to
commit treachery, and decides to carry out an undercover investigation to confirm
the identities of the traitors. Conventional broadcast encryption does not suffice to
protect the transmission channel to the soldiers involved in the investigation of the
traitors, because the selective exclusion of the conspirators from the communication
would already put them on notice. Broadcast steganography, instead, would allow
delivery of instructions to the investigating parties without risking alerting the traitors
to the investigation.
For a civil rights scenario, an activist/blogger may want to hide her commentary
into innocent-looking image postings to social media services (e.g., Instagram or
Weibo). Because censorship authorities may infiltrate among the activist’s followers,
the ability of broadcast steganography to authorize/deauthorize recipients at a fine
grain would enable the blogger to revoke the infiltrator and prevent him from recovering
the hiddentext, without him noticing that he has been singled out.
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Remark 4.2.1. Work of von Ahn et al. [111] and Chandran et al. [31] introduced
stealthiness to the setting of secure function evaluation, originating the notion of
covert two-party/multi-party computation. Covert protocols allow parties to carry
out distributed computations in a way that hides their very intent of taking part
in the protocol: that is, unless all parties actively participate, nobody can detect
that protocol messaging had been initiated (and aborted). This capability supports
stealthy coordination between mutually mistrustful parties and enables fascinating
applications like covert authentication [111] and co-spy detection [31]. However, it
does not imply efficient covert dissemination of information to a chosen subset of
(mostly passive) receivers, which is the main focus of this chapter.
Organization. We formally introduce the setting and the security models of broadcast
steganography in Section 4.3. Next, we introduce the formal security models of oABE$
in Section 4.4.1 and a secure construction of oABE$ in Section 4.4.2. Finally, in
Section 4.5, we devise efficient oABE$-based BS schemes at varying security levels
with sublinear stegotexts secure in the standard model against adaptive adversaries.
4.3 Formal Model
4.3.1 Setting of BS
We now formally define the setting of broadcast steganography. Please refer to
Section 2.4.5 for the formal definitions of documents, stegotexts, and channels.
Definition 4.3.1 (BS Setting): A broadcast steganography scheme, associated
with a universe of users U = [1, N ], a message space MSP, and a channel Ch
on a set of documents Σ, is a tuple of algorithms (Setup,KeyGen,Encode,Decode)
defined as follows.
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(MPK,MSK)← Setup(1λ, N): Setup takes the security parameter 1λ and the num-
ber of users in the system N as inputs and outputs the master public key MPK
and the master secret key MSK.
ski ← KeyGen(MPK,MSK, i): Given the master public keyMPK, the master secret
key MSK, and a user i ∈ U , KeyGen generates a secret key ski for user i.
s← Encode(MPK, S, h,m): Encode takes the master public key MPK, a set of
receivers S ⊆ U , a channel history h ∈ Σ∗, and a message m ∈MSP as inputs
and outputs a stegotext s ∈ Σ∗ from the support of Clh for some l = poly(|m|).
m/⊥ := Decode(MPK, ski, s): Given the master public key MPK, a secret key ski,
and a stegotext s ∈ Σ∗, Decode either outputs a message m ∈ MSP or the
failure symbol ⊥. We assume that Decode is deterministic.
Correctness. For every S ⊆ U , i ∈ S, legal channel history h ∈ Σ∗, andm ∈MSP , if
(MPK,MSK) is output by Setup(1λ, N) and ski is generated by KeyGen(MPK,MSK, i),
then it must be the case that
Decode(MPK, ski,Encode(MPK, S, h,m)) = m,
except with negligible probability in the security parameter λ. ♦
Remark 4.3.2. In contrast to the setting of regular steganography [66], which we
presented in Definition 2.4.17, the setting of broadcast steganography requires that
the Decode algorithm works without receiving the channel history h corresponding to
the stegotext s as an input. This is crucial for an efficient broadcast steganography
scheme, because requiring that authorized users feed the Decode algorithm with the
same h that was used by the sender entails a level of coordination that is unrealistic
in a broadcast setting. Our definition also applies to channels whose samples do not
depend on h at all, as Encode may simply ignore h.
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4.3.2 Security of BS
In broadcast encryption, the adversary’s goal is to learn something about the message
encrypted within a given ciphertext despite not having a valid decryption key. In
broadcast steganography, the adversary’s goal is to detect the presence of a message
in a given covertext without a valid decoding key. In either case, one may consider
multiple levels of security, according to the amount of power afforded to the attacker.
We discuss below three models of security for broadcast steganography schemes,
followed by formal definitions later in this section.
BS-IND-CHA Security. This model is called the chosen-hidentext attack security,
and it is the weakest model of security for a broadcast steganography scheme. Anal-
ogous to the chosen-plaintext attack in broadcast encryption, the adversary in this
context is only allowed to corrupt users by gaining their secret keys.
BS-IND-PDR-CCA Security. This is called the publicly-detectable replayable
chosen-covertext attack security. In this model, the adversary is additionally given
access to a decoding oracle through which he can obtain the hiddentext (if any) in
any covertext s of his choice, as recovered by any honest user i of their choice, subject
to the following restriction: after receiving the challenge covertext s∗ for the set of
recipients S∗, the adversary is not allowed to query the decoding oracle with a user
index i and a covertext s such that i ∈ S∗ and s ≡MPK s∗, where ≡MPK is an arbitrary
BS compatible relation whose definition is given in Definition 4.3.3 below.
Definition 4.3.3 (BS Compatible Relation): Denote by Π = (Setup,KeyGen,
Encode,Decode) a BS scheme. A binary relation on stegotexts of Π induced by
a master public key MPK is called a BS compatible relation (denoted by ≡MPK) if
for any two stegotexts s1, s2 encoded under sets of receivers S1, S2, respectively, the
following requirements are satisfied.
1. If s1 ≡MPK s2 then for any i1 ∈ S1 and i2 ∈ S2, it must be the case that
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Decode(MPK, ski1 , s1) = Decode(MPK, ski2 , s2) except with negligible probabil-
ity in the security parameter λ.
2. There exists a PPT algorithm that only takes MPK, s1, and s2 and determines
whether s1 ≡MPK s2.
BS-IND-CCA Security. This is the chosen-covertext attack model of security. A
BS-IND-CCA adversary has the same capabilities from the BS-IND-PDR-CCA model
of security, but the restriction for the decoding queries is now lifted. Specifically, the
only covertext that the adversary is not allowed to submit to the decoding oracle with
a user index i ∈ S∗ is the challenge covertext s∗ itself.
We now formally define the BS-IND-CCA model of security as a game played
between a PPT adversary A and a challenger C. Next, we show how this BS-IND-CCA
game can be tweaked to obtain the games corresponding to the BS-IND-PDR-CCA
and BS-IND-CHA security models.
Definition 4.3.4 (BS-IND-CCA Game): For a given BS scheme Π = (Setup,
KeyGen,Encode,Decode), the BS-IND-CCA game, which is played between a PPT
adversary A and a challenger C, is defined as follows.
Setup: C runs (MPK,MSK)← Setup(1λ, N) and gives A the resulting master public
key MPK, keeping the master secret key MSK to itself. C also initializes the set
of revoked users RU to be empty.
Phase 1: A adaptively issues queries of the following types.
Secret-key query i: A requests the secret key of a user i ∈ U . C runs ski ←
KeyGen(MPK,MSK, i), adds i to RU , and sends ski to A.
Decoding query (i, s): A issues a decoding query on a user index i ∈ U and a
covertext s ∈ Σ∗. C computes Decode(MPK,KeyGen(MPK,MSK, i), s) and
gives the result to A.
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Challenge: A gives C a message m∗ ∈ MSP, a legal history h ∈ Σ∗, and a set of
user identities S∗ ⊆ U with the restriction that S∗ ∩RU = ∅. C picks a random
bit b∗ ∈ {0, 1} and generates the challenge s∗ depending on it as follows. If
b∗ = 0, then C encodes m∗ into a stegotext s∗ for the receiver set S∗, more
precisely s∗ ← Encode(MPK, S∗, h,m∗). Otherwise, C sample s∗ as a covertext
of equal length, i.e., s∗ ←$ Cl∗h for l∗ = |Encode(MPK, S∗, h,m∗)|/σ. At the end,
C gives s∗ to A.
Phase 2: The interaction between A and C in this phase is similar to Phase 1 with
two restrictions as given below.
Secret-key query i: i 6∈ S∗.
Decoding query (i, s): If i ∈ S∗, then s 6= s∗.
Guess: A outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1} and wins if b = b∗.
The adversary A is called a BS-IND-CCA adversary and A’s advantage is defined as
AdvBS-IND-CCAA,Π :=
∣∣∣Pr[b = b∗]− 12 ∣∣∣,
where the probability is over the random coins used by A and C. ♦
Definition 4.3.5 (BS-IND-CCA Security): A BS scheme Π is (t, QU , QD, )-BS-
IND-CCA-secure if for any t-time BS-IND-CCA adversary making at most QU adaptive
secret-key queries and at most QD adaptive decoding queries, it must be the case that
AdvBS-IND-CCAA,Π ≤ . ♦
By restricting the kind of decoding queries allowed in Phase 2 of the BS-IND-
CCA game above, we can obtain the BS-IND-PDR-CCA game. Specifically, the
adversary now cannot issue any decoding query (i, s) such that i ∈ S∗ and s ≡MPK s∗
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for some BS compatible relation ≡MPK. The adversary A in this game is called a
BS-IND-PDR-CCA adversary and A’s advantage is defined as
AdvBS-IND-PDR-CCAA,Π :=
∣∣∣Pr[b = b∗]− 12 ∣∣∣,
where the probability is over the random coins used by A and C.
Definition 4.3.6 (BS-IND-PDR-CCA Security): A BS scheme Π is (t, QU , QD,
)-BS-IND-PDR-CCA-secure with respect to some BS compatible relation ≡MPK if
for any t-time BS-IND-PDR-CCA adversary making at most QU adaptive secret-key
queries and at most QD adaptive decoding queries, we have AdvBS-IND-PDR-CCAA,Π ≤ .♦
The BS-IND-CHA game is defined similar to the BS-IND-CCA game, with the
restriction that the adversary is not allowed to issue any decoding queries during
Phase 1 and Phase 2. The adversary is still allowed to issue secret-key queries.
Definition 4.3.7 (BS-IND-CHA Security): A BS scheme Π is (t, QU , )-BS-IND-
CHA-secure if Π is (t, QU , 0, )-BS-IND-CCA-secure. ♦
4.4 Anonymity and Pseudorandomness
in Broadcast Encryption
In Chapter 3, we presented the notion of outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption, a
security model for BE whose goal is to hide the identities of the intended receivers of
a broadcast ciphertext from unauthorized users. As outlined in Section 4.1, a crucial
technical step to realize broadcast steganography is combining receiver anonymity
with pseudorandomness of broadcast ciphertexts (cf. Section 4.5).
This section develops the notion of outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption
with pseudorandom ciphertexts, and presents an efficient construction secure in the
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standard model under a stronger security model, outsider anonymity and ciphertext
pseudorandomness against chosen-ciphertext attacks (oABE$-IND-CCA). Being an
extension of oABE, the setting of oABE$ is identical to the one given in Definition 3.3.1.
However, the security model of oABE$ is quite different as it has to take into account
the pseudorandomness of the ciphertexts. In Section 4.4.1 below, we formally present
the security model of oABE$.
4.4.1 Security of oABE$
We now present three models of security for outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption
with pseudorandom ciphertexts: oABE$-IND-CPA, oABE$-IND-PDR-CCA, and
oABE$-IND-CCA. These three models of security loosely corresponds to BS-IND-CHA,
BS-IND-PDR-CCA, and BS-IND-CCA models of security for broadcast steganography.
At a high level, these security models require that for any message m∗ and set of
recipients S∗, no PPT adversary A can distinguish between an actual encryption
of m∗ intended for the set S∗, and a truly random string of the same length as an
encryption of m∗ for S∗, so long as A does not possess the secret key of any user in
S∗. In Section 4.4.2, we present an oABE$-IND-CCA-secure construction.
First, we define the oABE$-IND-CCA model of security as a game played between
a PPT adversary A and a challenger C. Later, we show how BS-IND-CCA game can
be modified to obtain the games corresponding to the oABE$-IND-PDR-CCA and
oABE$-IND-CPA security models.
Definition 4.4.1 (oABE$-IND-CCA Game): For a given oABE$ scheme Π =
(Setup,KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt), the oABE$-IND-CCA game, played between a PPT
adversary A and a challenger C, is defined as follows.
Setup: C runs (MPK,MSK)← Setup(1λ, N) and gives A the resulting master public
key MPK, keeping the master secret key MSK to itself. C also initializes the set
of revoked users RU to be empty.
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Phase 1: A adaptively issues queries of the following types.
Secret-key query i: A requests the secret key of a user i ∈ U . C runs ski ←
KeyGen(MPK,MSK, i), adds i to RU , and sends ski to A.
Decryption query (i, c): A sends a decryption query on a user i ∈ U and a
ciphertext c ∈ CSP. C computes Decrypt(MPK,KeyGen(MPK,MSK, i), c)
and gives the result to A.
Challenge: A gives C a message m∗ ∈ MSP and a set of user identities S∗ ⊆ U
with the restriction that S∗ ∩ RU = ∅. C picks a random bit b∗ ∈ {0, 1}
and generates the challenge ciphertext c∗ depending on it: if b∗ = 0, then
c∗ ← Encrypt(MPK, S∗,m∗), else c∗ ←$ {0, 1}l∗ for l∗ = |Encrypt(MPK, S∗,m∗)|.
The challenge ciphertext c∗ is then given to A.
Phase 2: The interaction between A and C in this phase is similar to Phase 1 with
two restrictions as given below.
Secret-key query i: i 6∈ S∗.
Decoding query (i, s): If i ∈ S∗, then c 6= c∗.
Guess: A outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1} and wins if b = b∗.
The adversary A is called an oABE$-IND-CCA adversary and A’s advantage is
AdvoABE$-IND-CCAA,Π :=
∣∣∣Pr[b = b∗]− 12 ∣∣∣,
where the probability is over the random coins used by A and C. ♦
Observe that the key difference of the above definition from the one given in
Definition 3.3.2 is in the Challenge step, where the challenger either returns the
encryption of m∗ or a random bit-string with appropriate length.
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Definition 4.4.2 (oABE$-IND-CCA Security): An oABE$ scheme Π is (t, QU ,
QD, )-oABE$-IND-CCA-secure if for any t-time oABE$-IND-CCA adversary making
at most QU adaptive secret-key queries and at most QD adaptive decryption queries,
we have AdvoABE$-IND-CCAA,Π ≤ . ♦
The oABE$-IND-PDR-CCA game is obtained by restricting the adversary during
Phase 2 of the oABE$-IND-CCA game from submitting any decoding query (i, c) such
that i ∈ S∗ and c ≡MPK c∗, where ≡MPK is an arbitrary oABE$ compatible relation
of the oABE$ scheme. The definition of an oABE$ compatible relation is given in
Definition 4.4.3 below. The adversary A in this game is called an oABE$-IND-PDR-
CCA adversary and A’s advantage is defined as
AdvoABE$-IND-PDR-CCAA,Π :=
∣∣∣Pr[b = b∗]− 12 ∣∣∣.
Definition 4.4.3 (oABE$ Compatible Relation): Let an oABE$ scheme be de-
noted by Π = (Setup,KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt). A binary relation on ciphertexts of Π
induced by a master public key MPK is called an oABE$ compatible relation (denoted
by ≡MPK) if for any two ciphertexts c1, c2 encrypted under sets of receivers S1, S2,
respectively, the following requirements are met.
1. If c1 ≡MPK c2 then for any i1 ∈ S1 and i2 ∈ S2, it must be the case that
Decrypt(MPK, ski1 , c1) = Decrypt(MPK, ski2 , c2) except with negligible probabil-
ity in the security parameter λ.
2. There exists a PPT algorithm that only takes MPK, c1, and c2 and determines
whether c1 ≡MPK c2.
Definition 4.4.4 (oABE$-IND-PDR-CCA Security): An oABE$ scheme Π is
(t, QU , QD, )-oABE$-IND-PDR-CCA-secure with respect to an oABE$ compatible
relation ≡MPK if for any t-time oABE$-IND-PDR-CCA adversary making at most QU
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adaptive secret-key queries and at most QD adaptive decryption queries, it must be
the case that AdvoABE$-IND-PDR-CCAA,Π ≤ . ♦
By restricting the adversary in the oABE$-IND-CCA game from submitting any
decoding queries during Phase 1 and Phase 2, we obtain the oABE$-IND-CPA game.
The adversary is still allowed to issue secret-key queries.
Definition 4.4.5 (oABE$-IND-CPA Security): An oABE$ scheme Π is (t, QU ,
)-oABE$-IND-CPA-secure if Π is (t, QU , 0, )-oABE$-IND-CCA-secure. ♦
4.4.2 An oABE$-IND-CCA-Secure Construction
Our oABE$-IND-CCA-secure construction builds on the enhanced oABE-IND-CCA-
secure construction of Section 3.4.4. At a high level, the approach of the oABE-IND-
CCA-secure construction is to
1. “bundle” multiple ciphertexts of an anonymous identity-based encryption scheme
(e.g., [2, 24,51]) into a single oABE ciphertext,
2. “tag” each AIBE ciphertext to enable the decryptor to efficiently locate the
component compatible with her decryption key,
3. and “seal” everything together with a one-time signature to thwart CCA attacks.
To attain pseudorandom oABE ciphertexts in our oABE$-IND-CCA-secure con-
struction, we will start with an anonymous identity-based encryption scheme with
pseudorandom ciphertexts (AIBE$) like the one of [4]. Additionally, we will use an
entropy-smoothing hash function [69] to hide the structure in the ciphertext tags. The
definition of an entropy-smoothing hash function is given in Section 2.3.1.
These adjustments do not suffice because the presence of the one-time signature
introduces additional structure in the oABE ciphertext of the construction from
Section 3.4.4. To get around this, we substitute one-time signatures with MACs
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(implemented via pseudorandom functions) and employ a variant of an encapsulation
mechanism [20, 43] with an additional pseudorandom property as described below.
The definition of an encapsulation mechanism is given in Section 2.4.1.
Let p, q be primes such that 2λ < q < 2λ+1 and p = 2q + 1, and g be a square
modulo p. Denote by G = 〈g〉 the group of quadratic residues modulo p. To “pack”
quadratic residues into λ bits, we will use rejection sampling along with the following
well-known G–Zq bijection (cf. e.g., [66]).
mp(a) =







2 ≡ 1 mod p
p− b otherwise
Figures 4.3 to 4.5 show the SetupCom, Commit, and Open functionalities, re-
spectively, of our Pedersen-like [91] encapsulation mechanism over G. The hiding
requirement follows from the hiding properties of standard Pedersen commitments,
coupled with the observation that mp(·) is a bijection. Relaxed binding follows from
the discrete logarithm assumption in G, again similarly to standard Pedersen com-
mitments. A novel feature of our encapsulation mechanism is that the distribution
of commitments com induced by the Commit(PK) algorithm is uniform over {0, 1}λ,
and hence the relaxed commitment scheme of Figures 4.3 to 4.5 has pseudorandom
commitments.
Now we present our oABE$ construction. Let Π′ = (Setup′,Extract′,Encrypt′,
Decrypt′) be an AIBE$-IND-CCA-secure anonymous identity-based encryption scheme
having pseudorandom ciphertexts with expansion ` (i.e., |Encrypt′(MPK′, ID,m)| =
`(|m|)). Let F : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ be a pseudorandom function and let
Hes = {G2 → {0, 1}λ} be an entropy-smoothing hash function family. Using these
primitives, we construct an oABE$-IND-CCA-secure outsider-anonymous broadcast en-
cryption scheme with pseudorandom ciphertexts Π = (Setup,KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt)
as shown in Figures 4.6 to 4.9.
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Algorithm: SetupCom(1λ)
1 repeat
2 generate a random (λ+ 1)-bit prime p
3 q := (p−1)2
4 until q is prime
5 repeat
6 x ←$ Z∗p
7 until x 6= ±1 mod p
8 g := x2
9 y, z ←$ Zq
10 gcom := gy
11 hcom := gz
12 PK := (p, q, g, gcom, hcom)
13 return PK
Figure 4.3: SetupCom algorithm of our Pedersen-like encapsulation mechanism.
Algorithm: Commit(PK)
1 parse PK as (p, q, g, gcom, hcom)
2 kˆ ←$ {0, 1}λ
3 repeat
4 k˜ ←$ Zq
5 com := mp(gkˆcomhk˜com)
6 until com < 2λ
7 decom := (kˆ, k˜)
8 return (kˆ, com, decom)
Figure 4.4: Commit algorithm of our Pedersen-like encapsulation mechanism.
Algorithm: Open(PK, com, decom)
1 parse PK as (p, q, g, gcom, hcom)
2 parse decom as (kˆ, k˜)




Figure 4.5: Open algorithm of our Pedersen-like encapsulation mechanism.
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Algorithm: Setup(1λ, N)
1 (MPK′,MSK′)← Setup′(1λ)
2 PK′′ ← SetupCom(1λ)
3 parse PK′′ as (p, q, g, gcom, hcom)
4 H ←$ Hes
5 // Fam denotes the set of all the subtrees in T
6 for j := 1 to |Fam| do
7 // Tj denotes the subtree in Fam indexed by j
8 // HIDj denotes the hierarchical identifier of the root of Tj
9 a1,HIDj , a2,HIDj , b1,HIDj , b2,HIDj ←$ Zq
10 A1,HIDj := g
a1,HIDj
11 A2,HIDj := g
a2,HIDj
12 B1,HIDj := g
b1,HIDj
13 B2,HIDj := g
b2,HIDj
14 end
15 MPK := (MPK′,PK′′, H,N, {Ai,HIDj , Bi,HIDj}i∈{1,2},j∈[1,|Fam|])
16 MSK := (MSK′, {ai,HIDj , bi,HIDj}i∈{1,2},j∈[1,|Fam|])
17 return (MPK,MSK)
Figure 4.6: Setup algorithm of our oABE$-IND-CCA-secure construction.
Algorithm: KeyGen(MPK,MSK, i)
1 parse MSK as (MSK′, {ai,HIDj , bi,HIDj}i∈{1,2},j∈[1,|Fam|])
2 parse MPK as (MPK′,PK′′, H,N, {Ai,HIDj , Bi,HIDj}i∈{1,2},j∈[1,|Fam|])
3 // HIDi denotes the hierarchical identifier of leaf i in T
4 for z := 1 to n+ 1 do
5 ski,z := (a1,HIDi|z , a2,HIDi|z , b1,HIDi|z , b2,HIDi|z)
6 ski,z ← Extract′(MPK′,MSK′,HIDi|z)
7 end
8 ski := ((ski,1, ski,1), . . . , (ski,n+1, ski,n+1))
9 return ski
Figure 4.7: KeyGen algorithm of our oABE$-IND-CCA-secure construction.
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Algorithm: Encrypt(MPK, S,m)
1 parse MPK as (MPK′,PK′′, H,N, {Ai,HIDj , Bi,HIDj}i∈{1,2},j∈[1,|Fam|])
2 parse PK′′ as (p, q, g, gcom, hcom)








5 (kˆ, com, decom)← Commit(PK′′)
6 repeat
7 s ←$ Zq
8 c0 := mp(gs)
9 until c0 < 2λ
10 // Cov denotes the set of subtrees covering S in T
11 for j := 1 to |Cov| do
12 // Tj denotes the subtree in Cov indexed by j
13 // HIDj denotes the hierarchical identifier of the root of Tj
14 cj := H((Acom1,HIDjA2,HIDj)
s, (Bcom1,HIDjB2,HIDj)
s)
15 cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′,HIDj, com‖m‖decom)
16 end
17 for j := |Cov|+ 1 to L do
18 cj ←$ {0, 1}λ
19 cj ←$ {0, 1}`(3λ+1+|m|)
20 end
21 cˆ := c0‖c1‖c1‖ . . . ‖cL‖cL
22 σ := F (kˆ, cˆ)
23 c := σ‖cˆ‖com
24 return c
Figure 4.8: Encrypt algorithm of our oABE$-IND-CCA-secure construction.
CHAPTER 4. BROADCAST STEGANOGRAPHY 99
Algorithm: Decrypt(MPK, ski, c)
1 parse MPK as (MPK′,PK′′, H,N, {Ai,HIDj , Bi,HIDj}i∈{1,2},j∈[1,|Fam|])
2 parse PK′′ as (p, q, g, gcom, hcom)
3 parse ski as ((ski,1, ski,1), . . . , (ski,n+1, ski,n+1))
4 parse c as σ‖cˆ‖com
5 parse cˆ as c0‖c1‖c1‖ . . . ‖cL‖cL
6 c˜0 := mp−1(c0)
7 for z := 1 to n+ 1 do
8 parse ski,z as (a˜1,z, a˜2,z, b˜1,z, b˜2,z)




11 if ∃z ∈ [1, n+ 1] ∃j ∈ [1, L] : tagz = cj then
12 m′ := Decrypt′(MPK′, ski,z, cj)
13 if m′ 6= ⊥ then
14 parse m′ as com‖m‖decom
15 if com = com then
16 kˆ := Open(PK′′, com, decom)







Figure 4.9: Decrypt algorithm of our oABE$-IND-CCA-secure construction.
CHAPTER 4. BROADCAST STEGANOGRAPHY 100
To attain sublinear ciphertexts, we follow the approach of of the construction
given in Section 3.4.4, which is based on the public-key extension of the subset cover
framework [40,89]. We arrange the N = 2n users in a perfect binary tree with N leaves,
and assign to each user (using AIBE$) n+ 1 decryption keys, corresponding to all the
nodes in the path to its designated leaf (Line 6 of KeyGen). Each oABE$ ciphertext
consists of multiple AIBE$ components. For efficient decryption, AIBE$ components
are tagged using a twin-DH-based [29] technique reminiscent of Section 3.4.4 (Line 14
of Encrypt) so that recipients can single out which AIBE$ component to decrypt,
and with which key (Lines 7–11 and 12 of Decrypt). Throughout Encrypt, we make
sure that each piece in an oABE$ ciphertext looks random, with the use of rejection
sampling (Lines 6–9), entropy smoothing (Line 14), dummy components (Lines 17–20),
and pseudorandom MACs (Line 23) in place of one-time signature. Forgoing signatures
introduce a complication, as the input to the PRF appears to depend on the PRF
key kˆ: the cj values and the oABE$ components cj’s computed in Lines 14 and 15
are derived from com and decom, which correlate with kˆ. We solve this circularity by
mediating the occurrence of kˆ in the ciphertext via our Pedersen-like encapsulation
mechanism scheme given in Figures 4.3 to 4.5.
Theorem 4.4.6: If the PRF F is (t1, 1)-hard, the AIBE$ scheme Π′ is (t2, QU , QD,
2)-AIBE$-IND-CCA-secure, the family of hash functions Hes is a (t3, 3)-entropy-
smoothing, and DDH is (t4, 4)-hard in G, then the construction given in Figures 4.6
to 4.9 is
(
t1 + t2 + t3 + t4, QU , QD,
(










CCA-secure, where N and r are the total number of users the number of revoked users,
respectively. 
Proof. We organize our proof as a sequence of games, Game0,Game1,Game1, . . . ,
Gamel,Gamel, between the oABE$-IND-CCA adversary A and the challenger C,
where l denotes the cardinality of the coverset Cov induced by the set of authorized
receivers S∗ chosen by A during the Challenge step of the oABE$-IND-CCA game.
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During the Challenge step of the first game (Game0), A receives an encryption of m∗
for S∗, and in the last game (Gamel), A receives a uniformly random bit-string of the
appropriate length as the challenge ciphertext.
Game0: This game corresponds to the game given in Definition 4.4.2 when the
challenge bit b∗ is fixed to 0. The interaction between A and C during Setup,
Phase 1, Phase 2, and Guess steps follows exactly as specified in Definition 4.4.2.
During the Challenge step, A gives C a message m∗ ∈MSP and a set of user
identities S∗ ⊆ U with the restriction that S∗ ∩RU = ∅, where RU is the set of
users that A corrupted during Phase 1. C computes the challenge ciphertext c∗,
which is subsequently sent to A, as follows.
1 parse MPK as (MPK′,PK′′, H,N, {Ai,HIDj , Bi,HIDj}i∈{1,2},j∈[1,|Fam|])
2 parse PK′′ as (p, q, g, gcom, hcom)








5 (kˆ, com, decom)← Commit(PK′′)
6 repeat
7 s ←$ Zq
8 c0 := mp(gs)
9 until c0 < 2λ
10 for j := 1 to l do
11 cj := H((Acom1,HIDjA2,HIDj)
s, (Bcom1,HIDjB2,HIDj)
s)
12 cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′,HIDj, com‖m∗‖decom)
13 for j := l + 1 to L do
14 cj ←$ {0, 1}λ
15 cj ←$ {0, 1}`(3λ+1+|m∗|)
16 cˆ := c0‖c1‖c1‖ . . . ‖cL‖cL
17 σ := F (kˆ, cˆ)
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18 c∗ := σ‖cˆ‖com
Gameh(1 ≤ h ≤ l): This game is similar to Gameh−1, but, when creating c∗, C
replaces Lines 10–15 with the following.
1′ for j := 1 to l − h do
2′ cj := H((Acom1,HIDjA2,HIDj)
s, (Bcom1,HIDjB2,HIDj)
s)
3′ cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′,HIDj, com‖m∗‖decom)
4′ cl−h+1 := H((Acom1,HIDl−h+1A2,HIDl−h+1)
s, (Bcom1,HIDl−h+1B2,HIDl−h+1)
s)
5′ cl−h+1 ←$ {0, 1}`(3λ+1+|m∗|)
6′ for j := l − h+ 2 to L do
7′ cj ←$ {0, 1}λ
8′ cj ←$ {0, 1}`(3λ+1+|m∗|)
Gameh(1 ≤ h ≤ l): This game is similar to Gameh, but, when creating c∗, C replaces
Lines 4′–8′ with the following lines.
1′′ for j := l − h+ 1 to L do
2′′ cj ←$ {0, 1}λ
3′′ cj ←$ {0, 1}`(3λ+1+|m∗|)
For 0 ≤ i1 ≤ l and 1 ≤ i2 ≤ l let Advi1A,Π and Adv i2A,Π denote A’s advantage
in winning Gamei1 and Gamei2 , respectively. In Lemma 4.4.7, we show that if the
underlying PRF F is (t1, 1)-hard and the AIBE$ scheme Π′ is (t2, QU , QD, 2)-AIBE$-
IND-CCA-secure, then A’s advantage of distinguishing Gameh−1 from Gameh is at
most 1 + 2. In Lemma 4.4.8, we show that if Hes is an (t2, 2)-entropy-smoothing





advantage in distinguishing Gameh from Gameh. Therefore,
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∣∣∣Adv0A,Π − AdvlA,Π∣∣∣ ≤
(






























Lemma 4.4.7: For 1 ≤ h ≤ l, if the underlying pseudorandom function F is (t1, 1)-
hard and the anonymous identity-based encryption scheme with pseudorandom cipher-
texts Π′ is (t2, QU , QD, 2)-AIBE$-IND-CCA-secure, then A’s advantage of distinguish-
ing Gameh−1 from Gameh is at most 1 + 2, i.e.,
∣∣∣Advh−1A,Π − Adv hA,Π∣∣∣ ≤ 1 + 2. 
Proof. We build a PPT adversary B that internally runs the oABE$-IND-CCA game
with the adversary A in order to gain advantage in the AIBE$-IND-CCA game with
the challenger C ′. We denote the secret-key oracle and the decryption oracle of C ′ by
O′U(·) and O′D(·, ·), respectively. After receiving the master public key MPK′ of the
AIBE$ scheme from C ′, B executes the oABE$-IND-CCA game with A as follows.
Setup: B generates MPK, which he eventually sends to A, by executing Lines 2–
15 of the Setup algorithm given in Figure 4.6. B also keeps the exponents
{ai,HIDj , bi,HIDj}i∈{1,2},j∈[1,|Fam|] to himself and initializes the set of revoked users
RU to be empty.
Phase 1: B replies to A’s queries as follows.
Secret-key query i: B computes the secret key ski by executing lines Lines 2–
9 of the KeyGen algorithm of Figure 4.7 with one modification: during
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Line 6, B sets ski,z ← O′sk(HIDi|z). Next, after adding user i to RU , B sends
the secret key ski to A.
Decryption query (i, c): B computes the hierarchical identifier HIDi of leaf i
in T and proceeds as follows.
1 parse MPK as (MPK′,PK′′, H,N, {Ai,HIDj , Bi,HIDj}i∈{1,2},j∈[1,|Fam|])
2 parse PK′′ as (p, q, g, gcom, hcom)
3 parse c as σ‖cˆ‖com
4 parse cˆ as c0‖c1‖c1‖ . . . ‖cL‖cL
5 c˜0 := mp−1(c0)
6 for z := 1 to n+ 1 do
7 a˜1,z := a1,HIDi|z , a˜2,z := a2,HIDi|z b˜1,z := b1,HIDi|z , b˜2,z := b2HIDi|z
8 tagz := H(c˜ a˜1,zcom+a˜2,z0 , c˜
b˜1,zcom+b˜2,z
0 )
9 if ∃z ∈ [1, n+ 1] ∃j ∈ [1, L] : tagz = cj then
10 m′ := O′d(HIDi|k, cj)
11 if m′ 6= ⊥ then
12 parse m′ as com‖m‖decom
13 if com = com then
14 kˆ := Open(PK′′, com, decom)
15 if kˆ 6= ⊥ ∧ σ = F (kˆ, cˆ) then
16 return m
17 return ⊥
Challenge: After receiving from A a message m∗ ∈MSP and a set of user identities
S∗ ⊆ U with the restriction that S∗ ∩ RU = ∅, B picks (kˆ, com, decom) ←
Commit(PK′′) and sets
ID′ := HIDl−h+1, m′ := com‖m∗‖decom.
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Next, B sends the identity ID′ and the messages m′ as the challenge query to C ′.
Then, C ′ picks a random bit b′ ∈ {0, 1} and generates the challenge ciphertext
c′ depending on it: if b′ = 0, then c′ ← Encrypt′(MPK′, ID′, com‖m∗‖decom),
else c′ ←$ {0, 1}`(|m′|), and returns c′ to B. Finally, B computes the challenge
ciphertext c∗, which is eventually sent to A, as follows.
1 parse MPK as (MPK′,PK′′, H,N, {Ai,HIDj , Bi,HIDj}i∈{1,2},j∈[1,|Fam|])
2 parse PK′′ as (p, q, g, gcom, hcom)








5 (kˆ, com, decom)← Commit(PK′′)
6 repeat
7 s ←$ Zq
8 c0 := mp(gs)
9 until c0 < 2λ
10 for j := 1 to l − h do
11 cj := H((Acom1,HIDjA2,HIDj)
s, (Bcom1,HIDjB2,HIDj)
s)
12 cj ← Encrypt′(MPK′,HIDj, com‖m∗‖decom)
13 cl−h+1 := H((Acom1,HIDl−h+1A2,HIDl−h+1)
s, (Bcom1,HIDl−h+1B2,HIDl−h+1)
s)
14 cl−h+1 := c′
15 for j := l − h+ 2 to L do
16 cj ←$ {0, 1}λ
17 cj ←$ {0, 1}`(3λ+1+|m∗|)
18 cˆ := c0‖c1‖c1‖ . . . ‖cL‖cL
19 σ := F (kˆ, cˆ)
20 c∗ := σ‖cˆ‖com
Phase 2: B replies to A’s queries as follows.
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Secret-key query i: These queries are handled similarly to Phase 1, with the
usual restriction that A does not invoke a secret-key query i such that
i ∈ S∗.
Decryption query (i, c): B replies to (i, c = σ‖cˆ‖com), according to one of
the following cases.
• If c = c∗ and i 6∈ S∗, then B proceeds as in Phase 1. (Note that in this
case B’s output will be ⊥, as it should be.)
• If c = c∗, and i ∈ S∗, B just rejects the decryption query since A is
submitting an invalid query.
• If c 6= c∗ and i 6∈ S∗, then B proceeds as in Phase 1.
• If c 6= c∗ and i ∈ S∗, then B computes HIDi and proceeds as follows.
 If for all z = 1 to n + 1, it is the case that HIDi|z 6= HIDl−h+1,
then B proceeds as in Phase 1. Observe that the condition ∀z ∈
[1, n + 1] : HIDi|z 6= HIDl−h+1 ensures that the decryption query
that B will make to its challenger C ′ in the process of responding
to A’s query is allowed.
 If ∃ z ∈ [1, n+ 1] such that HIDi|z = HIDl−h+1, and c′ does not ap-
pear among the ciphertext components of c, then again B proceeds
as in Phase 1. Observe that the condition that c does not contain
c′ ensures that also in this case the decryption query that B will
make to its challenger C ′ in the process of responding to A’s query
is also allowed.
 If ∃ z ∈ [1, n + 1] such that HIDi|z = HIDl−h+1, but c′ appears
among the ciphertext components of c, then B outputs ⊥. Arguing
that this (i.e., ⊥) is the real reply that A would get in either
Gameh or Gameh requires some care, but can be done along the
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lines of the proofs of [20] and [43]. In a nutshell, the issue is the
circularity in the PRF usage: in generating the σ component of the
ciphertext, F (kˆ, ·) is computed over cˆ, which includes ciphertext
components that contain com and decom, which in turn correlate
with kˆ. The reason this circularity does not break the argument
is that the appearance of kˆ into the ciphertext is mediated by the
relaxed commitment scheme. In particular, since com is included
both in the clear and inside each ciphertext component (which are
individually AIBE-IND-CCA-secure as part of c∗), and since the
decryption algorithm checks that they be consistent, the adversary
is forced to keep in the outer layer of her query ciphertext c the
same value of com that was in the challenge c∗, or decryption would
fail. Now for that value of com, by the relaxed binding property,
the only valid PRF key that can be decommitted is kˆ. At this point
the argument would seem to get stuck again, as it is not apparent
how to guarantee that the adversary does not learn enough about
kˆ from the several ciphertext components in c∗ so as to be able to
compute F -values under that key. As it turns out, this point can
also be tamed through a separate sequence-of-games analysis [20].
It then follows that the adversary will not be able to compute the
proper σ for the ciphertext she was trying to craft, which finally
fully justifies the ⊥ reply by the simulator.
Guess: A outputs a guess b and B passes this bit as his guess for b′ to C ′.
Observe that, by construction, it holds that if C ′ chooses b′ = 0, then B is playing
Gameh−1, whereas if b′ = 1, then B is playing Gameh. Therefore, the PRF and
the AIBE$-IND-CCA advantage of B is essentially A’s advantage in distinguishing
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Gameh−1 from Gameh, i.e.,
∣∣∣Advh−1A,Π − Adv hA,Π∣∣∣ ≤ 1 + 2. 
Lemma 4.4.8: For 1 ≤ h ≤ l, if Hes in an (t3, 3)-entropy-smoothing hash function
family and the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is (t4, 4)-hard in G, then A’s













Proof. The proof of this lemma follow with the help of two intermediate games
G˜ame1,h and G˜ame2,h. During the transition from Gameh to G˜ame1,h, we replace
(Bcom1,HIDl−h+1B2,HIDl−h+1)
s with a random group element r2 ∈ G. Next, during the
transition from G˜ame1,h to G˜ame2,h, we replace (Acom1,HIDl−h+1A2,HIDl−h+1)
s with another
random group element r1 ∈ G. Finally, during the transition from G˜ame2,h to Gameh,
we replace H(r1, r2) with a truly random bit-string of length λ.
The indistinguishability of the first two transitions follows via a reduction argument
from the DDH problem and a PPT adversary B that internally executes the oABE$-
IND-CCA game with the adversary A in order to gain advantage in breaking the
DDH assumption. This reduction argument proceeds along the same lines as Lemma 1
of [83]. The indistinguishability of the second transition follows from the fact that
Hes is an entropy-smoothing hash function. Therefore, we have
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4.5 Constructions
We now present three constructions of broadcast steganography: one for each model
of security defined in Section 4.3.2. Our constructions employ the encrypt-then-embed
paradigm depicted in Figure 4.1, using outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption
with pseudorandom ciphertexts (Section 4.4) for encryption and rejection-sampling
[7,67,110] for embedding. In what follows, sσi denotes the ith leftmost non-overlapping
substring with length σ of a given bit-string s.
4.5.1 A BS-IND-CHA-Secure Construction
The rejection-sampler function used in our first construction is given in Figure 4.10.
Sample takes as input a security parameter λ, a channel history h ∈ Σ∗, a function
H : Σ→ {0, 1}, and a bit-string c ∈ {0, 1}∗, and outputs a covertext s ∈ Σ∗. Internally,
for every bit ci, Sample attempts to find a covertext sσi ∈ Σ such that H(sσi ) = ci by
repeatedly querying the channel oracle up to λ number of times. Sample may fail
to find a valid si during the λ iterations, but only with negligible probability in the
parameter λ. This mechanism allows a simple method to extract c from s: compute
c = H(sσ1 )‖ . . . ‖H(sσl ) where l = |s|/σ. As shown in [9, 110], if the channel is always
informative, H is a strong 2-universal hash function, and c is uniformly random, then
the maximum statistical distance between s1 ← Sample(λ, h,H, c) and s2 ← C|c|h for
any valid h ∈ Σ∗ is negligible in the security parameter λ. For simplicity, we denote
this statistical distance when |c| = 1 by 1 in the reminder of this chapter.
We obtain our BS-IND-CHA-secure broadcast steganography scheme by combining
the rejection-sampler function from Figure 4.10 with our outsider-anonymous broad-
cast encryption scheme with pseudorandom ciphertexts given in Figures 4.6 to 4.9.
Formally, given a strong 2-universal hash function familyHs2u = {H : Σ→ {0, 1}} and
an oABE$-IND-CPA-secure outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption with pseudo-
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Function: Sample(λ, h,H, c)
Input: parameter λ, history h, function H, bit-string c
Output: stegotext s
1 l := |c|
2 for i := 1 to l do
3 j := 0
4 repeat
5 j := j + 1, si ← Ch
6 until H(si) = ci ∨ j = λ
7 h := h‖si
8 end
9 s := s1‖ . . . ‖sl
10 return s
Figure 4.10: The regular rejection-sampler function.
Function: DSample(λ,H, c, r)
Input: parameter λ, function H, bit-string c, randomness r
Output: stegotext s
1 l := |c|
2 for i := 1 to l do
3 j := 0
4 repeat
5 j := j + 1, si := Channel(rλλ(i−1)+j)
6 until H(si) = ci ∨ j = λ
7 end
8 s := s1‖ . . . ‖sl
9 return s
Figure 4.11: The deterministic rejection-sampler function.
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Algorithm: Setup(1λ, N)
1 (MPK′,MSK′)← Setup′(1λ, N)
2 H ←$ Hs2u
3 MPK := (MPK′, H)
4 MSK := MSK′
5 return (MPK,MSK)
Figure 4.12: Setup algorithm of our BS-IND-CHA-secure construction.
Algorithm: KeyGen(MPK,MSK, i)
1 ski ← KeyGen′(MPK′,MSK′, i)
2 return ski
Figure 4.13: KeyGen algorithm of our BS-IND-CHA-secure construction.
Algorithm: Encode(MPK, S, h,m)
1 c← Encrypt′(MPK′, S,m)
2 s← Sample(λ, h,H, c)
3 return s
Figure 4.14: Encode algorithm of our BS-IND-CHA-secure construction.
Algorithm: Decode(MPK, ski, s)
1 l := |s|/σ
2 for j := 1 to l do
3 cj := H(sσj )
4 end
5 c := c1‖ . . . ‖cl
6 m := Decrypt′(MPK′, ski, c)
7 return m
Figure 4.15: Decode algorithm of our BS-IND-CHA-secure construction.
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random ciphertexts scheme Π′ = (Setup′,KeyGen′,Encrypt′,Decrypt′) with expansion
` (i.e., |Encrypt′(MPK′, S,m)| = `(|m|)), we build a BS-IND-CHA-secure BS scheme
Π = (Setup,KeyGen,Encode,Decode) as given in Figures 4.12 to 4.15.
Remark 4.5.1. If the outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption scheme with pseudo-
random ciphertexts employed in our BS-IND-CHA-secure broadcast steganography
construction is oABE$-IND-PDR-CCA-secure, then the resulting broadcast steganog-
raphy scheme is BS-IND-PDR-CCA-secure.
Theorem 4.5.2: If the channel is always informative, Hs2u is a strong 2-universal
hash function family, and the oABE$ scheme Π′ is (t2, QU , 2)-oABE$-IND-CPA-
secure, then the construction in Figures 4.12 to 4.15 is (t2, QU , µ1 + 2)-BS-IND-
CHA-secure, where µ is the polynomial bound on the total message length. 
Proof. We organize the proof as a sequence of games (Game0, Game1, Game2) between
a BS-IND-CHA adversary A and a challenger C. During the Challenge step in Game0,
A is given a stegotext for m∗ under S∗, whereas in Game2, A is given a covertext
consisting of some samples from the channel oracle.
Game0: This game is the actual BS-IND-CHA game when the challenge bit b∗ is
fixed to 0. The interaction between A and C during Setup, Phase 1, Phase 2,
and Guess steps follows as specified in Definition 4.3.7. During the Challenge
step, A sends C a message m∗ ∈MSP , a legal history h ∈ Σ∗, and a set of user
identities S∗ ⊆ U with the restriction that S∗ ∩RU = ∅. Next, C generates the
challenge stegotext s∗, which is later sent to A, as follows.
1 c← Encrypt′(MPK′, S∗,m∗)
2 s∗ ← Sample(λ, h,H, c)
Game1: This game is similar to Game0, but C computes the challenge s∗ as follows.
1 c ←$ {0, 1}`(|m∗|)
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2 s∗ ← Sample(λ, h,H, c)
Game2: This game is similar to Game1, but C now computes the challenge s∗ as a
covertext consisting of samples from the channel oracle.
1 s∗ ← C`(|m∗|)h
For 0 ≤ i ≤ 2, let AdviA,Π denote A’s advantage of winning Gamei. Since Π′
is (t2, Qsk, 2)-oABE$-IND-CPA-secure, it follows from a straightforward reduction
argument that A’s advantage in distinguishing Game0 from Game1 is at most 2 (i.e.,∣∣∣Adv0A,Π−Adv1A,Π∣∣∣ ≤ 2). Once we bound the total message length by the polynomial µ,
it follows from another simple reduction argument that A’s advantage in distinguishing
Game1 from Game2 is at most µ1 (i.e.,
∣∣∣Adv1A,Π−Adv2A,Π∣∣∣ ≤ µ1). Therefore, we have
∣∣∣Adv0A,Π − Adv2A,Π∣∣∣ ≤ µ1 + 2.
The theorem then follows from the observation that Game2 amounts to the actual
BS-IND-CHA game when the challenge bit b∗ is fixed to 1. 
4.5.2 A BS-IND-CCA-Secure Construction
Unfortunately, our first construction fails to provide a BS-IND-CCA-secure broadcast
steganography scheme even if the internally used outsider-anonymous broadcast
encryption scheme with pseudorandom ciphertexts provides oABE$-IND-CCA security.
The problem is that the rejection-sampler function from Figure 4.10 allows multiple
covertexts corresponding to a given bit-string. However, this limitation can be
overcome in the case of channels that are efficiently computable and whose samples
are independently distributed. In fact, for channels of this type, Hopper [65] devised
a deterministic rejection-sampler function DSample that maps a given bit-string to
exactly one covertext.
CHAPTER 4. BROADCAST STEGANOGRAPHY 114
Algorithm: Setup(1λ, N)
1 (MPK′,MSK′)← Setup′(1λ, N)
2 H ←$ Hs2u
3 MPK := (MPK′, H,G)
4 MSK := MSK′
5 return (MPK,MSK)
Figure 4.16: Setup algorithm of our BS-IND-CCA-secure construction.
Algorithm: KeyGen(MPK,MSK, i)
1 ski ← KeyGen′(MPK′,MSK′, i)
2 return ski
Figure 4.17: KeyGen algorithm of our BS-IND-CCA-secure construction.
Algorithm: Encode(MPK, S,m)
1 rˆ ←$ {0, 1}λ
2 c← Encrypt′(MPK′, S, rˆ‖m)
3 r := G(rˆ, |c| · λ2)
4 s := DSample(λ,H, c, r)
5 return s
Figure 4.18: Encode algorithm of our BS-IND-CCA-secure construction.
Algorithm: Decode(MPK, ski, s)
1 l := |s|/σ
2 for j := 1 to l do
3 cj := H(sσj )
4 end
5 c := c1‖ . . . ‖cl
6 m′ := Decrypt′(MPK′, ski, c)
7 if m′ 6= ⊥ then
8 parse m′ as rˆ‖m
9 r := G(rˆ, l · λ2)





Figure 4.19: Decode algorithm of our BS-IND-CCA-secure construction.
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As shown in Figure 4.11, DSample takes in input a security parameter λ, a predicate
H : Σ→ {0, 1} along with a bit-string c ∈ {0, 1}∗ to embed, and a random bit-string
r ∈ {0, 1}|c|·λ2 that controls the embedding. To sample s ∈ Σ∗, for every bit ci of c,
DSample seeks sσi ∈ Σ such that H(sσi ) = ci, by repeatedly drawing from the channel
according to the random chunks specified in r. This approach requires that the channel
be efficiently computable by a function Channel whose samples are independent of
the history (hence we drop h from its input), but guarantees that an adversary who
intercepts a stegotext is unable to tweak it meaningfully. Furthermore, as shown
in [9, 66, 110], if H is a strong 2-universal hash function, and c and r are uniformly
random, then the statistical distance between stegotexts produced by DSample and
innocent covertexts sampled from Channel is a negligible function 1 of λ. The definition
of a strong 2-universal hash function is given in Section 2.3.2.
Figures 4.16 to 4.19 reports the details of our BS-IND-CCA-secure broadcast
steganography scheme Π = (Setup,KeyGen,Encode,Decode), which is based on a
strong 2-universal hash function familyHs2u, a variable-length pseudorandom generator
(vPRG) G : {0, 1}λ × Z→ {0, 1}∗ (whose second input sets the output length), and
an oABE$-IND-CCA-secure outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption scheme with
pseudorandom ciphertexts Π′ = (Setup′,KeyGen′,Encrypt′,Decrypt′) with expansion `.
Theorem 4.5.3: If the channel is always informative, Hs2u is a strong 2-universal
hash function family, G is a (t2, 2)-hard vPRG, and the oABE$ scheme Π′ is
(t3, QU , QD, 3)-oABE$-IND-CCA-secure, then the construction presented in Fig-
ures 4.16 to 4.19 is (t2 + t3, QU , QD, µ1 + 2 + 3)-BS-IND-CCA-secure, where µ
is the polynomial bound on the total message length. 
Proof. We organize this proof as a sequence of games (Game0, Game1, Game2, Game3)
between a BS-IND-CCA adversary A and a challenger C. During the Challenge step
of Game0, A is given a stegotext for m∗ under S∗. The stegotext given to A during
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the Challenge step of Game3, on the other hand, consists just of documents sampled
from the channel function under uniform randomness.
Game0: This game is the actual BS-IND-CCA game when the challenge bit b∗ is
fixed to 0. The interaction between A and C during Setup, Phase 1, Phase 2,
and Guess steps follows as specified in Definition 4.3.5. After A submitted a
message m∗ ∈ MSP and a set of user identities S∗ ⊆ U (with the restriction
that S∗∩RU = ∅) during the Challenge step, C generates the challenge stegotext
s∗, which is later given to A, as follows.
1 rˆ ←$ {0, 1}λ
2 c← Encrypt′(MPK′, S∗, rˆ‖m∗)
3 r := G(rˆ, |c| · λ2)
4 s∗ := DSample(λ,H, c, r)
Game1: This game is similar to Game0, but C now computes the challenge stegotext
s∗ as given below.
1 rˆ ←$ {0, 1}λ
2 c ←$ {0, 1}`(λ+|m∗|)
3 r := G(rˆ, |c| · λ2)
4 s∗ := DSample(λ,H, c, r)
Game2: This game is similar to Game1, but C now computes the challenge stegotext
s∗ as shown below.
1 c ←$ {0, 1}`(λ+|m∗|)
2 r ←$ {0, 1}|c|·λ2
3 s∗ := DSample(λ,H, c, r)
Game3: This game is similar to Game2, but C generates the challenge stegotext s∗
as follows.
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1 l := `(λ+ |m∗|)
2 for j := 1 to l do
3 r ←$ {0, 1}λ
4 s∗j := Channel(r)
5 s∗ := s∗1‖ . . . ‖s∗l
For 0 ≤ i ≤ 3, let AdviA,Π denote A’s advantage of winning Gamei. Because
Π′ is (t3, Qsk, Qd, 3)-oABE$-IND-CCA-secure, it follows from a simple reduction
argument that A’s advantage in distinguishing Game0 from Game1 is at most 3 (i.e.,∣∣∣Adv0A,Π−Adv1A,Π∣∣∣ ≤ 3). SinceG is (t2, 2)-hard, it follows from another straightforward
reduction argument that A’s advantage in distinguishing Game1 from Game2 is at
most 2 (i.e.,
∣∣∣Adv1A,Π−Adv2A,Π∣∣∣ ≤ 2). Once we bound the total message length by the
polynomial µ, it follows from yet another simple reduction argument thatA’s advantage
in distinguishing Game2 from Game3 is at most µ1 (i.e.,
∣∣∣Adv2A,Π − Adv3A,Π∣∣∣ ≤ µ1).
Thus, ∣∣∣Adv0A,Π − Adv3A,Π∣∣∣ ≤ µ1 + 2 + 3.
The theorem then follows from the observation that Game3 amounts to the actual




Recent developments in cloud computing has given rise to the convenience of remote
storage services, a.k.a. cloud storage. Taking advantage of the economies of scale,
third party companies are now able to provide cloud storage with high availability
and low latency for pay-per-use cost structures that amount to a couple of pennies per
gigabyte stored [6, 62, 88]. Instead of enduring the cost and the hassle of managing
in-house storage infrastructure, more and more individuals and companies alike are
relying on cloud storage to manage large amounts of data they generate.
One of the biggest concerns with outsourcing data storage to a cloud is the
confidentiality of the outsourced data. Most security-conscious clients encrypt their
data before exporting to a cloud. However, while encryption preserves the secrecy
of the data, it does not hide the access patterns between the clients and the storage
providers. It has been shown that in certain situations, these access patterns can reveal
a considerable amount of sensitive information regarding the outsourced data [32,70,92].
For example, as Islam et al. [70] demonstrated, statistical attacks on access patterns
between the clients and an encrypted email repository can be leveraged to infer
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about 80% of the search queries. It is evident that a secure cloud storage system
should preserve the confidentiality of the outsourced data and obfuscate the access
patterns between the clients and their cloud storage providers. These requirements
have been formalized in the cryptographic literature under the term oblivious storage
(OS) [5, 21,25,35,36,58–61,78,84,92,102,105–108,115–117,119].
A related notion to oblivious storage is oblivious random access machine (ORAM).
It is a mechanism proposed by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [55, 56, 90] for protecting
computer software from memory access pattern-based reverse engineering attacks. In
this setting, the authors represented a computer software as a random access machine
(RAM) program executed within a CPU that accessed external memory; and showed
that an adversary who had control over only the memory had the potential to reverse
engineer the RAM program executed inside the CPU even when the CPU was fully
trusted. They proved that this attack could be prevented if one converted the RAM
program into an ORAM program.
With the insight that the CPU and the external memory in the setting of software
protection conveniently correlate to the client and the remote storage in the cloud
storage setting, Williams and Sion [114] proposed that ORAM protocols can be used to
construct oblivious storage protocols. Since then, there have been several subsequent
results [5, 21, 25, 35, 36, 58–61, 78, 84, 92, 102, 105–108, 115–117, 119] utilizing ORAM
protocols in the construction of oblivious storage protocols. While most of these
results have focused on optimizing the parameters of the original model of ORAM
[21,58–61,78,92,102,106–108,115,116,119], others have proposed constructions that
outsourced storage to multiple non-colluding data centers [84,105], that could support
parallel executions from mutually trusting clients [25, 117], that were information
theoretically secure [36], statistically secure [35], and even secure without the need for
any cryptographic assumptions [5].
An attractive benefit of having the data outsourced to a cloud is the ability to
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easily share that data with other clients. In fact, most of the popular cloud storage
providers nowadays provide some mechanism, such as temporary links [45], for their
clients to share their data. However, giving group access to outsourced data while
also preserving the oblivious storage guarantees is still a problem not well understood,
let alone solved. There have been several proposals, however, to provide oblivious
group data access to cloud storage [25,61,72,117]. All these proposals only provide
an all-or-nothing access control policy to the outsourced content since they all require
(either explicitly [25, 61, 117] or implicitly [72]) the authorized clients to share the
secret keys to the cloud storage. As real-world clients prefer to impose fine-grained
access control policies over their shared data, an all-or-nothing level of access is simply
out of the question. Part of the reason behind this disconnect with the real-world
requirements is in the original definition of OS that is based on the assumption that
only a single client accesses the outsourced content.
An important way of categorizing the OS protocols from the perspective of oblivious
shared storage is stateful vs. stateless solutions. In a stateful OS protocol, the client is
required to maintain some state in between data access requests [5,21,35,36,60,105–108,
116,119], whereas in a stateless OS protocol [25,55,56,58,59,61,78,84,90,92,102,115,117],
the client carries no such state. This difference renders stateless OS protocols an ideal
starting point for oblivious shared storage protocols since sharing some state among
clients in a shared data access setting prohibitively increases the communication
complexity. In fact, there have been a couple of results [25,61,72,117] that attempted
to construct oblivious shared storage protocols using stateless ORAM protocols, albeit
with an all-or-nothing access policy on the shared data. Still, constructing oblivious
shared storage protocols that match the read-world data-secrecy and access-pattern-
obliviousness requirements is a non-trivial task.
Jinsheng et al. [72] proposed multi-user oblivious RAM, a promising extension of
ORAM to the oblivious shared storage setting. The novel idea of M-ORAM is the
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inclusion of a sequence of proxies, called the anonymizers, in between the clients and
the cloud storage provider. Any message sent between the clients and the storage
provider would pass through the anonymizers. With this arrangement, Jinsheng et
al. [72] were able to prove that as long as at least one anonymizer remains honest, the
access pattern between any honest user and the storage provider remains hidden from
any other user, the anonymizers, and the storage provider. However, all the clients in
a M-ORAM protocol, including those who are compromised, have access to all the
data in the cloud storage; thus, even with the help of anonymizers, M-ORAM can
only provide all-or-nothing level of access control on the outsourced data. A review of
the setting of M-ORAM is given in Section 2.4.6.
5.2 Contributions
To illustrate the need for fine-grained access control for shared data, consider a hospital
that wishes to outsource the storage of medical records to a third-party cloud storage
provider. Since encryption alone is not enough to protect the medical records from the
prying eyes of the outsiders, including the third-party cloud storage provider [32,70,92],
the hospital may decide to communicate with the cloud storage using an OS protocol.
However, all the existing OS protocols allow the entire hospital staff to access the
medical records of any patient of their choosing. This is a serious violation of patient
privacy since the medical records of any individual patient should only be accessible to
medical staff directly related to that patient’s medical history [30]. A more alarming
concern with this approach is that the compromise of the access credentials of a single
member of the hospital staff has the potential to compromise the medical records of
all the patients of the hospital. As one can see, what the hospital really needs is an
OS-like system that also allows the medical staff to control access to the outsourced
medical data at the record level.
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Oblivious Group Storage. In this chapter, we propose oblivious group storage
(OGS), an extension of the OS model to the setting of shared data access. An OGS
protocol allows one to share the data stored in a cloud with fine-grained access
control policies while also enjoying the data-secrecy and access-pattern obliviousness
guarantees provided by OS protocols. Table 5.1 shows how OGS compares to other
types of oblivious cloud storage protocols. As one can see, only OGS allows clients to
impose fine-grained access control policies over their data. We believe that this is the
first proposal to provide such capabilities in the setting of oblivious cloud storage.
Organization. Our presentation is twofold. First, in Section 5.3, we formally define
the setting and the security model of OGS so that one can argue about oblivious
shared data access without ambiguity. A crucial component of the setting of OGS
is the inclusion of a sequence of proxies, an idea originally proposed by Jinsheng et
al. [72], that facilitate the communication between the clients and the cloud storage
provider. Second, we provide a proof-of-concept construction in Section 5.4 along with
a formal analysis of security with respect to our security model in order to show the
feasibility of OGS. This construction can be seen as a framework that produces an
OGS protocol by combining existing cryptographic primitives.
5.3 Formal Model
Oblivious group storage is an extension of oblivious storage. An OGS protocol allows
a group of capacity-constrained clients to obliviously share the storage at a remote
untrusted storage provider S, where the amount of storage is abundant and the cost
of storage is cheap. The clients also have some storage capacity, although it is much
smaller than at the server S.
An OGS protocol provides several security guarantees. Similar to a stateless
oblivious storage protocol deployed in a multi-user setting [25, 61, 117], an OGS
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protocol allows the clients to hide the contents of the outsourced data items from S
and prevents S from extracting any significant information about the outsourced data
items based on the pattern in accessing the data between the clients and S. Also,
similar to a multi-user oblivious RAM protocol [72], an OGS protocol allows any
individual client to prevent other clients from extracting any non-trivial information
about the outsourced data by observing his access patterns with S. In addition,
an OGS protocol also allows the clients to share the data items stored at S among
subgroups of clients so that the shared data items are hidden from the unauthorized
clients even if they collude with S. In order to provide security against collusion, an
OGS protocol makes use of a sequence of proxies, a.k.a. anonymizers, between the
clients and S.
5.3.1 Setting of OGS
An OGS protocol consists of four types of parties: the system initialization authority,
the clients, the anonymizers, and the storage provider S; and four algorithms: Setup,
KeyGen, Write, and Read. The two duties of the SIA are,
1. To initialize the OGS protocol by generating the system-wide secret keys, the
anonymizer secret keys, and setting up the initial server storage at S via the
algorithm Setup.
2. To enroll new clients to an OGS instance by generating client-specific secret
keys via the algorithm KeyGen.
Once the OGS protocol is initialized and the clients are enrolled into the system,
the clients interact with S through the anonymizers to store new data items in S’s
storage by executing the algorithm Write and to retrieve existing data items from
S’s storage by running the algorithm Read. The clients can also share the storage
at S by authorizing other clients to execute Read and Write algorithms on the data
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items that they have stored at S. The formal definition of an OGS protocol is given
in Definition 5.3.1 below.
Following the standards of existing OS protocols, we model the storage in OGS
protocols as a key-value interface. We refer to the key-value pairs supplied by the
clients for storage as position-message pairs. Depending on the execution path of the
OGS algorithm, these position-message pairs translate into one or more key-value
pairs in the storage provided by S. We refer to those key-value pairs that get stored
at S as address-block pairs.
As we described in Definition 5.3.1, the algorithms Read and Write executed
between the clients, the anonymizers, and S are interactive. We call the complete
execution of a single interactive algorithm between these parties an episode. For ease
of reference, we refer to the entire storage at S at the completion of an episode a server
state st. It should be noted that a given server state includes all the address-block
pairs stored at S as well as any other outsourced data (such as encrypted secret keys,
encrypted hash function seeds, etc.) related to a given OGS instance.
Definition 5.3.1 (OGS Setting): An oblivious group storage scheme, associated
with an SIA, a set of clients C = [1, N ], a set of anonymizers A = [1,M ], a server
S, a position space PSP, and a message space MSP, is a tuple of algorithms
(Setup,KeyGen,Write,Read) defined as follows.
(MPK,MSK, ak1, . . . , akM , st0)← Setup(1λ,M,N): Setup is a non-interactive
algorithm executed by the SIA. This algorithm takes the security parameter 1λ
and the number of anonymizers and clients in the system M , N as inputs and
outputs the master public key MPK, the master secret keyMSK, the anonymizers’
secret keys ak1, . . . , akM , and the initial state of the server storage st0. At the
end of this algorithm, the SIA places MPK in a publicly accessible location,
keeps MSK to herself, provides the anonymizers’ secret keys to the corresponding
anonymizers, and places st0 in the storage provided by S.
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cki ← KeyGen(MPK,MSK, i): KeyGen is also a non-interactive algorithm executed
by the SIA. This algorithm takes the master public key MPK, the master secret
key MSK, and a client i ∈ C as inputs and outputs a secret key cki for client i.
At the end of this algorithm, the SIA gives cki to client i.
(ak′1, . . . , ak′M , stt+1)← Write(MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , cki, S, p,m, stt): Write is
an interactive algorithm executed between a client i ∈ C, the M anonymizers,
and S. The anonymizers supply their secret keys ak1, . . . , akM . The client i
supplies his secret key cki, a set of receivers S ⊆ C, a position p ∈ PSP , and a
message m ∈MSP . S provides the current server state stt. At the end of this
algorithm, the server state transforms from stt to stt+1 and the old anonymizers’
secret keys get replaced by the new secret keys ak′1, . . . , ak′M .
(m/⊥, ak′1, . . . , ak′M , stt+1)← Read(MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , cki, p, stt): Read is
also an interactive algorithm executed between a client i ∈ C, theM anonymizers,
and S. The anonymizers supply their secret keys ak1, . . . , akM . The client i
provides the secret key cki and a position p. S provides the current server state
stt. At the end of this algorithm, the client i learns a message m or the failure
symbol ⊥, the server state transforms from stt to stt+1, and the old anonymizers’
secret keys get replaced by the new secret keys ak′1, . . . , ak′M .
Correctness. LetMPK, ak1, . . . , akM , and stt be a valid master public key, a sequence
ofM anonymizers’ valid secret keys, and a valid server state, respectively. For every h ∈
C, S ⊆ C, i ∈ S, p ∈ PSP , and m ∈MSP , if ckh, cki are the secret keys of the clients
h, i, respectively, Write(MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , ckh, S, p,m, stt) = (ak′1, . . . , ak′M , stt+1),
and ak′1, . . . , ak′M and stt+1 transform into ak
′
1, . . . , ak
′
M and stt+1 after zero or more
executions of Read and Write algorithms that do not modify the message at position
p, then Read(ak′1, . . . , ak
′
M , cki, p, stt+1) yields m, except with negligible probability in
the security parameter λ. ♦
CHAPTER 5. OBLIVIOUS GROUP STORAGE 127
5.3.2 Security of OGS
The basic security requirement of a secure storage protocol is to prevent unauthorized
parties from learning any non-trivial information about the data items. Usually, this
requirement is satisfied by encrypting the data items using a semantically secure
cryptosystem before exporting to the storage provider. As mentioned in Section 5.1,
the pattern in accessing data items between a storage provider and its clients can
reveal non-trivial information regarding the data items. The goal of an oblivious
storage protocol is to also prevent that information leakage.
Informally, the security model of an OGS protocol guarantees four aspects of
security for honest clients against unauthorized clients and an honest-but-curious
server, who are also allowed to collude. These aspects of security are, namely, server-
side/client-side access pattern obliviousness and server-side/client-side data secrecy.
The two aspects of access pattern obliviousness require that any honest client’s pattern
of accessing data stored at S leaks no non-trivial information regarding the accessed
data items to either the unauthorized clients or S. Server-side data secrecy aspect
assures that any honest client’s exported data items are hidden from S even though
the server states are maintained by S during the execution of the OGS protocol. As
mentioned in Section 5.2, one attractive use case of an OGS protocol is that it allows
the clients to share the storage among groups of clients. The client-side data secrecy
property guarantees that the data items belonging to any group of such clients are not
accessible to any unauthorized client event if that client is a legitimate participant of
the OGS protocol.
Remark 5.3.2. The security model of a M-ORAM protocol, which is presented in
Section 2.4.6, only provides three out of four aspects of security provided by an OGS
protocol, leaving out the client-side data secrecy property. In other words, while an
OGS protocol allows the clients to impose a fine-grained access control policy for each
of their outsourced data item, a M-ORAM protocol allows any client to access the
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outsourced data items belonging to any other client in the system.
In spite of the missing security guarantee mentioned above, a M-ORAM protocol
can preserve the access pattern obliviousness of any honest client even in the face
of an the honest-but-curious storage server colluding with the compromised clients.
Jinsheng et al. [72] allows this adversarial collusion by using a sequence of proxies
(a.k.a. anonymizers), who are also allowed to collude, between the clients and S.
It is this property of security against collusion that makes M-ORAM protocols an
indispensable underlying primitive in our OGS protocol construction in Section 5.4.
In order to provide the OGS security guarantees mentioned above while allowing
the honest-but-curious server to collude with the unauthorized clients, an OGS protocol
makes use of a chain of proxies called anonymizers that facilitate the communication
between the clients and S. To allow a stronger level of security, we also allow these
anonymizers to be corrupt and to collude with the unauthorized clients and S. However,
we require at least one of these anonymizers remain honest.
The formal definition of security of an OGS protocol is also defined in an honest-but-
curious adversarial model, where the adversary is allowed to gain as much information
as he can with the requirement that he follow the OGS protocol as specified in
Definition 5.3.1. We define the OGS security model as a game (OGS-IND-OBC game)
which is played between a PPT adversary and a challenger. In this game, the challenger
simulates the entire OGS protocol while giving the adversary read access to the private
states of the storage server, the revoked clients, and the compromised anonymizers.
It is required, however, at least one anonymizer remains honest throughout the
game. A secure OGS protocol assures that the adversary’s advantage in winning the
OGS-IND-OBC game is negligible in the security parameter λ.
Definition 5.3.3 (OGS-IND-OBC Game): For a given oblivious group storage
scheme Π = (Setup,KeyGen,Write,Read), the OGS-IND-OBC game, played between
a PPT adversary A and a challenger C, is defined as follows.
CHAPTER 5. OBLIVIOUS GROUP STORAGE 129
Setup: C runs (MPK,MSK, ak1, . . . , akM , st0)← Setup(1λ, N), gives A the resulting
master public key MPK and the initial server state st0, and keeps the master
secret key MSK and the anonymizer keys ak1, . . . , akM to itself. C also initializes
the sets of revoked clients RC and compromised anonymizers RA as empty sets.
Phase 1: A adaptively issues queries of the following types.
Client secret-key query i: A requests the secret key of a client i ∈ C. C
runs cki ← KeyGen(MPK,MSK, i), adds i to RC , and gives cki to A.
Anonymizer secret-key query j: A requests the secret key of an anonymizer
j ∈ A. C adds j to RA and gives akj, the most recent secret key of the
anonymizer j, to A. We do, however, require that at least one anonymizer
remain uncompromised for the duration of the OGS-IND-OBC game.
Revoked client write query (i, S, p,m): A inquires C to execute the Write
algorithm on behalf of a revoked client i ∈ RC with a set of target clients S ⊆
C, a position p ∈ PSP , and a message m ∈MSP . Then, using the secret
key of client i, the most recent anonymizer keys, and the server state, C sim-
ulates the interactive algorithm Write(MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , cki, S, p,m, stt)
and gives the adversarial view of this execution of Write algorithm to A.
Revoked client read query (i, p): A asks C to run the Read algorithm on
a position p ∈ PSP on behalf of a revoked client i ∈ RC . C simulates
Read(MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , cki, p, stt) using the client i’s secret key, the most
recent anonymier keys, and the server state; and gives the adversarial view
of this execution of Read to A.
Honest client write query (i, S,m): A asks C to run theWrite algorithm for
an honest client i ∈ C\RC with a set of target clients S ⊆ C, and a message
m ∈MSP . C, however, does not allowA to provide a position for this query.
Instead, C picks p ←$ PSP uniformly at random and assigns to it a sequen-
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tial identifier id. After running Write(MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , cki, S, p,m, stt)
using the client i’s secret key, the most recent anonymizer keys, and the
server state, C gives the adversarial view of this execution of Write and the
position identifier id to A.
Honest client read query (i, id): A inquires C to run the Read algorithm for
an honest client i ∈ C \RC on the position associated with the identifier id.
C looks up the position p that she associated with id during a previous honest
client write query, simulates Read(MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , cki, p, stt) using the
client i’s secret key, the most recent anonymier keys, and the server state;
and provides the adversarial view of this execution of Read to A.
Pre-Challenge: A gives C two messages m∗0,m∗1 ∈MSP , two sets of target clients
S∗0 , S
∗
1 such that RC ∩ (S∗0 ∪ S∗1) = ∅, and a client i∗ ∈ S∗0 ∩ S∗1 . C picks
two positions p∗0, p∗1 ←$ PSP and assigns sequential identifiers id∗0, id∗1 to them,
respectively. Next, it runs Write(MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , cki∗ , S∗0 , p∗0,m∗0, stt) and
Write(MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , cki∗ , S∗1 , p∗1,m∗1, stt+1) using the client i∗’s secret key,
the most recent anonymizer keys, and the server state; and gives the adversarial




Phase 2: This phase is similar to Phase 1 with the exception that A is not allowed
to submit any revocation query for any client i ∈ S∗0 ∪ S∗1 . Also, note that A
may submit honest client read queries on the position identifiers id∗0, id∗1.
Challenge: C picks a random bit b∗ ∈ {0, 1} and simulates the execution of Read(
MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , cki∗ , p∗b∗ , stt) using the client i∗’s secret key, the most recent
anonymier keys, and the server state. C also assigns two new sequential position
identifiers id∗2, id∗3 to p∗b , p∗1−b, respectively. Finally, C gives the adversarial view of
this execution of Read and the two position identifiers id∗2, id∗3 to the adversary.
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Phase 3: This phase is similar to Phase 2 with the exception that A is not allowed to
submit any honest client read queries on the position identifiers id∗0, id∗1. However,
A is allowed to submit such queries on the position identifiers id∗2, id∗3
Guess: A outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1} and wins if b = b∗.
A is called an OGS-IND-OBC adversary and A’s advantage in winning the above
game is defined as
AdvOGS-IND-OBCA,Π :=
∣∣∣Pr[b = b∗]− 12 ∣∣∣,
where the probability is over the random coins used by A and C. ♦
Definition 5.3.4 (OGS-IND-OBC Security): An OGS scheme Π is (t, QC , QA,
QD, )-OGS-IND-OBC-secure if for any t-time OGS-IND-OBC adversary making at
most QC , QA, and QD adaptive client secret-key, anonymizer secret-key, and data
access queries, respectively, it is the case that AdvOGS-IND-OBCA,Π ≤ . ♦
5.4 Construction
We now present our construction of an oblivious group storage protocol. One can
view our approach as a framework that produces a secure OGS protocol by using
a secure multi-user oblivious RAM protocol and an outsider-anonymous broadcast
encryption scheme as underlying primitives. Consequently, a major advantage of our
OGS construction is that it allows one to easily improve its parameters if more efficient
underlying primitives are realized in the future. The security of our OGS construction
is proven with respect to the OGS-IND-OBC game given in Definition 5.3.3. This
proof consists of reduction arguments from the security models of the underlying
M-ORAM protocol and the oABE protocol.
Given an outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption protocol Π′ = (Setup′,KeyGen′,
Encrypt′,Decrypt′) and a multi-user oblivious RAM protocol Π′′ = (Setup′′,KeyGen′′,
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Write′′,Read′′), we construct an oblivious group storage protocol Π = (Setup,KeyGen,
Write,Read) as follows.
Setup(1λ,M,N): Setup algorithm is a combination of Setup′ and Setup′′. First, it
obtains (MPK′,MSK′)← Setup′(1λ, N) and (MPK′′,MSK′′, ak1, . . . , akM , st0)←
Setup′′(1λ,M). Next, it sets MPK := (MPK′,MPK′′) and MSK := (MSK′,MSK′′).
Finally, it outputs (MPK,MSK, ak1, . . . , akM , st0).
KeyGen(MPK,MSK, i): KeyGen algorithm is a combination of KeyGen′ and KeyGen′′.
First, it computes ski ← KeyGen′(MPK′,MSK′, i) and ck′′i ← KeyGen′′(MPK′′,
MSK′′, i). Then, it sets cki := (ski, ck′′i ) and outputs cki.
Write(MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , cki, S, p,m, stt): Write algorithm is a composition of
Encrypt′ and Write′′. First, it computes the oABE ciphertext c← Encrypt′(MPK′,
S,m). Then, it interactively computes (ak′1, . . . , ak′M , stt+1) ← Write′′(MPK′′,
ak1, . . . , akM , ck
′′
i , p, c, stt) with client i, the anonymizers, and S. Note that at
the end of Write′′, the server state at S gets updated to stt+1 and the anonymizer
keys get updated to ak′1, . . . , ak′M .
Read(MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , cki, p, stt): Read algorithm is a composition of Read′′
and Decrypt′. First it interactively computes (c, ak′1, . . . , ak′M , stt+1)← Read′′(
MPK′′, ak1, . . . , akM , ck′′i , p, stt) with client i, the anonymizers, and S. Dur-
ing the execution of Read′′, the server state at S gets updated to stt+1 and
the anonymizer keys get updated to ak′1, . . . , ak′M . Finally, it computes m :=
Decrypt′(MPK′, ski, c) and returns m to client i.
The security of the above construction tightly depends on the underlying oABE
and M-ORAM schemes. According to Section 3.3.2, there exists two types of oABE
schemes with respect to the provided level of security, namely oABE-IND-CPA security
and oABE-IND-CCA security. In our OGS construction, we require Π′ to be oABE-
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IND-CPA-secure. We also require the M-ORAM scheme Π′′ to be secure with respect
to the M-ORAM-IND-OBC model of security presented in Definition 2.4.25.
The following theorem summarizes the security of our OGS construction. The
proof of this theorem consists of a sequence of three hybrid games, where each is based
on the one given in Definition 5.3.3. We prove that each consecutive pair of these
games is indistinguishable by reduction arguments to the security of the underlying
oABE or M-ORAM schemes.
Theorem 5.4.1: If the oABE scheme Π′ = (Setup′,KeyGen′,Encrypt′,Decrypt′) is
(t, QC , QD, 1)-oABE-IND-CPA-secure and the M-ORAM protocol Π′′ = (Setup′′,
KeyGen′′,Write′′,Read′′) is (t, QC , QA, QD, 2)-M-ORAM-IND-OBC-secure, then the
construction given above is (t, QC , QA, QD, 21 + 2)-OGS-IND-OBC-secure. 
Proof. We organize our proof as a sequence of games, Game0, Game1, Game2, and
Game3, played between a PPT adversary A and a challenger C. Each of these games
is a slightly modified version of the OGS-IND-OBC game given in Definition 5.3.3.
During the Challenge step of Game0, C always considers the position p∗0, whereas
in Game3, she always considers p∗1. Game1 and Game2 are hybrid games that lie
in between Game0 and Game3. We prove that A is unable to distinguish between
the pair Game0 and Game1 as well as the pair Game2 and Game3 using reduction
arguments to the security of the underlying oABE scheme. Similarly, we prove that
Game1 and Game2 are indistinguishable to A, but this time reducing to the security
of the M-ORAM scheme. Given below are the details of our proof.
Game0: This game corresponds to the OGS-IND-OBC game given in Definition 5.3.3
when the challenge bit b∗ is fixed to 0. The interaction between A and C during
Setup, Phase 1, Pre-Challenge, Phase 2, and Phase 3 steps follow exactly as
stated in Definition 5.3.3.
During the Challenge step, C simulates the execution of Read(MPK, ak1, . . . ,
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akM , cki∗ , p
∗
0, stt) using the secret key of client i∗ that the adversary submitted to
her during Pre-Challenge step, the most recent anonymier keys, and the server
state. Then, C assigns two new sequential position identifiers id∗2, id∗3 to p∗0, p∗1,
respectively. At the end, C gives the adversarial view of this execution of Read
and the two position identifiers id∗2, id∗3 to A.
Finally, A submits his guess b to C and wins the game if b = 0.
Game1: This game is a slightly modified version of Game0. Except for the Pre-
Challenge step, the interaction between C and A during this game is the same
as in Game0.
During the Pre-Challenge step, A gives to C two messages m∗0,m∗1 ∈MSP , two
sets of target clients S∗0 , S∗1 ⊆ C \ RC , and a client i∗ ∈ S∗0 ∩ S∗1 . Next, after
picking two positions p∗0, p∗1 ←$ PSP and assigning sequential identifiers id∗0, id∗1
to them, respectively, C runs Write(MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , cki∗ , S∗1 , p∗0,m∗1, stt) and
Write(MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , cki∗ , S∗1 , p∗1, m∗1, stt+1) using the client i∗’s secret key,
the most recent anonymizer keys, and the server state. At last, C gives the
adversarial views of these executions of Write and their corresponding position
identifiers id∗0, id∗1 to A.
At the end, A outputs his guess b and wins if b = 0.
Game2: The interaction between C and A during Game2 is similar to Game1, except
for the Challenge step. During the Challenge step, C simulates the execution of
Read(MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , cki∗ , p∗1, stt) using the secret key of client i∗ that the
adversary submitted during Pre-Challenge step, the most recent anonymier keys,
and the server state. After assigning two new sequential position identifiers
id∗2, id
∗
3 to p∗0, p∗1, respectively, C gives the adversarial view of this execution of
Read and the two position identifiers id∗2, id∗3 to A.
Finally, A outputs his guess b and wins the game if b = 0.
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Game3: This game is similar to Game2, except for the Pre-Challenge step. During
the Pre-Challenge step, A sends C two messages m∗0,m∗1 ∈ MSP, two sets
of target clients S∗0 , S∗1 ⊆ C \ RC , and a client i∗ ∈ S∗0 ∩ S∗1 . Then, C picks
two positions p∗0, p∗1 ←$ PSP and assigns sequential identifiers id∗0, id∗1 to them,
respectively. Next, C runs Write(MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , cki∗ , S∗0 , p∗0,m∗0, stt) and
Write(MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , cki∗ , S∗1 , p∗1, m∗1, stt+1) using the client i∗’s secret key,
the most recent anonymizer keys, and the server state. Finally, C gives the
adversarial views of these executions of Write and their corresponding position
identifiers id∗0, id∗1 to A.
At the end, A sends his guess b to C and wins the game if b = 0.
Let AdviA,Π denote A’s advantage of winning Gamei. In Lemma 5.4.2 (respectively
Lemma 5.4.4), we prove that if the underlying oABE scheme is (t, QC , QD, 1)-oABE-
IND-CPA-secure then the adversary’s advantage in distinguishing Game0 from Game1
(respectively Game2 from Game3) is at most 1. In Lemma 5.4.3, we show that if the
underlying M-ORAM scheme is (t, QC , QA, QD, 2)-M-ORAM-IND-OBC-secure then
A’s advantage in distinguishing Game1 from Game2 is at most 2. Therefore,
∣∣∣Adv0A,Π − Adv3A,Π∣∣∣ ≤ 21 + 2. 
Lemma 5.4.2: If the underlying outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption scheme Π′
is (t, QC , QD, 1)-oABE-IND-CPA-secure, then A’s advantage of distinguishing Game0
from Game1 is at most 1. In other words,
∣∣∣Adv0A,Π − Adv1A,Π∣∣∣ ≤ 1. 
Proof. We build a PPT adversary B that runs the oABE-IND-CPA game with her
challenger C ′ as follows. After receiving the master public key MPK′ of the oABE
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scheme from C ′, B executes the OGS-IND-OBC game with A in order to gain advantage
in the OGS-IND-CPA game. The details of the interaction among the adversaries C ′,
B, and A are explained below.
Setup: First, B executes (MPK′′,MSK′′, ak1, . . . , akM , st0) ← Setup′′(1λ,M) and
sets MPK := (MPK′,MPK′′). Next, she gives MPK and st0 to A and keeps
ak1, . . . , akM to herself. B also initializes the sets of revoked clients RC and
compromised anonymizers RA as empty sets.
Phase 1: B replies to A’s queries as follows.
Client secret-key query i: First, B sends a secret key query to C ′ and ob-
tains the oABE secret key ski of client i. Then, B computes ck′′i ←
KeyGen′′(MPK′′,MSK′′, i), sets cki := (ski, ck′′i ), adds i to RC , and finally
returns cki to A.
Anonymizer secret-key query j: B adds j to RA and gives akj to A. Note
that at least one anonymizer should remain uncompromised.
Revoked client write query (i, S, p,m): First, B computes the oABE ci-
phertext c← Encrypt′(MPK′, S,m). Then, she simulates Write′′(MPK′′, ak1,
. . . , akM , ck
′′
i , p, c, stt) and gives its adversarial view to A. Since A has com-
promised client i, A is allowed to see any private information visible to i,
and as a result, c is part of the adversarial view of Write as well. Therefore,
B also provides the ciphertext c to A.
Revoked client read query (i, p): First, B simulates (c, ak′1, . . . , ak′M , stt+1)
← Read′′(MPK′′, ak1, . . . , akM , ck′′i , p, stt). After that, she computes m :=
Decrypt′(MPK′, ski, c). Finally, she gives the adversarial view of this exe-
cution of Read′′, c, and m to A. The reason for returning c and m is the
same as for giving c in the revoked client write query above.
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Honest client write query (i, S,m): B picks p ←$ PSP and assigns to it a
sequential identifier id. Then, she computes ck′′i ← KeyGen′′(MPK′′,MSK′′,
i) if she has not computed ck′′i before. Next, she computes c← Encrypt′(
MPK′, S,m) and simulates Write′′(MPK, ak1, . . . , akM , ck′′i , p, c, stt). Finally,
she gives the adversarial view of this execution of Write′′ and the position
identifier id to A. B does not provide c to A since A has not corrupted i.
Honest client read query (i, id): B first maps id to the corresponding posi-
tion p. Then, she computes ck′′i ← KeyGen′′(MPK′′,MSK′′, i) if she has not
previously computed ck′′i . Next, she simulates (c, ak′1, . . . , ak′M , stt+1) ←
Read′′(MPK′′, ak1, . . . , akM , ck′′i , p, stt) and returns the adversarial view of
this execution to A. Since neither c nor the message m encrypted in c is
part of the adversarial view, B does not decrypt c or return c to A.
Pre-Challenge: B receives two messages m∗0,m∗1 ∈MSP , two sets of target clients
S∗0 , S
∗
1 ⊆ C \ RC , and a client i∗ ∈ S∗0 ∩ S∗1 from A. Then, she submits
m∗0,m
∗
1 and S∗0 , S∗1 as her challenge query to C ′. C ′ picks a random bit b′ ∈
{0, 1} and sends c′ ← Encrypt′(MPK′, S∗b′ ,m∗b′) to B. Next, B computes c ←
Encrypt′(MPK′, S∗1 ,m∗1), ck′′i∗ ← KeyGen′′(MPK′′,MSK′′, i∗), and picks two po-
sitions p∗0, p∗1 ←$ PSP and assigns sequential identifiers id∗0, id∗1 to them, re-
spectively. Next, it runs Write′′(MPK′′, ak1, . . . , akM , ck′′i∗ , p∗0, c′, stt) and Write′′(
MPK′′, ak1, . . . , akM , ck′′i∗ , p∗1, c, stt+1) and gives the adversarial views of these
executions of Write′′ and their corresponding position identifiers id∗0, id∗1 to A.
Phase 2: B responds to A’s queries similar to Phase 1 with the exception that A is
not allowed to submit any revocation query for any client i ∈ S∗0 ∪ S∗1 .
Challenge: B simulates the execution of (c, ak′1, . . . , ak′M , stt+1) ← Read′′(MPK′′,




0, stt). Next, she assigns two new sequential position identi-
fiers id∗2, id∗3 to p∗0, p∗1, respectively. Finally, she returns the adversarial view of
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Read′′, id∗2, and id∗3 to A. Note that B does not provide c to A or even attempt
to decrypt c because its not part of the adversarial view.
Phase 3: B responds to A’s queries as in Phase 2 with the usual exception that
A is not authorized to submit any honest client read queries on the position
identifiers id∗0, id∗1.
Guess: A outputs a guess b and B passes it to C ′.
Observe that if C ′ chooses b′ = 0, then B is playing Game0, whereas if b′ = 1, then
B is playing Game1. Therefore, B’s oABE-IND-CPA advantage is equivalent to A’s
advantage in distinguishing Game0 from Game1. More formally,
∣∣∣Adv0A,Π − Adv1A,Π∣∣∣ ≤ 1. 
Lemma 5.4.3: If the underlying multi-user oblivious RAM protocol Π′′ is (t, QC ,
QA, QD, 2)-M-ORAM-IND-OBC-secure, then A’s advantage of distinguishing Game1
from Game2 is at most 2. In other words,
∣∣∣Adv1A,Π − Adv2A,Π∣∣∣ ≤ 2. 
Proof. We build a PPT adversary B that runs the M-ORAM-IND-OBC game with its
challenger C ′′ as follows. After receiving, the master public key MPK′′ and the initial
server state st0 from C ′′, B executes the OGS-IND-OBC game with A in order to gain
advantage in the M-ORAM-IND-OBC game. Given below are the details.
Setup: First, B computes (MPK′, MSK′) ← Setup′(1λ, N) and initializes MPK :=
(MPK′,MPK′′). Next, she gives MPK and st0 to A. B also initializes the sets of
revoked clients RC and compromised anonymizers RA as empty sets.
Phase 1: B replies to A’s queries as follows.
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Client secret-key query i: First, B sends a client secret-key query to C ′′ and
obtains the M-ORAM secret key ck′′i of client i. Then, she computes
sk′i ← KeyGen′(MPK′,MSK′, i), sets cki := (ski, ck′′i ), adds i to RC , and
returns cki to A.
Anonymizer secret-key query j: B first adds j to RA. Next, she submits
an anonymizer secret-key query to C ′′, obtains obtains akj of anonymizer j,
and eventually passes it to A. Note that at least one anonymizer should
remain uncompromised.
Revoked client write query (i, S, p,m): First, B computes the oABE ci-
phertext c ← Encrypt′(MPK′, S,m). Then, she submits a revoked client
write query (i, p, c) to C ′′, obtains the adversarial view from C ′′, and passes
it to A. She also returns the ciphertext c to A because he has compromised
client i and, as a result, he is allowed to see any private information visible
to client i.
Revoked client read query (i, p): B first submits a revoked client read query
(i, p) to C ′′ and obtains the adversarial view and the oABE ciphertext c.
Next, she computes m := Decrypt′(MPK′, ski, c) and passes the adversarial
view, c, and m to A. The reason for returning c and m to A is the same
as for return c in the previous type of query.
Honest client write query (i, S,m): First, B computes the oABE cipher-
text c ← Encrypt′(MPK′, S,m). Then, she sends an honest client write
query (i, c) to C ′′, obtains the adversarial view and a position identifier
id, and passes them to A. B does not provide c to A since A has not
compromised the client i.
Honest client read query (i, id): B sends an honest client query (i, id) to
C ′′, obtains the adversarial view, and passes it to A.
CHAPTER 5. OBLIVIOUS GROUP STORAGE 140
Pre-Challenge: A sends to B two messages m∗0,m∗1 ∈ MSP, two sets of tar-
get clients S∗0 , S∗1 ⊆ C \ RC , and a client i∗ ∈ S∗0 ∩ S∗1 . B generates c∗0 ←
Encrypt′(MPK′, S∗0 ,m∗0), c∗1 ← Encrypt′(MPK′, S∗1 ,m∗1) and sends (c∗0, c∗1, i∗) as her
Pre-Challenge query to C ′′. C ′′ picks two positions p∗0, p∗1 ←$ PSP , assigns sequen-





0, stt) and Write′′(MPK′′, ak1, . . . , akM , ck′′i∗ , p∗1, c∗1, stt+1), and returns
the adversarial views of these executions of Write′′, id∗0, and id∗1 to B. B forwards
all these values returned by C ′′ to A.
Phase 2: B responds to A’s queries similar to Phase 1 with the exception that A is
not allowed to submit any revocation query for any client i ∈ S∗0 ∪ S∗1 .
Challenge: C ′′ picks a random bit b′′ ∈ {0, 1}, simulates the execution of Read′′(MPK′′,




b′′ , stt), assigns two new sequential position identifiers id∗2, id∗3
to p∗b′′ , p∗1−b′′ , respectively, and sends the adversarial view of of the execution of
Read′′, id∗2, and id∗3 to B. B forwards this adversarial view, id∗2, and id∗3 to A.
Phase 3: B responds to A’s queries as in Phase 2 with the exception that A is




Guess: A outputs a guess b and B sends it to C ′′.
Note that if C ′′ chooses b′′ = 0, then B is playing Game1, whereas if b′′ = 1, then B
is playing Game2. Therefore, B’s M-ORAM-IND-OBC advantage is equivalent to A’s
advantage in distinguishing Game1 from Game2. More formally,
∣∣∣Adv1A,Π − Adv2A,Π∣∣∣ ≤ 2. 
Lemma 5.4.4: If the underlying outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption scheme Π′
is (t, QC , QD, 1)-oABE-IND-CPA-secure, then A’s advantage of distinguishing Game2
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from Game3 is at most 1. More precisely,
∣∣∣Adv2A,Π − Adv3A,Π∣∣∣ ≤ 1. 
Proof. The argument is analogous to the proof of Lemma 5.4.2. 
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